关于公民参政的“政治法”思考

发展社会主义民主政治,是中国共产党始终不渝的奋斗目标。民主政治有一个最基本的要求,就是各政治主体必须依照既定的规则和程序从事活动,所以,发展民主政治必须同健全法制紧密结合,实行依法治国方略。政治参与亦称参与政治、简称参政,既是现代政治学的一个重要术语,又是民主政治发展的一项重要内容。然而,作为主要规范政治参与行为的独立的法律部门,政治法在我国的法律体系     

论协商民主在行政决策机制中的引入

我国现行“公众参与、专家论证、政府决定”的行政决策机制由于“公众参与”之规定停留于一般要求,造成公众在机制中的“结构——过程”两阶段中角色断裂,进而使机制所追求的民主正当性目标落空。而强调公众参与的广泛与平等、重视理性与真诚协商、注重偏好转向的协商民主有助于修复行政决策中公众参与可能遗漏的民主性,美国行政决策中的协商民主在实践层面上验证了此种功能取向。由是,在我国行政决策机制中引入协商民主可成为一种增强决策过程民主性的选择性方案,更为重要的是,我国政治协商制度为此种引入提供了政治与制度基础。而协商民主要在行政决策中获得稳定性并持续发展,必需借助法律媒介使其制度化。     

司法语境下的标准建构——人权标准、法律标准、法律解释标准新探

标准作用于经济、管理有助于标准化,运用于司法则促进制度化。价值层面,抽象的司法人权转化为具体的人权标准系统;规范层面,法律规则与法律标准对于司法各有其理论优势和实践功能;方法层面,法的适用的合法与适当有赖于对法律解释标准的遵循。在司法的语境中建构标准的复合性系统,才能利用标准的若干特质与功能为司法理念与制度的完善缔造新的视角。     

规则与原则的背后——以法律的稳定性和变动性为视角

法律规则与法律原则共同构成了法律规范,一般来说,法律规则在适用中不允许进行任意的修改,以体现法律的稳定性、确定性给我们以可以预期的行为结果。但有些时候过于稳定的法律原则在个案中会引发极端不公正,在此时,法律原则由于其本身性质得以调整不公的案件。随着时代的发展和法制改革的推进,在保证法律规则稳定的前提下,重视法律原则变动性对正义的守护。     

认真对待软法——公域软法的一般理论及其中国实践

我国最近20多年的公域之治一直在实践着一种软硬兼施的混合法结构,这在相当程度上彰显出民主政治与法治建设的中国特色。本文认为,包含着大量本土性制度资源的“软法”,是一种法律效力结构未必完整、无需依靠国家强制保障实施、但能够产生社会实效的法律规范。软法与硬法同为法律的一种基本表现形式,它以不同于硬法的方式体现法律的基本特征、实现法律的主要功能,并具有严格区别于硬法的个性特征与独特功能。软法与硬法大致具有法律逻辑上的错综复杂、法律功能上的优势互补、法律规范上的相互转化三种基本关系。软硬兼施的混合法模式乃是我国解决公共问题的基本模式,这就要求我国公法学回应公域之治的现实需要,在对软法作用加以客观评析的基础上,研究探讨全面提升公域软法的理性品质,并按照宪政精神与法治原则的要求推动中国公法朝着软硬兼施的混合法结构方向发展,旨在全面实现公域之治与法治目标。     

论协商民主广泛多层制度化发展——从场域理论的视角

协商民主的广泛多层制度化发展是鼓励公众有序政治参与的新形式。它既与中国社会的多样性、复杂性相适应．也与发达国家的代表性理论具有一定的契合性。场域理论为协商民主广泛多层制度化发展提供了新的理论分析视角。本文根据实践场域客观存在的协商民主形式,从协商主体、主题、具体形式、方法、程序等方面对协商民主的广泛多层制度化发展提供经验支持．进而说明这一协商民主形式是当代中国民主政治发展的新观念和新实践。     

巴塞尔协议的性质疑析

对于巴塞尔协议及其规则的性质,目前相当流行的＂国际习惯说＂并无具体实例证明国家对于巴塞尔规则的法律确念,无法成立。＂有拘束力的建议说＂以规则的国内法属性直接推出其国际法属性,完全忽视了国际法和国内法的相对独立性。＂软法说＂的缺陷在于软法概念本身的不确定性。巴塞尔协议能否称为软法,取决于对软法概念本身的界定。巴塞尔协议本身是不具法律约束力的文件,而其中包含的规则迄今只构成＂通例＂。     

推进协商民主广泛多层制度化发展——基层民主制度的生存环境分析

基层民主制度建设是国家民主政治体系建设的重要组成部分,完善基层民主在很大程度上体现了社会主义的政治文明程度.借鉴于西方代议民主的补充——协商民主,结合在我国已得到长期实践,取得丰富宝贵经验的政治协商制度,是基层民主建设的主要实现方式.当前我国基层社会已初步具备社会主义协商民主的运行条件,政治文明建设应首先从基层民主做起,在解决问题的过程逐步实现国家民主政治建设的广泛、多层和制度化.     

