韩国资本市场法上内幕交易规制研究

韩国通过制定、实施资本市场法,进一步完善了对内幕交易行为的规制力度。该法扩大了内幕人员和内幕信息的范围,强化和完善了对公开收购、大量取得或处分股份过程中的内幕交易行为的规制,完善和强化对内幕交易行为的民事、行政和刑事责任等。在我国完善证券法、期货交易法律、刑法等立法过程中,韩国资本市场法的许多规定和做法均值得我国借鉴。     

Insider trading and the public enforcement of private prohibitions: some complications in enforcing simple rules for a complex world

Accepting the argument made by Manne, Epstein and others that firms wishing to allow their employees to insider trade should be permitted to do so, this article shows that there is still a crucial role for government in regulating insider trading. In particular, allowing employees to profit by insider trading is a form of employee compensation that, in contradistinction from conventional forms of equity compensation, results in unknowable and effectively unlimited costs to the company. Since providing employee compensation in this form causes the company to lose control of its compensation expense, even if insider trading were legal, virtually every company would rely on conventional forms of employee compensation and prohibit its employees from insider trading. But, pace Manne, Epstein and others, companies lack the means to detect insider trading by their employees, and even when they do catch employees insider trading, companies can impose only mild contractual sanctions, generally not exceeding disgorgement of profits and dismissal. As a result, although an efficient agreement between a company and its employee would prohibit the employee from insider trading, this prohibition cannot be effectively enforced by the company. Government, with its usual law enforcement powers, is better able to detect insider trading and can impose more severe sanctions on violators, including criminal penalties. Government should thus enforce a ban on insider trading in those instances, which will be virtually all instances, in which a company prohibits its employees from insider trading. The efficient solution is thus a hybrid system of private prohibition and public enforcement. Such a system is not unusual but the norm. Employers prohibit employees from embezzling their money and stealing their property, and employees are subject to contractual sanctions and dismissal for violating these prohibitions, but we still need statutes against theft to generate an optimal level of deterrence. This is all the more true when the employee misappropriates information, which is much harder to detect than a theft of money or property.

     

证券内幕交易主体识别的理论基础及逻辑展开

在我国法律制度中,规定证券内幕交易主体的法律用语有"内幕信息的知情人"、"非法获取内幕信息的人"和"任何知情人",但主体范围并未清晰界定。内幕交易主体立法应以"信息平等理论"为基础、以"(任何)知情人"为统一立法用语、以"行为识别主义"为实践导向和主体类型化依据,其内在逻辑方为畅达,我国现行法律制度应据此作出修改。     

反内幕交易法的公平性基础——从内幕交易“无损害”假说谈起

内幕交易是否违反法律的公平 ,多有争议。内幕交易“无损害”是反对以法律方式禁止内幕交易的逻辑起点。本文在介绍无损害性假说并对之提出针对性的批判之后 ,循着“以人为中心的公平”的论证体系 ,对内幕交易的不公平性作了分析 ,为反内幕交易法的公平性基础提供了新的理论构架。     

Regulating information flows: Is it just? Insider trading and mandatory-disclosure rules from a free-market perspective

Much of Henry Manne’s work on insider trading emphasised that this practice enhances quick dissemination of information and ultimately efficiency. In this paper, we draw attention to the fact that regulating insider trading encroaches upon the foundations of a free-market economy, and boils down to a question of envy, rather than justice. In particular, there is nothing undesirable, fraudulent or shameful in a process through which selected agents (the insiders) transform dispersed information into specialised knowledge, and make use of it. One may be envious that insiders make a profit or avoid a loss thanks to their privileged position. Yet, insiders do not steal any information and do not violate any property right. Their only constraint is an explicit contractual agreement with their employer. In that case, the government might be required to enforce the contract. Regulation would be illegitimate.     

