Interest group dynamics in a weak and transitional state: the case of Bolivia

Bolivia's political development has been characterized by elitist control set in an environment of political instability and a weak decentralized state. Since the 1980s and Bolivia's transition to a limited form of democracy, this elitist control has been successfully challenged from the left and, since the early 2000s, particularly by the indigenous population. In fact, Bolivian contemporary politics and interest group activity have been shaped mainly by the rise in political power of the left and indigenous interests. This rise, given a weak state transitioning to limited democracy, has had several consequences for interest group activity that add increasing complexity to the group system. One consequence of Bolivia's course of political development is that, although it exhibits many common elements of interest group activity explained by existing group theories, aspects of its group development are not adequately accounted for by these theories. In addition, there are questions about whether the new configuration of interest groups promotes or undermines democracy. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Kosovo: The development of interest groups in a fragile democracy

Kosovo offers a unique opportunity to study interest groups in both a transitional political system and a new country. As the youngest of the Balkan countries, both its pluralist democracy and its interest group system are in the early stages of development. The most significant influence on this development was Kosovo's grueling fight for independence from Serbia in the 1990s. This produced a particular form of interest and interest group activity quite different from most political systems in transition to democracy. As in all such systems, however, Kosovo's group system has also been shaped by its political culture, socioeconomic, including religious, factors, and particularly the international community. This article explains the various factors that shaped early interest group activity, its characteristics, and how it has evolved into a more traditional group system but one that remains bifurcated.     

Can't get no satisfaction with the Westminster model? Winners,losers and the effects of consensual and direct democratic institutions on satisfaction with democracy

Are citizens in consensus democracies with developed direct democratic institutions more satisfied with their political system than those in majoritarian democracies? In this article, individual‐level data from the second wave of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and an updated version of Lijphart's multivariate measure of consensus and majoritarian democracy covering 24 countries are used to investigate this question. The findings from logistic multilevel models indicate that consensual cabinet types and direct democratic institutions are associated with higher levels of citizens' satisfaction with democracy. Furthermore, consensus democracy in these institutions closes the gap in satisfaction with democracy between losers and winners of elections by both comforting losers and reducing the satisfaction of winners. Simultaneously, consensus democracy in terms of electoral rules, the executive–legislative power balance, interest groups and the party system reduces the satisfaction of election winners, but does not enhance that of losers.     

A mirror of the ethnic divide: Interest group pillarization and elite dominance in Bosnia and Herzegovina

To date, there is no comprehensive treatment of interests and interest groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). This article seeks to fill that gap. It does so by explaining that interest groups reflect the country's complex political system with multiple levels of power sharing along societal cleavages. Political parties are the major power centers, and the link between ethnicity and party allegiance is most significant in defining the role of interest groups. The result is a pillarized (separate, intragroup) and bifurcated group system with 3 separate interest group subsystems with little interchange between them. This fragmentation has been challenged by international institutional organizations promoting multiethnic interests. Nevertheless, with the persistence of many informal interests, the group system is stymied in moving toward an integrated system, a development that is key to strengthening BiH's consociational democracy.     

The changing politics of lobbying: private sector organizations in Mexico

This article analyzes how the relations between Mexico's private sector, particularly that of business power groups and interest groups, and the political elite changed as a result of processes of neo-liberalization and democratization from the early 1980s through the presidency of Vicente Fox (2000–2006). The analysis provides several insights into Mexico's developing interest group system during these years and particularly that of business interests. On the one hand, the changes increased political pluralism, the number of groups operating, and their lobbying options and helped move Mexico toward liberal democracy. On the other hand, with its major resources and political connections, big business was able to maintain, in fact enhance, its political status, whereas small business was less politically successful. Moreover, many old political practices used by big business to influence government persist as well as skepticism among the public regarding democratic institutions. As a consequence, this article argues that despite the new developments in political advocacy, the continuation of traditional political practices presents obstacles to the development of interest group activity resulting in a plutocratic element to Mexico's emerging democracy. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Constituency Opinion and PAC Contributions: A Case of the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League