环境风险的规制进路与范式重构——基于硬法与软法的二元构造

环境风险是现代国家环境治理的重要议题,规范主义和公共治理是当前环境风险规制的两种主要进路。实践中,规范主义规制模式存在规则体系的结构性不足与司法裁量的适用局限,而试图对其加以修正的公共治理模式则由于规范缺失与参与不足导致了环境风险规制的失范。从本质看,环境风险规制就是对风险中的诸多利益进行平衡与协调,规制活动应当确保合法性与回应性,故而有必要在“硬法—软法”的法理基础上重新认识环境风险规制的内涵。“硬法—软法”范式要求拓展法律的外延与规制要素,将包括公共利益在内的广泛因素纳入规制领域,完善互动协调的二元法体系以及成熟的法解释学等制度与技术支持,进而在此基础上构建环境风险规制的二元法构造模式。     

协商民主视角下农民非制度化政治参与探析

由于受到宗族势力、经济环境以及农民个人素质等多方面因素的影响,农民在政治参与过程中出现了一系列的非制度化的政治参的情况。如何从协商民主的视角规避农民的非制度化政治参与,促进农民政治参与的有序性,对当前维护农村社会稳定仍然有着重要的作用。     

协商民主理念下加拿大公众参与环境法律实施的路径选择及对我国的启示

协商民主相对于参与民主而言,通过理性的协商对话消除冲突等不和谐因素,实现公共利益,更强调参与的深度。加拿大特有的国情为协商民主的实现提供了良好的氛围,公众参与环境法律实施是其环境法制革新的民主化方向,公众以政府与公民社会新型关系的参与路径确保协商主体的平等性;公众以环保专业知识、传统生态知识参与路径促进理性协商;公众以环保社团参与路径为主确保协商的团体优势;公众的全方位救济途径确保协商民主的有效性。当前我国在协商民主大环境下,公众参与环境法律实施路径应该变"被动参与"为"主动实施";变"松散参与"为"社团参与";变"无为参与"为"专业参与";变"单一救济"为"多元救济",从而实现积极、有序和有效的公众参与环境法律实施。     

Deliberative Democracy and Liberal Rights

Many liberals cannot help distrusting deliberative democracy theory. In their view, the theory offers no sufficient guarantee that the outcomes of democratic deliberation will be respectful of individual interests generating what they conceive as basic moral rights. The purpose of this text is to provide one argument showing that liberal rights are sufficiently protected within deliberative democracy theory. The argument does not rest on the idea of moral rights or material justice. It rests on the conditions of legitimate law deliberative democracy theory presupposes, namely, the conditions that make concrete the idea of legitimacy as "actual public justification."     

“二元协商”模型对我国环境公众参与制度的启示与借鉴

环境公众参与被定位为实现环境民主的具体制度,对其制度现状的审视与制度完善的建议应纳入民主理论框架内。协商民主理论与环境公众参与具有内在关联,完整的协商民主程序应包括公众参与结构性的社会学习和政策制定这两个阶段构成的“二元协商”框架模型,该模型对于完善环境公众参与制度具有借鉴意义。社会学习阶段的审慎民意调查、网络公共论坛和民主恳谈会等形式为公众真正参与环境公共事务进行知识准备和程序训练;公众可以通过公民陪审团和社区环境活动等形式正式参与环境公共政策的制定过程。     

协商民主与农村基层民主自治制度创新——一种完善农村民主政治建设的有效路径

经过多年的实践，我国农村基层民主自治制度取得了一定程度上的进步，但是仍然存在许多问题。从政治学的角度来说，加强农村基层民主协商机制的建设是完善农村民主政治建设的有效途径，是对农村基层民主自治制度的一种创新，有利于发挥农村村民的积极性和创造性，提高农民的参政质量，增进村民和基层政府的互动，构建和谐的党政关系，从而有利于社会主义和谐农村的建设和完善。     

The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals of Constitutional Democracy

The paper is a critical survey of the last ten years of research on the principles of legitimacy of constitutional democracy and their application in practice in Europe and North America. A constitutional democracy is legitimate if it meets the test of two principles: the principles of democracy or popular sovereignty and of constitutionalism or the rule of law. There are three contemporary trends which tend to conflict with the principle of democracy and thus diminish democratic freedom. There are three responses to the lack of legitimacy of these three trends. The first is to downplay the principle of democracy in order to endorse the three trends. The second is to uphold the principle of democracy, in the form of deliberative constitutional democracy, in order to criticise aspects of the three trends and to call for further democratisation. The third trend deepens this critical response by tying the test of democratic legitimacy more closely to case studies of attempts by citizens to exercise their democratic freedom.     

