Retirement income security in the United Kingdom.

This article examines the U.K. retirement income security system from the American perspective. It addresses issues that most concern U.S. analysts: how the United Kingdom has kept its future public pension costs at a manageable level, the extent to which privatization of public pensions has contributed to low pension costs, the popular appeal of individual pension accounts, and the impact of privatization on retirement income. These issues are best understood in the context of the U.K. pension program's particular institutional structure and policies, two of which--"contracting out" of public pensions, and strong reliance on means-tested benefits--have been largely rejected in the evolution of U.S. policy to date. Particular use is made of recently available data on coverage rates for public and private pension programs over the total working population and administrative records on inactive personal pension accounts.     

The Financial Crisis and Varieties of Pension Privatization Reversals in Eastern Europe

Since the global financial crisis, those East European countries that had partly privatized their pension systems in the 1990s or early 2000s increasingly scaled back their mandatory private retirement accounts and restored the role of public provision. What explains this wave of reversals in pension privatization and variation in its outcomes? Proponents of pension privatization had argued that it would boost domestic capital markets and economic growth. By revealing how pension privatization helped increase sovereign debt and how large a part of pension funds' assets was invested in government bonds, the crisis strengthened the position of domestic opponents of mandatory private accounts. But these actors' capacity and determination to reverse pension privatization depended on the level of their country's public debt and on pension funds' portfolio structure. Empirically, the argument is supported with case studies of Hungarian, Polish, and Slovak pension reform.     

财政支出比较视角下公务员退休金制度设计

公务员退休金和企业职工养老保险金的待遇差是社会热点问题,并波及事业单位养老金制度改革,助长了提前退休浪潮。机关公务员与企业人员退休后收入的待遇差来自人员身份和计算方法的制度隔墙,本文审视了针对公务员养老金的政府责任和财政负担,探讨了中国公务员退休金制度的新路径,即三元组合的公务员养老金制度。养老金制度目标有两个,一是通过国民基础养老金避免老年贫困;二是通过职业养老金个人账户实现老年体面生活。公务员作为公民应享有国民基础养老金,作为政府雇员应享有职业养老金并附之以廉政奖励养老金,政府应当分别承担相应责任。通过模型计算和实际数据模拟计算表明,新制度初期财政支出超过原有制度,但若干年后低于原有制度,本文提出的模型和政策建议具有不降低公务员养老金待遇的同时减轻未来政府财政负担的效应。     

Social security reform in Central and Eastern Europe: variations on a Latin American theme

After Chile reformed its social security system in 1981, several other Latin American countries and certain Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries implemented the Chilean model, with some variations: either a single- or multitier system, or with a period of transition to take care of those in the labor force at the time of the change. The single-tier version consists of individual accounts in pension fund management companies. Multi-tier systems retain some form of public program and add mandatory individual accounts. Most of the CEE countries did not want to incur the high transition costs associated with the Chilean model. The switch to a market economy had already strained their economies. Also, the countries' desire to adopt the European Union's Euro as their currency--a move that required a specific debt ceiling--limited the amount of additional debt they could incur. This article describes the CEE reforms and makes some comparisons with the Latin American experience. Most of the CEE countries have chosen a mixed system and have restructured the pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) tier, while the Latin American countries have both single- and multi-tier systems. Some CEE countries have set up notional defined contribution (NDC) schemes for the PAYGO tier in which each insured person has a hypothetical account made up of all contributions during his or her working life. Survivors and disability programs in CEE have remained in the public tier, but in most of the Latin American programs the insured must purchase a separate insurance policy. Issues common to both regions include: Administrative costs are high and competition is keen, which has led to consolidation and mergers among the companies and a large market share controlled by a few companies. Benefits are proportionately lower for women than for men. A large, informal sector is not covered by social security. This sector is apparently much larger in Latin America than in the CEE countries. Issues that are unique to some of the CEE countries include: Individual accounts in Hungary and Poland have proved more attractive than originally anticipated. As a result, contributions to the public PAYGO system in Hungary and Poland fell short of expectations. In several countries, laws setting up the programs were enacted without all the details of providing benefits. For example, in some countries laws must now be drawn up for establishment of annuities because they do not yet exist. Setting up a coherent pension policy has been difficult in some countries because of frequent and significant changes in government. This situation has affected the progress of reform in various stages of development. In general, a definitive assessment of individual accounts in these countries will not be possible until a cohort of retirees has spent most of its career under the new system.     