To test whether interest group politics doharm to a representative democracy, thispaper simulates congressionaldistrict-level constituency opinion onabortion. Analyzing the relationshipbetween the constituency opinion andNARAL's contributions in the 102nd and103rd Congresses, this paper presentsempirical evidence that NARAL'scontribution decision is influenced byconstituency opinion. The evidence,however, is mixed. Constituency opinioninfluences NARAL's decision on who will getits money. Constituency opinion, however,does not influence NARAL's decision on whowill get more money. According to theseresults, financial representation byinterest groups does not seriously causeharm to a representative democracy, but itcan still bias the representativeness tosome extent. An interest group may selectlegislators whose districts support itsposition less strongly and contribute agreater amount of money to the legislators.     

‘Illiberal Democracy’ after Post-Democracy: Revisiting the Case of Hungary

In taking stock of the ruling Fidesz party's project of ‘illiberal democracy’ in Hungary, this article first develops considerations based on Claude Lefort's democratic theory for critiquing ‘illiberal democracy’ and post-democracy alike, situating the former in an early 2010s post-democratic moment characterised by the emergence of a neoliberal crisis management regime in the Eurozone. ‘Illiberal democracy’ and ‘market-conforming democracy’ are both problematic from this standpoint insofar as they subordinate the key Lefortian dimension of democratic contestation to either the primacy of the markets or a reified conception of the ‘national interest’ as represented by a single party. The analysis then traces the development of ‘illiberal democracy’ and its construction of key signifiers such as the ‘national interest’ in programmatic speeches made by Viktor Orbán, from its beginnings in the post-democratic moment to subsequent crisis conjunctures in which it has redefined itself against ever newer threats.     

Interest groups in Venezuela: lessons from the failure of a ‘Model Democracy’ and the rise of a Bolivarian democracy

This article uses the Venezuelan case to shed light on the potential role of interest-group systems in discrediting liberal democracies and to identify challenges that the region's democracies are likely to confront in constructing effective and fair interest-group systems. It first analyzes the role Venezuela's interest groups played in discrediting its 40-year two-party democracy. It argues that the discrediting of a system heralded by many as the region's ‘model democracy’ cannot be understood by merely assessing how the structure of the group system excluded certain groups. The study shows that the inclusion of certain business interests in visible positions of power also helped discredit the two-party democracy. The article then compares the above system with the new group system which has emerged since 1998 as part of a new democratic system inspired by Latin America's 19th century Liberator, Simón Bolívar. This comparison reveals that the current system inverts the former system of inclusion and exclusion, even as it has retained a number of the old system's less virtuous features. The implications of the Venezuelan case for the region's democracies are elaborated in the conclusion. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Direct Democracy and its Critics: Support for Direct Democracy and ‘Stealth’ Democracy in Finland

In this article support for direct democracy and for stealth democracy in Finland is analysed. Stealth democracy represents a step towards a democracy in which there would be even less citizen involvement than in the representative form of today's democracy. The authors found that both options gained significant support among the Finnish electorate. Additionally, they found that it is mostly the same variables that contribute to the probability of citizens being supporters of either direct democracy or stealth democracy. It is the people with less education, who do not know much about politics and who feel that the current system does not respond to citizens' needs, that want change. The direction of change appears to be a matter of secondary interest. Political ideology affects which of the two options respondents favour. Right-wing citizens are more likely to favour stealth democracy. Citizens leaning to the left are more interested in direct democracy.     

The Convention Experience: Between Rhetoric and Participation

Abstract

This article investigates the participation of interest groups in the EU's Constituional Convention and their contribution to the debate on participatory democracy and EU governance. I argue that the constitutional moment prompted interest groups to define their priorities beyond focused policy issues to include wider principles of governance. While the Convention process was more inclusive that any previous treaty reform procedure, its institutional set up was a constraint to improving citizen participation either directly or via interest groups. The Convention reproduced a model of closed elitist politics which did not communicate sufficiently with the citizens, while the role of interest groups was restricted by a Convention designed as a drafting phase in preparation for the real decisive phase during the IGC. Despite the impact of specific domestic contexts, the ‘no’ votes in France and the Netherlands proved that civil society and participation were rhetorical devices deployed during the Convention to gain legitimacy rather than a genuine move towards a more pluralistic EU democracy capable of deploying effective mechanisms of active citizen participation.     