股份回购中内幕交易行为之证券法规制

在公司股份回购过程中,容易产生内幕交易等证券违法行为。美、日等国家一般在放松公司股份回购的同时,在证券法中加强对内幕交易等证券违法行为的联动规范。但我国在公司法中增加股份回购事由的规定时,并未在证券法中对信息披露、内幕交易行为作联动规范。鉴于此,我们应在证券法中针对股份回购中的内幕交易行为作联动规范,将公司规定为内幕人员;股份回购行为本身构成应披露的内幕信息;限制内部人交易本公司的股份;同时还应禁止公司的短线交易行为。     

Insider Cyber-threats: Problems and Perspectives

In many jurisdictions, the issues concerning computer misuse have, in the main, tended to concentrate upon the increasing threats from outside the organization, whilst largely ignoring the threats posed to the organization by the insider. This research note will focus on the broader issue of the threats, and the dilemma posed, to the organization by insiders as well as the legal challenges that insiders present to the courts. It will review how the courts have tended to protect computer owners or employer organizations against the insiders, despite their own misconception over what constitutes unauthorized access, as envisaged by the Computer Misuse Act 1990. This focus upon the insider threat is particularly useful in understanding how the interpretation of computer misuse within organizations can be mediated through the notion of opportunity. On the one hand, the electronic office provides insiders with ample opportunities to threaten their employer organizations. Yet on the other hand, the availability of technology in the work environment suggests that increasingly surveillance and control of employees are no longer a distant possibility.     

Difficulties in the criminal prosecution of insider trading—A clinical study of the Bekaert case

If the enforcement of insider trading prohibition is of crucial importance to ensure the integrity of financial markets, then the current criminal prosecution in Europe fails in reaching this goal. This article illustrates several difficulties in prohibiting and prosecuting insider trading by using a clinical study of the Belgian industrial company Bekaert, NV. It is shown that courts currently seem to lack knowledge of the functioning of financial markets to assess an insider trading case. Therefore their decisions give little guidance to future litigants. Using, a law and economics framework, this clinical study is clarifying in several aspects compared to a traditional legal analysis. The analysis focuses on two aspects of an insider trading case. First, the price-sensitive character of the information is examined. Second, the standard of proof is examined. JEL classification G14 · K22 · K42     

The Effectiveness of Insider Trading Regulation in Italy. Evidence from Stock-Price Run-Ups Around Announcements of Corporate Control Transactions

All developed countries and most emerging countries restrict insider trading in the belief that it may undermine investors' confidence and the integrity of financial markets.Such regulation, however, has proved to be relatively ineffective almost everywhere, as shown by the records on convictions in the last few decades and by the pervasiveness of insider trading signalled by stock-price run-ups around announcements of private information.Identifying illegal insider transactions may be difficult: the private information must be material, i.e. price-sensitive, and in some countries prosecutors have to prove the use of such information by corporate insiders. Moreover, the investigative powers of the enforcing Authority may be weak and the deterrence of criminal sanctions may be diminished by lengthy proceedings, especially when alternatives, such as administrative fines and civil actions, do not exist.To date, the Italian legal system has experienced great difficulty in detecting and punishing illegal insider trading. Since they were first enacted in 1991, the insider trading rules have led to two convictions and to a very low ratio of prosecutions to allegations of illegal trading. Moreover, leakage of private information appears to be widespread, given that news about firm-specific events seems to be incorporated in stock prices long before it is disclosed in public announcements.This paper examines the effectiveness of Italian insider trading legislation by focusing, among other things, on the stock-price run-up around announcements of corporate events. In particular, after a brief survey of earlier research on legal and illegal insider trading and on the most important weaknesses in the Italian legal framework, standard event-study methodology is used to analyse stock-price run-ups around 29 announcements of corporate control transactions in the period 1998–2000. Indicators of the leakage of non-public material information are then constructed, showing that securities prices follow similar patterns regardless of whether insider trading is likely to have occurred. This evidence raises questions as to the efficacy of Italian insider trading regulation and the paper concludes with some suggestions as to how it could be improved.     

