Distributional coalitions,state strength,and economic growth: Toward a comprehensive theory of economic development

High-performing economies in the Asia-Pacific region together with only mediocre economic development in Latin America prompts the question of what explains differential economic growth rates among developing countries. Combining a statist perspective with Olson's theory of interest group formation, this research hypothesizes that nations with weak distributional coalitions will more likely experience high growth and state intervention will be effective. Using a longitudinal research design, this secondary analysis involves a comparative and interactive examination of eight Asian-Pacific and twelve Latin American countries. By considering the role of the state in interaction with distributional coalitions in society, the results indicate that approximately two-thirds of the variance in national economic growth is explained.     

Choosing the path of austerity: how parties and policy coalitions influence welfare state retrenchment in periods of fiscal consolidation

What are the conditions under which some austerity programmes rely on substantial cuts to social spending? More specifically, do the partisan complexion and the type of government condition the extent to which austerity policies imply welfare state retrenchment? This article demonstrates that large budget consolidations tend to be associated with welfare state retrenchment. The findings support a partisan and a politico-institutionalist argument: (i) in periods of fiscal consolidation, welfare state retrenchment tends to be more pronounced under left-wing governments; (ii) since welfare state retrenchment is electorally and politically risky, it also tends to be more pronounced when pursued by a broad pro-reform coalition government. Therefore, the article shows that during budget consolidations implemented by left-wing broad coalition governments, welfare state retrenchment is greatest. Using long-run multipliers from autoregressive distributed lag models on 17 OECD countries during the 1982–2009 period, substantial support is found for these expectations.     

Reforming the state: The policy of administrative reform in Italy under the Ciampi government

Since 1992, administrative reform has become a major theme on the Italian political agenda. This article examines the pressures leading to reform under the Ciampi government (April 1993‐May 1994). It focuses, first, on the directions to be taken by reform that were identified and, second, on their implementation. Also considered are the obstacles to reform found in the political and administrative systems. The limits to the reform and its legacy illustrate the more general problems of the Italian legal and constitutional order.     

The story of two administrative states: state capacity in Hong Kong and Singapore

Abstract

Hong Kong and Singapore are both typical administrative states with an efficient administration and a vibrant market, which had achieved rapid economic growth in the past decades. This article examines the trajectory of their state capacity, highlighting recent problems and challenges. Based on a conceptual framework that captures and links up four dimensions – namely polity, bureaucracy, economy and civil society – their commonalities and differences in response are discussed. Their experience should be of particular relevance to transitional authoritarian states in Asia such as China, which faces similar challenges to reform in the arenas of politics, administration, economics and society.     

The erosion of the administrative state under President Trump: Citizens' pushback against individual and institutional racism

President Trump encouraged bad state actors within the administrative state to contribute to inequities for civilians. We highlight how Trump's actions and rhetoric led to increased individual, institutional, and systemic racism and violence. As a response to this increased violence and rhetoric, we discuss the role civilians (including professional athletes) played in engaging in protests and the 2020 election. Given that more individuals voted in that election cycle, we emphasize the importance for public administration to adapt, evolve, and engage with new actors concerned with administrative action or inaction.     

Sectoral reallocation, distributional coalitions and the welfare state as determinants of economic growth rates in industrialized democracies

Abstract. This paper investigates three propositions about economic growth. It rejects the proposition that differences in the size of the agricultural sector or in opportunities to reallocate resources from this sector to other sectors of the economy significantly contribute to the explanation of differential growth rates among industrialized democracies. It supports Olson's proposition that long lasting democracies suffer from an accumulation of distributional coalitions whose rent-seeking activities retard economic growth. It also supports the proposition that the welfare state contributes to economic decline. Technically, this paper applies cross-sectional and pooled regression analyses of growth rates on employment in agriculture as a percentage of civilian employment, age of democracy, and social security transfers as a percentage of GDP. Data refer to the 1960–82 period and 19 nations.     

The administrative state and fiscal policy: A comparative analysis of political issues in China and the United States

This article examines the budgetary politics in China and the United States. It illustrates the inherent political nature of fiscal policies produced by different political and economic systems. Although both countries are concerned with the distributive effects of reform, the study indicates that the central government of China confronts issues related to the distribution of power between the center and the provinces during economic transformation. In contrast, the debate in the United States is produced by the distribution of costs and benefits brought about by federal fiscal policy. The context of the debate is influenced, in part, by the administrative state.     

Wisconsin's Budget Deficit: Size, Causes, Remedies, and Consequences

Wisconsin's lawmakers increased spending and cut taxes during the 1990s. Then, in January of 2001, they faced an estimated $2.4 billion budget gap or deficit for the FY 2001–2003 biennium. They cut spending and generated additional revenue by borrowing against future tobacco settlement income. Still, by January of 2002, the estimated deficit had grown by an additional $1.3 billion, and more cutting and borrowing took place. Despite these actions, a $3.5 billion deficit was projected for FY 2003–2005. In this study, the causes of the deficit, the "remedies" selected, and their effects are examined. "Lessons" highlighted by Wisconsin's experience include the risks associated with nonincremental policy making, the high costs of excessive political partisanship, and the corrosive effects of "fiscal brinksmanship."     