Governance and governmentality: a discussion in the context of UK private pension provision

Abstract

While the governance of pension schemes, and the risk this poses for pension savers, is a prominent issue in current pension debate in the UK, this paper places that debate in, arguably, the more important context of the governance of individual behaviour. Using the concept of governmentality as a means of interpreting the course of recent UK pension policy and its attempts to influence individual saving behaviour, it critiques that policy. The paper then goes on to consider the effect of the introduction of personal accounts upon the pensions landscape, and in particular its potential to push forward the government's recent approach to pension provision. It argues that these reforms, rather than furthering individual saving for retirement, may alternatively create the very real possibility of undermining it.     

事业单位养老金制度的帕累托改进条件分析

事业单位养老金制度是社会保障体系的重要组成部分,本文分析了目前我国事业单位养老金制度的弊端及改革滞后的主要原因和存在问题,提出了"职业养老金替代退休金和对接国民基础养老金"的二元结构事业单位养老金方案;利用世代交替模型,求出这一制度安排相对于原有的退休金制度,实现"事业单位职工的养老金待遇不降低,我国整体养老金制度得到改善,财政养老金负担趋于下降"这一"帕累托改进"目标的条件;分析了该二元结构养老金方案的帕累托改进效应及这一方案在推进国民基础养老金改革、促进职业养老金和养老金市场的发展、完善养老金个人账户和公共服务体系等方面所能发挥的积极的社会效应;分析了方案实施的政治、经济和社会基础并通过仿真分析验证了本方案的有效性和可行性。     

Pension Privatization: Evolution of a Paradigm

From 1981 to 2004, a paradigm shift occurred in pension systems worldwide as more than 30 countries fully or partially replaced their state‐administered pay‐as‐you‐go pension systems with ones based on individual, private savings accounts. Yet in 2005, pension privatization abruptly stopped. After the 2008 crisis, several countries that had privatized their pension systems scaled back or even canceled individual accounts. Is the new pension paradigm dead? And if so, why? This article shows that fiscal and ideational factors caused a temporary halt to pension privatization worldwide and induced transnational pension policy networks to find new ways to respond to perceived failures. Adjustments to the new pension paradigm such as emphasizing minimum pensions and recommending that governments “nudge” rather than mandate pension savings will enable pension privatization to continue in years ahead, albeit in a revised form.     

Social Security privatization in Latin America

The new, partially privatized social security system adopted by Chile in 1981 has attracted attention in many parts of the world. Since then, a number of Latin American countries have implemented the Chilean model, with some variations: either with a single- or multi-tier system, or with a period of transition to take care of those in the labor force at the time of the change. The single-tier version consists of a privatized program with individual accounts in pension fund management companies. Multi-tier systems have a privatized component and retain some form of public program. This article describes each of the new programs in Latin America, their background, and similarities and differences among them. Much more information is available for Chile than for the other countries (in part because Chile has the oldest system), enough to be able to evaluate what, in most cases, is the most accurate information. That is often not the case for the other countries, especially when dealing with subjects such as transition costs and net rates of return (rates of return minus administrative fees). No country has copied the Chilean system exactly. Bolivia, El Salvador, and Mexico have closed their public systems and set up mandatory individual accounts. Argentina has a mixed public/private system with three tiers. In Colombia and Peru, workers have a choice between the public and private programs. Uruguay created a two-tier mixed system. Costa Rica has a voluntary program for individual accounts as a supplement to the pay-as-you-go program and has just passed a law setting up mandatory accounts containing employer contributions for severance pay. All of the countries continue to face unresolved issues, including: High rates of noncompliance--the percentage of enrollees who do not actively and regularly contribute to their accounts--which could lead to low benefits and greater costs to the governments that offer a guaranteed minimum benefit; Proportionately lower benefits for women and lower earners than for men and higher earners; A minimum required rate of return among the pension fund management companies (in most of these countries) that has resulted in similarity among the companies and the consequent lack of meaningful choice; and High administrative fees in most of these countries, which reduce the individual's effective rate of return. To what extent these issues can be mitigated or resolved in the future is not yet clear. In general, a definitive assessment of the Chilean model and its Latin American variations will not be possible until a cohort of retirees has spent most of its career under the new system.     

Does retirement education teach people to save pension distributions?