论“光大证券事件”中的期货内幕交易

光大证券在期货市场的交易行为是否构成内幕交易值得深究。从解释论的角度看,证监会的处罚没有说明为何光大证券属于内幕知情人,通过对《期货交易管理条例》第82条第12项的解释,应当认为光大证券作为期货投资者,不属于期货内幕知情人,因而不构成期货内幕交易;从英、美两国的规定看,无论是通过对期货内幕人范围的限定还是规定相应的抗辩事由,比较法上的经验都说明了并非利用重大非公开的信息都可构成内幕交易;分析期货市场的特殊性,可以发现期货市场的主要功能是套期保值,而套期保值者相比于投机者具有不可避免的市场信息优势,为了实现套期保值与市场的流动性,利用信息优势进行期货交易属于期货市场的惯常做法;"光大证券乌龙指事件"给资本市场造成了很大的冲击,但在我国期货监管机构以及交易所对该种异常情形缺乏规定的情况下,其利用信息优势进行套期保值,仍然属于该惯常做法的范围内;若监管机构拟对这类行为进行规制,应该事先制定例外规则,对特定类型的做空交易进行限制。     

Regulated and unregulated insider trading around earnings announcements

This paper analyses insider trading behaviour around annual and interim earnings announcements during changing legislative environments in Sweden from 1980 to 2003. Using a unique data set, we are able to explore the nature of insider trading patterns from unregulated to strongly regulated insider trading markets. We find limited evidence of opportunistic insider trading. Insiders seem to be reluctant to sell stocks before positive earnings announcements. They also tend to time their trades in conjunction with an immediate post-announcement period, i.e. “safety trading”, which becomes more evident within stronger legislation environments. Some support for contrarian trading behaviour is also found.

Trading when you cannot trade: Blackout periods in Italian firms

This paper is part of the general debate concerning corporate governance. It focuses on a mechanism of self-regulation geared at avoiding market abuses: the use of blackout periods during which insiders are temporarily prohibited from trading on the market. Data concerning corporate characteristics, blackout periods, and internal dealing, seem to indicate that companies with a large number of independent directors and a consistent ability to monitor are more likely to adopt blackout periods. However, the research shows that during 2003 insiders did not comply with Italy's Code of Best Practice; they did not totally refrain from trading during the assigned blackout periods. All three variables measuring frequency trading – the numbers of transactions carried out, of active insiders, and of shares traded – were statistically significant during the specified blackout periods. Therefore, this paper could have practical implications for policy makers. If they decide to adopt self-regulation to fight market abuses, they must be aware that a law is only as effective as its enforcement.     

公司取得自己股份法律问题研究

公司取得自己股份是指公司取得并持有了自己发行在外的股票。世界各国对公司取得自己股份问题主要分为两种立法模式 :一种是规定公司可以取得自己的股份 ,以美国为代表 ;另一种是采取“原则禁止 ,例外许可”的限定模式 ,如德国、法国、日本等国。我国的公司法应借鉴大陆法系国家的立法 ,在原则禁止的前提下 ,许可公司取得自己的股份 ,并就取得自己股份的事由、方式、程序、后果等事项作出具体的法律规定。     

论我国上市公司内部监督机制模式的选择--兼及独立董事与监事会的关系

为了完善上市公司治理结构,防止内部人控制,保护中小股东的利益,我国引入了英美法上的独立董事制度.中国引进和移植独立董事制度必须联系中国的实际情况,处理好其本土化问题,特别是要协调好与监事会的关系,这将决定着独立董事制度在中国的移植能否成功.通过对独立董事制度与监事会制度的关系进行比较,指出我国新<公司法>应授权上市公司在其章程中任意选择采用单层制或双层制公司监督机制模式.     

Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary Comparative Evidence

Despite the long-standing insider trading debate, there is littleempirical research on insider trading laws, especially in acomparative context. The article attempts to fill that gap.I find that countries with more prohibitive insider tradinglaws have more diffuse equity ownership, more accurate stockprices, and more liquid stock markets. These findings are generallyrobust to controlling for measures of disclosure and enforceabilityand suggest that formal insider trading laws (especially theirdeterrent components) matter to stock market development. Thearticle suggests further avenues of empirical research on thespecific mechanisms through which insider trading laws mightmatter and the political economy of their adoption.     

