Government employment and pay: the global and regional evidence

Against the background of paucity of complete and reliable data as the basis for sound policy, this article reports on the results of a major international survey of government employment and wages in about 100 countries. Key findings are that: in developing countries as a whole, relative government employment is now less than half the level of OECD countries; the reduction in the role of the state in the ‘decade of adjustment’ is striking, and so is the erosion in real government wages in the poorest countries—particularly in anglophone Africa; decentralization in Latin America is visible in the substantial shift of employment from central to subnational government levels; and the lean and well-paid civil service of East Asia is one possible reason why rapid economic growth could coexist for so long with the governance weaknesses that have surfaced in the form of the Asian crisis. The article then undertakes an aggregate cross-sectional analysis of the determinants of government employment. In Africa and Latin America, relative government employment is positively associated with per capita income and the fiscal deficit, and negatively associated with relative wages and population. Clearly, the tendency for government to expand as the economy grows—the so-called ‘Wagner law’—is still operative in developing countries. However, it seems no longer at work in OECD countries, suggesting that Wagner's law ceases to operate beyond certain per capita income level. The article concludes, nevertheless, with a reminder of the limits of cross-sectional analysis: even ‘good facts’ prove little by themselves—good analysis and policy must rest on country-specific quantitative and qualitative evidence. Copyright © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Government size and growth: Accounting for economic freedom and globalization

We examine the relationship between government size and economic growth, controlling for economic freedom and globalization, and using Bayesian Averaging over Classical Estimates in a panel of rich countries. Countries with big government have experienced above average increases in the KOF globalization index and in the Fraser institute’s Economic freedom index. To maintain comparability with earlier studies, we use two sample periods: 1970–1995 and 1970–2005. Government size robustly correlates negatively with growth. We also find some evidence that countries with big government can use economic openness and sound economic policies to mitigate negative effects of big government.     

Government growth and private contributions to charity

We exploit the time-series properties of charitable giving to provide additional insights into the relationship between charitable contributions and government spending. Cointegration tests reveal a significant long-run relationship between several categories of charitable giving and government spending. Granger causality tests provide evidence on the short-run giving and spending relationship. Evidence suggests that charitable contributions to education respond quite differently to state and local government education expenditures versus federal government expenditures. We argue that the government spending and charitable giving relationship depends on the source of government revenue, how this revenue is used, and the rational ignorance of private donors.     

Government spending and happiness of the population: additional evidence from large cross-country samples

This study uses large cross-country samples and several measures of happiness, income, and government spending to revisit the relation between government spending and the population’s happiness. The main finding is that increased government spending does not lower happiness in broad cross-country contexts. Much caution is, therefore, urged in interpreting the negative association between government spending and happiness reported in some earlier studies and the suggested policy implications. Three additional points are noted. First, the weight of the evidence suggests a significant positive association between income and happiness. Second, estimates based on income and government-share data from Penn World Table and the new International Comparison Program show similar patterns. Third, the parameter for generalized trust seems fragile.     

Government growth in the twenty-first century

Public choice explanations of government growth fall into three main categories: budget-maximization theories, rational-choice models, and path-dependent models like the “ratchet hypothesis”. The strengths and weaknesses of these theories as explanations for government growth are considered along with some facts about the actual growth of government to conjecture about its trajectory in the twenty-first century. Government size seems to have been constrained in the past primarily by its ability to raise revenue. Growth rates in the new century thus appear to depend on factors constraining government’s ability to continue to expand the tax base.     

Parties and institutions: empirical evidence on veto players and the growth of government

Does the effective number of veto players in a political system explain the rate of government growth? Panel data analyses are conducted in order to test several measures of veto players against each other, and these results are compared with similar analyses of government fractionalization. The analyses indicate that veto players and especially government fractionalization exert a constraining effect on changes in the size of government, but also that the effect is not consistent over time: neither veto players in general nor fractionalization of government in particular exerted any constraining effect during the decades of rapid government growth due to welfare state creation and expansion in the 1960s and 1970s. The strength of government fractionalization vis-a-vis the veto player measures in explaining changes in the size of government suggest that the constellation of partisan veto players within coalition governments matters, while the effect of institutional veto players remains uncertain.     