As defined contribution pension plans have become increasingly common over the past two decades, so have lump sum distributions from those plans. Employees who elect such a distribution take the balance of their pension account with them when they leave a job. They can then choose to maintain the funds in accounts designated for retirement, invest them in other saving vehicles, or spend them. If spent pension distributions are not replaced by other savings, however, the future elderly are unlikely to be able to maintain a desirable standard of living. With employee-funded pensions expected to play an increasingly important role in financing Americans' retirement, saving these funds in essential. This article is the first to examine the relationship between retirement education--specifically, meetings sponsored by employers or by public and private institutions--and the saving of lump sum distributions. Two definitions of saving are used: one that includes reinvestment only in tax-deferred saving vehicles, and a broader one that includes tax-deferred vehicles, general saving vehicles (stocks, bonds, savings accounts, and so on), and paying off debt. The analysis also evaluates the effects of retirement education on specific groups identified in previous research as being less likely to keep their pension distributions in tax-deferred accounts: namely, women, younger persons, and persons with less than a college education. The same groups tend to be less financially secure in retirement, making the effects of retirement education on them particularly relevant. With an econometric model using ordinary least squares and data from the 1992 Health and Retirement Study, the analysis finds that retirement education does not affect the overall likelihood that employees will save their distributions, whether in tax-deferred or non-tax-deferred vehicles. The picture is more complicated for subgroups of employees. Attending a retirement meeting is associated with an increased likelihood of saving among persons age 40 and under but a decreased probability of saving among college graduates and women. No effect was found for men, individuals over age 40, or persons who did not graduate from college. The finding that retirement education increases the likelihood of younger persons' saving a distribution is reassuring, for these workers are America's future retirees. However, the finding that attending a meeting does not increase saving among some of the most financially vulnerable groups is a matter of concern to policymakers. Further study of the long-term effects of spending pension distributions is needed.     

The evolution of Japanese employer-sponsored retirement plans

This article examines the development of Japanese voluntary employer-sponsored retirement plans with an emphasis on recent trends. Until 2001, companies in Japan offered retirement benefits as lump-sum severance payments and/or benefits from one of two types of defined benefit (DB) pension plans. One type of DB plan was based on the occupational pension model used in the United States before the adoption of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), but lacked the funding, vesting, and other protective features contained in ERISA. The other type of DB plan allowed companies to opt out of the earnings-related portion of social security, commonly referred to as "contracting out." Landmark laws passed in 2001 introduced a new generation of occupational retirement plans to employers and employees. One law increased funding requirements and enhanced employee protections for employer-sponsored DB plans, while a second law introduced defined contribution (DC) plans for several reasons, chiefly to increase retirement savings and help boost Japanese financial markets. These laws complemented earlier changes in the tax code and financial accounting standards already affecting employer-sponsored retirement plans. As a result, new retirement plan designs will replace most prereform era company retirement plans by 2012. In 2001, the experience of 401(k) plans in the United States, where 42 million participants had accumulated more than $1.8 trillion in assets over 20 years, attracted considerable attention among Japanese lawmakers finalizing provisions of the DC pension law. Even with government support and encouragement from the financial services industry, Japanese companies have not adopted these new DC plans in large numbers. As a result, occupational retirement plans in Japan have remained predominantly DB-a surprising development in light of the shift in a number of countries from DB to DC plans observed in recent decades. However, recent proposals to make DC plans more attractive to employers in Japan are likely to be implemented in the near future. This article summarizes the Japanese retirement system, with an emphasis on private-sector employees, and the complementary role played by voluntary employer-sponsored retirement plans; describes the financial pressures that faced retirement plan sponsors in the late twentieth century and the factors motivating the reform of Japanese voluntary retirement plans; examines the 2001 legislative changes that have transformed company retirement plans; and concludes with a review of trends and recent developments in employer-sponsored retirement plans since the implementation of the 2001 pension laws.     

Pension coverage among private wage and salary workers: preliminary findings from the 1988 survey of employee benefits

Based on data for private wage and salary workers in May 1988, this article examined pension coverage under two types of employer-sponsored pension plans. Some of the factors associated with employer-financed pension coverage were also examined, and comparisons were made to findings on pension coverage of full-time workers in 1972, 1979, and 1983. "Covered" workers were defined as those actually participating in a pension plan. Among all private sector employees studied, 34 percent were covered by a "basic" pension plan (most of which, presumably, were defined benefit plans), and 14 percent were covered by a pretax retirement savings plan--a subtype of defined contribution plan. With 7 percent of the respondents covered by both types of plans, the total coverage rate under employer-sponsored plans was 41 percent. Twelve percent of the respondents reported that they had contributed to an IRA in 1987. The reported IRA usage was somewhat higher among those already covered by a pension plan than among noncovered workers. Six percent of the respondents were not covered by an employer-sponsored plan but were contributing to an IRA, yielding a total of 47 percent who were participating in either an employer-sponsored or an individual retirement plan. While it was assumed--as in previous studies--that all "basic" coverage was being funded by employers, only four-fifths of those in pretax retirement savings plans reported that employers were also contributing to these plans. The remainder of the analysis was restricted to coverage under employer-financed plans, and it was further restricted to full-time workers. A total of 46 percent of these workers were covered under employer-financed pension plans--33 percent covered only by a basic plan, 7 percent covered only by a pretax plan, and 6 percent dually covered. Among men, the coverage rate was 49 percent, compared with 43 percent among women. Several individual and job-related characteristics were found to be associated with employer-financed pension coverage among full-time employees. Coverage rates were quite low among workers under age 25, but were substantially higher among those aged 35-59. Pension coverage was also low among those with less than 5 years of employment on the job, but relatively high among those with 5 years or more of job tenure. Coverage rate differences by race were not substantial. Whites reported a coverage rate of 47 percent, compared with 42 percent among blacks and 45 percent among other races.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