The Political Economy of Unmediated Democracy: Italian Austerity under Mario Monti

This article explores the political economy of reform under the technocratic government of Mario Monti. Unlike the technocratic governments of the 1990s, the Monti interregnum was an experiment in unmediated democracy, in which a government is actively supported neither by political parties nor by encompassing social groups. Italian political leaders adopted unmediated democracy because of the underlying interest group conflicts in the Italian political economy. Unmediated democrats such as Monti can impose bitter medicine on a stalemated society when it is in a stage of acute crisis, but the passage of longer-term reforms requires a social coalition to support those reforms beyond the critical stage of crisis. Thus the government implemented budget cuts, but liberalisation and institutional reform stalled in the face of opposition. Italy is unlikely to be durably reformed by a government that is not anchored to society through political parties or interest groups.     

Opus Dei and Mexico: Civil but Sinister?

Are voluntary organizations an essential ingredient of democratization, and if so, does that include the vast number of voluntary organizations, such as the Opus Dei, which appear to be authoritarian in their internal affairs? Do groups whose goals and internal structure have little relationship to the nurturing of democracy nevertheless contribute to a democratic culture? Discussing such questions is one of the main burdens of this article, which on that respect is a contribution to the now‐growing volume of literature about political transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The problems presented by such groups as Opus Dei are an illustrative case in weighing the contributions of Latin American volunteerism to democratization. The Catholic Church has had a more than passing interest in which nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) would be successful in Mexico and which would not. It has encouraged some NGOs—Opus Dei being, we think, a strong case in point.     

Letter from Ankara

This article focuses on the relationship between discourses of economic development and prospects for democracy in Turkey. It does so by tracing the political discourse of high‐ranking government officials and journalists close to them to show how they use arguments for economic development as a tool to politically legitimise interventions into liberal democracy. I first illustrate the dangers caused by the discourse surrounding economic development to democracy by looking at the Gezi protests. I show how demands for pluralism and respect for different lifestyles—which are crucial aspects of liberal democracy—were instead framed by the government as chaos created by agents of the so‐called ‘interest rate lobby’ and provocations caused by those who want to stop Turkey's economic development. I analyse Gezi in comparative perspective with presidentialism debates and the corruption scandal of December 2013. In these cases too, demands for democracy, transparency, checks and balances are pitted against economic development. Citizens are made to choose between a vaguely defined notion of economic development and democratisation.     

The Quality of Representation and Satisfaction with Democracy: The Consequences of Citizen-Elite Policy and Process Congruence

Citizen-elite congruence has long been considered an important yardstick for the quality of democracy. The literature on citizen satisfaction with democracy, however, has reduced congruence almost exclusively to one of its components, policy congruence. Just as citizens are considered to have positions on policy issues, there is growing scholarly interest in the preferences they have about the process of representation. Yet studies inquiring into the impact of the divergent preferences that citizens and elites have regarding the representational process thus far have been few and their results inconclusive. Combining new, unique data from the 2014 Belgian Election and Candidate Studies, we seek to address this lacuna. Our findings indicate that we cannot understand citizen satisfaction without also taking process into account—even as the policy gap has the greater effect. They should be of interest to scholars of democracy, those concerned about citizen disengagement from politics, and political practitioners.     

Lobbying in developing countries: The Peruvian case

In the transparent exercise of democracy, there is a technique of persuasion called lobbying. The technique involves applying persuasion by representing one's own interests or the interests of third parties. In literature, lobbying is therefore related to interest groups and pressure groups. It is considered a key tool to guarantee equal conditions in the decision‐making process that promotes democracy and citizen control is transparency. Lobbying, also called interest management, is a legitimate activity that in Latin America has a bad press and consequently a bad reputation. However, it is a very important input into the democratic process. According to the NGO Legislative Directory: “It allows the general public to engage in the public decision‐making process, and it has the potential to improve the quality of public decisions by opening channels for diverse opinions and thematic experts.” It is an activity that is put into practice in all countries of the world and that has a regulatory background in most countries of the northern hemisphere and in some South American countries such as Peru and Chile. The general spirit of these norms is to “transform a suspected irregular activity into a deliberation and democratic game,” justify the Legislative Directory.     