内幕交易规制的立法体系进路：域外比较与中国选择

内幕交易监管全球化背景下,当代世界各国规制内幕交易的立法体系可以归纳为信义进路与市场进路。信义进路的发展历史,就是一部不断拓宽信义义务人范围边界与判断其交易主观状态的历史;市场进路的发展历史,就是一部限缩或废除内幕交易认定的主体与主观要件与完善内幕交易客观构成要素的历史。中国资本市场内幕交易难以禁止的现实困境,实则是内幕交易行为构成体系逻辑混乱的一个映射,并已对内幕交易行为认定与责任追究构成妨碍。就内幕交易规制立法体系变革方向而言,我国目前不宜引入信义进路,而市场进路或许更适合我国法制传统和资本市场实际。在市场进路指引下,任何不当使用内幕信息的行为皆应被认定为内幕交易,废除现行法中关于内幕交易行为构成的主体要件和主观要件,同时完善客体要件和客观要件,既能推助内幕交易规制立法的功能实现,又可彰显证券法的核心宗旨和基本原则,或为契合本土实际并体现世界最新立法趋势的内幕交易立法改革方案。     

Using Author Topic to detect insider threats from email traffic

One means of preventing insider theft is by stopping potential insiders from becoming actual thieves. This article discusses an approach to assist managers in identifying potential insider threats. By using the Author Topic [Rosen-Zvi Michal, Griffiths Thomas, Steyvers Mark, Smyth Padhraic. The author-topic model for authors and documents. In: Proceedings of the 20th conference on uncertainty in artificial intelligence; 2004. p. 487–94.] clustering algorithm, we discern employees' interests from their daily emails. These interests then provide a means to create an implicit and an explicit social network graph. This approach locates potential insiders by finding individuals who either (1) feel alienated from the organization (a key warning sign of a possible disgruntled worker) or (2) have a hidden interest in a sensitive (e.g. proprietary or classified) topic. In both cases, this is revealed when someone demonstrates an interest in a topic but does not share that interest with anyone in the organization. By applying this technique to the Enron email corpus, we produce coherent, sensible topics and reveal Sherron Watkins, the famous Enron whistleblower, as a potential insider threat from the viewpoint of the individuals behind the Enron scandal.     

内幕交易犯罪识别路径研究:从发行人许可的“内幕交易”谈起

近年来,部分美国学者主张允许发行人许可的内幕交易,在我国执法环境中,上述行为大概率将被认定为具有行政违法性,但是否当然地引发对当事人刑事责任的追究则有待商榷。本文对我国内幕交易犯罪的法益识别理论进行了反思,主张根据以信义义务为基础的反欺诈理论对内幕交易中值得刑法保护的法益加以甄别。司法机关应当对内幕交易案件进行独立判断,在发行人许可并对特定内幕信息知情人参与交易的行为及时予以披露的情形当中,即便在超额收益与行为人所具备信息优势地位间存在可被证明的因果关系,因不存在对发行人和股东的欺诈,仍应考虑非犯罪化处理的可能。借此希望为司法实践提供一种有效、稳定且克制的裁判路径,缓解当前由行政机关把握内幕交易"入罪"节奏的实践难题。     

内幕人交易的规制理论与内幕人的范围--以美国法为比较分析的素材

主要从比较法的视点出发,着重考察分析了美国判例法上有关内幕人的规制理论和内幕人的范围。基于这样的考察,提出以下的观点:与美国法相比,我国现行法无法将公司外部人利用内幕信息的情况纳入规制的射程范围,故而将导致证券法中的公正、公平理念变得苍白无力;因此我们有必要导入美国的判例法中的信息窃取理论以界定内幕人的范围。     

内幕交易侵权责任的因果关系

证券内幕交易侵权责任因果关系的研究,需要借助因果关系理论的发展并重新审视内幕交易的行为本质。投资者因内幕交易而致权益被侵害是完全被动的,"比较优势论"有助于实现对内幕交易行为及其侵权责任的整体认知。内幕交易侵害其交易对手——"善意同时反向交易者"之"以信息对称为核心的公平交易法益",而非投资者的"知情法益"。内幕交易行为提升了投资者亏损发生的客观可能性,二者之间具有事实上的因果关联。依托以原因力、有责性、公平性等若干要素为中心的理论与价值判断体系,并贯彻侵权法之填补及预防损害的补偿性功能,经论证可知内幕交易侵权行为引致的损失限定为对手"交易损失的一半",但应以相当于内幕交易人非法获利(包括所获收益或避免的损失)的投资者损失额为限。