基本养老保险个人账户收益率与替代率关系定量分析

基本养老保险之目的是为退休人员提供合意的退休金，避免陷入老年贫困。本文分别从现行制度计发办法和实际生命余岁精算的角度出发，定量分析了我国基本养老制度个人账户收益率与其替代率的关系，提出应高度重视当前个人账户低收益率所带来的严重后果，较高的收益率既是替代率的重要保证，也是累积制优越性的重要体现。而收益率的重要性却没有在政策制定中充分体现，低水平计息、微不足道的替代率皆与当初设想相去甚远。结论：既然建立了个人账户就应该将其做实并通过市场化运营获得较高的回报；而在还未有效地解决好收益率的情况下，不应草率地再将个人账户推广至其他群体，以免使更多人受损。     

TILTING TOWARD MARKETIZATION: Reform of the Canadian Pension Plan

Public concern about the earnings‐related Canada Pension Plan has forced the Canadian government to move toward fuller funding, a new investment policy, and changes to benefits and administration. Together, the three initiatives, and particularly the first two, amount to a modest degree of marketization. The assumption behind the reform is that the Canada Pension Plan will remain public and mandatory but the change will create a board and an investment policy which are more sensitive to market pressures and less amendable to government interference. The Canada Pension Plan is one of three tiers of support for the elderly in retirement. It is a contributory social insurance scheme which protects against loss of income. The other two are a social allowance (Old Age Security) as well as an income tested benefit (Guaranteed Income Supplement) which provide basic income support and employment based retirement pension plans as well as group and individual registered retirement savings plans which supplement the other two tiers on a voluntary basis. This article examines the reform of the Canada Pension Plan. After a brief examination of Canada's retirement benefits in an international context, the article summarizes recent debates in Canada, government policies to develop fuller funding and new investment strategies, and reflections on possible developments in the future.     

Influencing retirement behavior: A key issue for social security

Recent trends toward earlier retirement threaten future supplies of labor and the financial stability of many of our public and private pension systems. One of the few federal efforts now in place to reverse this trend has been the 1977 law outlawing mandatory retirement before age 70 for most American workers. This legislation by itself will have little effect on retirement patterns, because strong financial incentives to retire remain imbedded in the system. Changes in the Social Security Act enacted this year begin to recognize these incentives but are highly controversial and at best will not begin to go into effect until 1990. To be successful, efforts of policymakers to increase work at older ages must focus on the financial incentives at the heart of retirement plans rather than on merely attempting to weaken mandatory retirement constraints.     

The role of earnings and financial risk in distributional analyses of Social Security reform measures

The Social Security Trustees project that the Social Security program faces longterm financing difficulties. Several proposals that have been offered to shore‐up the finances of the Social Security program would create individual retirement accounts funded with part of the payroll tax. The authors of many of these proposals claim that future beneficiaries will be better off under their new system than under the current system. This study examines the consequences of differing earnings patterns and year‐to‐year differences in asset returns have for Social Security retired worker benefits in three Social Security reform proposals. Incorporating both actual earnings histories and variation in asset returns shows that none of the three individual account plans can always deliver benefits that are higher than payable current‐law benefits. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

Teacher Pension Systems,the Composition of the Teaching Workforce,and Teacher Quality

Teacher pension systems concentrate retirements within a narrow range of the career cycle by penalizing individuals who separate too soon or remain employed too long. The penalties result in the retention of some teachers who would otherwise choose to leave, and the premature exit of some teachers who would otherwise choose to stay. We examine the link between teachers’ pension incentives and workforce quality and find no evidence to suggest that the incentives raise quality. Given the large and growing costs associated with maintaining teacher pension systems, and the lack of evidence regarding their efficacy, experimentation by traditional and charter schools with alternative retirement benefit structures would be useful.     