Legitimacy is Not Authority

The two leading traditions of theorizing about democratic legitimacy are liberalism and deliberative democracy. Liberals typically claim that legitimacy consists in the consent of the governed, while deliberative democrats typically claim that legitimacy consists in the soundness of political procedures. Despite this difference, both traditions see the need for legitimacy as arising from the coercive enforcement of law and regard legitimacy as necessary for law to have normative authority. While I endorse the broad aims of these two traditions, I believe they both misunderstand the nature of legitimacy. In this essay I argue that the legitimacy of a law is neither necessary nor sufficient for its normative authority, and I argue further that the need for legitimacy in law arises regardless of whether the law is coercively enforced. I thus articulate a new understanding of the legitimacy and authority of law.     

Promoting Whole-Process People’s Democracy Following the Rule of Law

Whole-process people’s democracy profoundly reflects the features of socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics, and comprehensively and systematically reveals the concept of people’s democracy as providing important mechanisms of national and social governance. Based on the traditional democratic understanding of democracy as majority rule, whole-process people’s democracy emphasizes the universality and extensive range of democratic governance, but also has the natural value defects of democratic value itself. Therefore, we must organically combine democracy with the values of the rule of law and human rights, to build a well-defined governance order based on people’s democratic value. The whole process in the “whole-process people’s democracy” has really resolved the situation of people’s “absence” from many links of state power operation caused by over-emphasizing the election-democracy in the Western capitalist democratic system. Through the people’s extensive participation and effective supervision, the state power operation mechanism based on the fundamental political system, the people’s congress system, has been ensured to be always in the framework of people’s democratic governance. This effectively realizes the people’s sovereignty and is consistent with the declaration that “all power in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) belongs to the people,” stipulated in the Constitution of China. To improve the governance efficiency of whole-process people’s democracy in practice, we must bring it onto the rule of law, and use the rule of law philosophy and methods to reasonably and effectively resolve all kinds of theoretical and practical problems.     

Depoliticizing Democracy

Abstract. It is now widely accepted as an ideal that democracy should be as deliberative as possible. Democracy should not involve a tussle between different interest groups or lobbies in which the numbers matter more than the arguments. And it should not be a system in which the only arguments that matter are those that voters conduct in an attempt to determine where their private or sectional advantage lies. Democracy, it is said, should promote public deliberation among citizens and authorities as to what does best for the society as a whole and should elicit decision‐making on that basis. But the ideal of deliberative democracy has two components—the deliberative and the democratic—and often they pull apart. In this paper I look in the first section at a series of problems that arise on the deliberative front, arguing that their resolution requires various degrees of depoliticization. And then I ask in the second whether the depoliticizing responses that those problems require are antithetical to the ideal of democracy. I argue that they are not in tension with the ideal, if that ideal is cast in the relatively revisionary, two‐dimensional form that I favour.¹     

Beyond Consensus: Law, Disagreement and Democracy

Nowadays democratic liberal societies face a rising challenge in terms of fragmentation and erosion of shared values and ethical pluralism. Democracy is not anymore grounded in the possibility of a common understanding and interpretation of the same values. Neverthless, legal and political philosophy continue to focus on how to reach consensus, especially through monist, objectualist, contractualist, discursive and deliberative approaches, rather than openly affording the issue of disagreement. Far from being just a disruptive force, disagreement and conflict are matters of fact that no reflection on democracy can underevaluate. They are the major issues through which to look at the intersection of law, politics and morals. The inclusion of dissent is a powerful tool for moral recognition of different understandings of justice. That is where legal procedures become crucial. Law is a fundamental element in the building of a democracy. But it is also particularly exposed to disagreement. Language indeterminacy, dogmatic concepts and value pluralism constitute the main elements that lead to alternative and conflicting interpretations of law in a democratic framework. Major legal progress in the past has come from different understandings of the same legal materials. In this article I argue that respect for disagreement should be a moral principle in democracy and that the role of legal disagreement is essential to understand the evolution and the future directions of democracy as the government of a political community. To do so, a link between respect for disagreement and legal interpretation and argumentation must be established in order to make room for reason and avoid extreme skepticism on the contribution of law to the enforcement of democracy.     

协商民主视域下的社会管理创新问题思考

提 要：从协商民主视域创新社会管理是加强社会建设的基本要求与发展趋势.因此,充分认识协商民主视域下社会管理创新的时代价值,对协商民主视域下社会管理创新的现实问题作出分析,进一步明确协商民主对社会管理创新提出的新要求,努力探讨协商民主视域下社会管理创新的理论突破与实践选择,具有非常重要的现实意义.