Relationships between government size and economic growth: Japan's government reforms and evidence from OECD

This paper examines the relationship between government size and economic growth of 21 industrialized countries. Government size is measured by government final consumption expenditures and transfer payments. The relationship between government consumption is expected to increase GDP growth for developing countries, and reduce it for industrialized countries. Government consumption can contribute to increased economic growth. However, government consumption is likely to expand beyond an efficient level in industrialized countries. In contrast, transfer payments, and social welfare programs are likely to reduce economic growth for most countries. These programs reduce work incentives and encourage tax avoidance activities. Work disincentives and tax avoidance reduce economic growth. These expected relationships are consistent with economic performance and government size for the countries considered here. Inefficiency and excessive government growth are checked by voter feedback as tax burdens exceed the associated benefits. Unfortunately, government program costs and benefits are asymmetrically distributed. The resulting tendency is to expand government programs, particularly programs that benefit a majority of voters at the expense of a minority. This tendency becomes even more acute as the tax system becomes more progressive (i.e., tax burdens become concentrated. Reductions in government size are more likely with stagnant or declining economic growth, and in government programs whose costs are widely shared, compared to programs with widely shared benefits and narrowly shared costs.     

New evidence on the relationship between democracy and economic growth

It is often maintained that democracy is a luxury which comes at a price in terms of subsequent slower increases in national living standards. However, various recent cross-section studies on economic growth have found evidence that lack of civil and political liberties is negatively correlated with economic growth. Using a new measure of democracy, which is based upon the number of years that a country can be regarded as a democracy, the robustness of this relationship is examined. Both direct and indirect effects of lack of democratic liberties are analysed. Our main conclusion is that the relationship between democracy and economic growth is not rubust.     

有限政府:民主政府的时代内涵

民主政府的实质是国家的一切权力属于人民,政府的权力来自于人民的授权,由于人民对政府的授权是有限的,因而,政府就必然是有限政府。鉴于市场对资源的配置起着基础性的作用,市场经济形式下的政府也只能为有限政府。有限政府是政府介入社会和市场的程度在无限政府和无为政府之间,其权力、职能、规模和行为方式上要受到法律的限制。     

Ethics and Government: Preliminary Considerations

This symposium reproduces several of the papers presented during the international conference sponsored by the Queensland University of Technology Centre for the Study of Ethics, at Parliament House, Brisbane, 11-13 February, 1999. The theme of the conference was 'Government and Business: Integrity and Accountability'. The papers have been revised following discussions within a research colloquium associated with the conference. They were initially presented within a strand entitled 'Competition, Marketisation, Public Services and Public Ethics' which explored ethical issues for contemporary government within different national contexts (New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Malaysia and Australia) around the impact of economic policies that have reframed the role of government primarily as a servant of the international market.     

Further evidence on the relationship between economic freedom and economic growth

Much of the literature on the power of elected officials and bureaucratic agencies argues, from an empirical perspective, that bureaus appears to exercise autonomy. In this paper, a theoretical model sets out the conditions under which the Congress, the President, and one agency (we use the U.S. Federal Reserve as an extended example) can dictate policy outcomes. The results of the paper include the “Congressional Dominance” theorem: If more than 2/3 of House members, and more than 2/3 of Senate members, agree on something, they get it. The theorem is obvious (the “proof” is in the U.S. Constitution), but often forgotten in the substantive literature. More realistic results are derived for situations where the preferences of members of Congress are more diverse. Powers of the President to influence policy with, and without, appointments are also analyzed.     

政府声誉、政府能力与非政府组织对政府的信任

非政府组织对政府部门的信任非常重要,政府声誉和政府能力是其重要影响因素.为了揭示政府声誉和政府能力对政府信任的影响,作者以非政府组织的项目负责人和志愿者为抽样对象,以非政府组织与政府部门的关系为背景,通过对政府声誉、政府能力与信任之间的相关分析和回归分析,分析了政府声誉、政府能力对政府信任的影响.研究表明,政府声誉、政府能力对政府信任产生正向影响,政府能力比政府声誉对政府信任的影响更加明显.因此,能否树立良好的声誉、培养较高的能力对政府部门获得非政府组织的信任与支持具有十分重要的现实意义.当然,影响非政府组织对政府部门信任的因素还包括非政府组织特征、制度特征等;研究模型可以进一步扩展,更全面地考察非政府组织与政府部门间的信任形成机制.     

政府再造与政府能力之提升

政府再造对政府而言是一场革命,其实质与终极目的就是为了提升政府能力;在当今全球化的时代,政府能力已是一国核心竞争力的综合体现。就我国政府目前的状况而言,可通过创造良好的行政文化,政府组织机构的重塑,合理的分权和权力下放,改革公共服务的提供体制,建立和推广电子政务,培养积极主动和精明强干的公务员队伍等途径来提升政府的能力。并建立健全提升政府能力的常效机制,在政府改革的动态进程中长期持续,与时俱进。