Social Security: a financial appraisal for the median voter

Several explanations have been proposed for why voters continue to support unfunded social security systems. Browning (1975) suggests that the extremely large unfunded pension systems of most democracies depend on the existence of a voting majority composed of middle-aged and older people who fail to fully internalize the cost of financing the system. In fact, when voting, economically rational workers consider only their current and future contributions to the system and their expected pension benefits--not their past contributions, which they regard as sunk costs. If, for a majority of voters, the expected continuation return from social security exceeds the return from alternative assets, an unfunded social security system is politically sustainable. This article explores the validity of Browning's proposition by quantifying the returns that U.S. voters in presidential elections from 1964 to 1996 have obtained, or expect to obtain, from Social Security. Did "investments" in Social Security outperform alternative forms of investment, such as mutual funds or pension funds, for a majority of the voters? What can be expected for the future? The U.S. Social Security system redistributes income within age cohorts on the basis of sex, income, and marital status. To account for some of these features, the median voter is represented by a family unit whose members--a husband who accounts for 70 percent of household earnings and a wife who accounts for 30 percent--make joint economic and voting decisions. Thus, retirement and survival benefits paid out to the spouse of an insured worker can be included in the calculation of Social Security returns. Interval estimates of voters' family incomes from the U.S. Census Bureau were used to obtain the median voter's household earnings. The median voter's age is derived from the ages of those who voted in presidential elections, not from the ages of the entire electorate. The median voter's contributions to Social Security are the product of the joint employer/employee Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) tax rate and employee earnings. Data on actual contributions are available for median voters in the 1964 to 1976 elections; Social Security Administration (SSA) estimates are used for future tax rates and average wage growth rates. Data on actual old-age, retirement, and survivor benefits, as well as estimates of future benefits, are also available from SSA. Analysis of ex-post returns from "investing" in Social Security and from a buy-and-hold strategy applied to three alternative assets--the Standard & Poor's Composite Index (S&P), the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), and U.S. government bonds--shows surprising results. In 1964 and 1968, Social Security largely outperformed the other three assets. In 1972, Social Security and the stock market performed almost equally. In 1976, however, the median voter would have been better off in the stock market. The expected returns for median voters in later elections cannot be directly compared with realized returns from alternative assets. However, estimates range from 5.7 percent in 1984 to 7.0 percent in 1996 and thus compare favorably with average returns of 5.6 percent for S&P, 5.3 percent for DJIA, and 2.1 percent for government bonds over the 1964-1996 period. Although these findings must be taken with caution since they compare ex-post returns, they show that, despite a continuous reduction in profitability, Social Security still represents a safe, high-return asset for a majority of families.     

Altered Europeanisation of Pension Reform in the Context of the Great Recession: Denmark and Italy Compared

This article analyses the Europeanisation of national pension systems in Denmark and Italy. Through the analytical framework of a ‘two-level’ game, it analyses pension reforms in the two countries, which, in the wake of the crisis, breached EU budgetary requirements, and shortly after reformed their pension systems. The EU affects pension reform in both cases, but in distinct ways. When Denmark’s economy was financially vulnerable, the EU’s excessive deficit procedure affected the decision to reform pensions indirectly, by triggering a rapid political decision to speed up a pension reform. By contrast, the Italian economy’s critical vulnerability and the consequent risk for the whole Eurozone led to a situation whereby the European actors entered the domestic political scene and thereafter more forcefully induced reforms. The findings from the two cases show that the EU’s role in pension reform has been significant during crises, but through interaction with domestic actors. Furthermore, from a theoretical perspective, the intervening variables – domestic and EMU vulnerability as well as EU and domestic politics – are crucial to understanding the reform decisions through two-level games.     

How electoral vulnerability affects pension politics: Introducing a concept,measure and empirical application

Are electorally vulnerable politicians really less likely to support controversial legislation, such as pension reforms? While the literature on welfare state retrenchment has increasingly pointed to the role of electoral factors in the dynamics of social policy cutbacks, there are few studies that actually measure the magnitude of electoral pressure and its consequent impact on the politics of reform. To this end, the authors have developed a quantitative measure of the electoral vulnerability of politicians and tested its impact on pension reform outcomes using an original dataset comprising 16 Western European countries from 1980 to 2003. In line with expectations, the results show that the impact of electoral vulnerability on reform depends upon the system of interest intermediation. In corporatist systems, electoral vulnerability indeed impedes reform. But in pluralist systems, increased electoral vulnerability is associated with higher levels of reform. This is because unions in corporatist (but not in pluralist) systems can exploit electoral vulnerability in pre‐legislative bargaining, and thus pressure politicians. Consequently, this study has broader implications for the differential responsiveness of democracies to redistributive issues more generally.