How some rules just don't matter: The regulation of lobbyists

Brinig, Holcombe, and Schwartzstein (1993) have argued recently that lobby regulation restricts entry into the population of lobbying organizations, and that the number of lobbying organizations then influences legislative activity. However, they analyze only the relationship between the restrictiveness of lobby regulation and legislative activity, thereby assuming that regulation actually reduces numbers of registered interest organizations. We test this assumption with data on state interest organization populations and find little support for it. We consider several other explanations and comment more generally on the status of institutions and their rules in the study of political phenomena.     

Explaining the formation of minimal coalitions: Anti-system parties and anti-pact rules

Abstract.  Recent theoretical arguments hold that the institutional setting of a political system influences coalition formation. Empirical analyses that confront these hypotheses have, however, been slow to emerge. We provide a first test of the relation between coalition formation and one element within this institutional setting: the existence of commitments not to join forces with certain 'pariah' parties (i.e., anti-pact rules). Specifically, we study the effect of the 'cordon sanitaire' around the Flemish extreme right-wing party Vlaams Blok over the period from 1976 to 2000. The results show that the refusal to coalesce with Vlaams Blok significantly affects the probability that 'minimal winning', 'minimal number' and 'minimal size' coalitions are formed.     

Advocacy coalitions and the practice of policy analysis

Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (above) have presented a framework for describing the processes by which public policies change over time, and Heintz and Weyant (above) have provided an array of case studies illustrating and elaborating those processes. This article will focus explicitly on the manner in which the advocacy coalition framework bears on the practice of policy analysis, both from the perspective of the manager of analytical resources, and from the perspective of the practicing policy analyst.     

Interest groups and the regulation of pesticides: Congress,coalitions, and closure

This article is essentially a rejoinder to Christopher Bosso's piece, Transforming Adversaries Into Collaborators: Interest groups and the regulation of chemical pesticides, which appeared in this journal (21: 3–22). The case of pesticides regulation is re-examined and some new insights are offered. At the center of Bosso's argument is the contention that Congress is passive. John Kingdon's agenda/alternative distinction is utilized to arrive at an alternative way to think about the role of Congress in today's permeable pressure system.     

Policy making and collective action: Defining coalitions within the advocacy coalition framework

Research on policy communities, policy networks, and advocacy coalitions represents the most recent effort by policy scholars in North America and Europe to meaningfully describe and explain the complex, dynamic policy making processes of modern societies. While work in this tradition has been extraordinarily productive, issues of collective action have not been carefully addressed. Focusing on the advocacy coalitions (AC) framework developed by Sabatier (1988) and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) as an example of a productive research program within the policy network tradition, this article (1) examines the potential of the AC framework, with its emphasis on beliefs, policy learning, and preference formation, to provide richer explanations of policy making processes than frameworks grounded exclusively in instrumental rationality; (2) suggests that paradoxically, however, the AC framework can more fully realize its potential by admitting the explanations of collective action from frameworks based on instrumental rationality; (3) incorporates within the AC framework accounts of how coalitions form and maintain themselves over time and of the types of strategies coalitions are likely to adopt to pursue their policy goals; and (4) derives falsifiable collective action hypotheses that can be empirically tested to determine whether incorporating theories of collective action within the AC framework represents a positive, rather than a degenerative, expansion of the AC framework.     

Industrialists and farmers: British interests and the European community

The ‘Europeanisation’ of domestic public policies has been among the key themes in recent reforms in EU member states. This article employs the analytical concept of ‘isomorphism’ to come to a better understanding of ‘Europeanisation’. Various mechanisms which might lead to isomorphic change are being identified and applied to the reforms in German competition and public procurement law. The application of the isomorphism framework suggests that ‘Europeanisation’ has multiple sources and cannot be understood as a uniform process nor as leading to uniform outcomes.     

Balancing inside and outside lobbying: The political strategies of lobbyists at global diplomatic conferences

This article seeks to explain the use of inside and outside lobbying by organised interests at global diplomatic conferences. At first sight, the lobbying at these venues is puzzling as it does not seem to be a very fruitful way to acquire influence. The use of outside strategies especially is perplexing because most aspects of international negotiations fall outside of the purview of national constituencies. It is argued in this article, however, that the presence of outside lobbying is not so puzzling if lobbying is seen both as a way to attain influence and as a way to pursue organisational maintenance goals. Empirically, the article draws on interview data with 232 interest group representatives that participated at either the 2012 session of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Geneva, or the 2011 (Durban) and 2012 (Doha) United Nations Climate Conferences. The analysis demonstrates that organisational needs, and especially the competition actors face in obtaining resources, significantly affects the relative focus of organised interests on inside and outside lobbying.