协商民主研究综述

随着中国社会主义市场经济体制的不断发展和完善,中国社会结构分化日益加剧,新的利益主体的不断涌现,社会不稳定因素增多,凸显出的一些问题与矛盾使得某些现有政治运行体制运作的乏力,日益凸显协商民主的作用.     

Interest groups and policy volatility

We offer a model of how interest groups affect policy stability. The relationship between interest group density and policy volatility is concave because of two forces: (a) the number and interaction of interest groups in a policy domain and (b) the effect of this interaction on policy image and attention. After laying out the logics of both processes, we identify three ideal type situations: (a) capture (low interest group density, low attention) and (b) deadlock (high interest group density, high attention) lead to low levels of policy volatility while (c) lability (medium interest group density, intermittent attention) leads to high levels of policy volatility. For our empirical evidence, we rely on all budget functions in the American states from 1984 to 2010 and employ generalized additive regression modeling. The article contributes to the literature on understanding interest group strategies, interest group influence in policy making, and broader questions of deliberative democracy.     

The mass media's dual role: ‘watchdog’ and guardian of their own interests

The mass media are a special case of interest articulation in a democracy because they play two distinct roles. On the one hand, mass media provide information about efforts by various interest groups to influence public policy. On the other hand, being interest groups themselves, the mass media work to protect and advance their own interests. This article examines the compatibility of these two roles in Argentina and Uruguay by placing this in a broader discussion about the role of lobbying in democratic societies. The evidence suggests that despite impediments to the media's ability to fulfill both roles simultaneously, some have performed a credible job. The best explanation for the variance in performance among the media outlets includes a combination of the following factors: the size and density of the media market, patterns of media ownership, the relative strength of the state vis-à-vis the media, levels of public advertising, and the particular practices adopted by individual media companies. Evidence suggests that neither the traditional distinction between corporatist and pluralist societies nor government regulation of lobbying plays a dominant role in determining the media's performance. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Competition and interaction: Party ties to interest groups in a multidimensional policy space

Political parties and interest groups play a vital role in incorporating societal interests into democratic decision-making. Therefore, explaining the nature and variation in the relationship between them will advance our understanding of democratic governance. Existing research has primarily drawn attention to how exchange of resources shapes these relationships largely neglecting the role of contextual conditions. Our contribution is to examine whether parties’ structured interactions with different categories of interest groups vary systematically with the pattern of party competition at the level of policy dimensions. First, we argue that higher party fragmentation in a policy space makes organisational ties to interest groups more likely, due to fears of voter loss and splinter groups. Second, we expect higher polarisation between parties on a policy dimension to make ties to relevant groups less likely due to increased electoral costs. We find support for both expectations when analysing new data on 116 party units in 13 mature democracies along nine different policy dimensions. Our findings underline the value of considering the strategic context in which parties and interest groups interact to understand their relationship. The study sheds new light on parties and interest groups as intermediaries in democracy and contributes to a new research agenda connecting interest group research with studies of parties’ policy positions and responsiveness.     

Technocratic attitudes: a citizens’ perspective of expert decision-making

Despite repeated appointments of technocratic governments in Europe and increasing interest in technocracy, there is little knowledge regarding citizens’ attitudes towards technocracy and the idea of governance by unelected experts. This article revisits normative debates and hypothesises that technocracy and democracy stand in a negative relationship in the eyes of European citizens. It tests this alongside a series of hypotheses on technocratic attitudes combining country-level institutional characteristics with individual survey data. While findings confirm that individual beliefs about the merits of democracy influence technocratic attitudes, two additional important factors are also identified: first, levels of trust in current representative political institutions also motivate technocratic preferences; second, historical legacies, in terms of past party-based authoritarian regime experience, can explain significant cross-national variation. The implications of the findings are discussed in the broader context of citizen orientations towards government, elitism and the mounting challenges facing representative democracy.