Regulatory reforms,normative changes,and performance: Evidence from the electricity sector in Latin America

Over the past three decades the Latin American region has experienced various regulatory reforms, and distinctive normative changes have been introduced in the framework, instruments, or procedures adopted by independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). While there is evidence that the establishment of an IRA positively affects regulated sector performance, little is known about the effects of these additional legal dispositions when incorporated in primary or secondary legislation. However, normative changes may shape IRAs' actual regulatory activities and the signals they send to their stakeholders, potentially influencing sectoral performance. This research traces the evolution of several instruments and procedures legally adopted by IRAs located in Latin America and comprehensively assesses the influence of these normative changes on the performance dimensions of the electricity sector. We built indexes that describe the adoption of specific legal dispositions in the region. These indexes reveal that the evolution of the normative dispositions varies in terms of extent, context, and timing of adoption. In addition, the changes are not equally or even positively associated with specific performance dimensions. While economic regulatory instruments shape many performance dimensions, “soft” procedural dispositions also play an important role in perceptions of quality in the electricity sector.     

Professionalised Campaigning in Latin America

Abstract

This paper analyses the process of democratisation within Latin American by focusing on the nature of election campaigning in the region. Particular attention is paid to developments in three former military dictatorships, which now regularly hold elections. The states are Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, and consideration is given to the insights and limitations of applying the “Americanisation” or modernisation thesis in studying their distinctive media and political cultures. The elections held in each state during 1999 are used as case studies. What emerges is a complex pattern in which candidates and parties have simultaneously adopted some of the professional forms of electioneering whilst retaining and valuing the more traditional and interpersonal electioneering techniques. Furthermore, it was pointed out that there were marked differences in politicians' approaches to campaigning both between as well as within the three different political systems.     

Niche parties in Latin America

Niche parties, which have been defined as focusing on a narrow range of issues their competitors neglect, are a phenomenon that has so far been described and analysed primarily in Western Europe. In this paper, we extend existing work by examining the presence and nature of niche parties in Latin America. Using the expert survey data collected by [Wiesehomeier, N., and K. Benoit. 2009. “President, Parties, and Policy Competition.” The Journal of Politics 71: 1435–1447], we show that there are niche parties in most Latin American party systems. Two kinds of niche party, traditionalist and postmaterialist, predominate. We also show that niche parties, despite being defined based on issue-based characteristics, are in fact less programmatic in their linkage strategies than mainstream competitors. Instead, niche parties are slightly more likely to draw on charismatic strategies and tend to establish strong organizational links to ethnic and religious organizations. Niche parties in Latin America are primarily vehicles for the mobilization of group interests. These findings have implications for our understanding of political representation in new democracies and niche party strategies more generally.     

Tax morale in Latin America

In the tax compliance literature, there is a lack of empirical evidence on the degree of tax morale in developing countries. As a novelty, this paper focuses thus on Latin America, analysing tax morale as a dependent variable and searching for factors that systematically affect tax morale, working with the two data sets Latinobarómetro and World Values Survey. Our findings indicate that there is a significant correlation between tax morale and the size of shadow economy. Furthermore, people who said they knew/have heard about practised tax avoidance have a significantly lower tax morale than others. Looking at individuals’ perception of reasons for tax evasion we found that the tax burden, lacking honesty, and corruption are seen as the main factors. We observed a significantly lower tax morale in South America/ Mexico than in the Central American/Caribbean area. Furthermore, trust in the president and the officials, the belief that other individuals obey the law and a pro democratic attitude have a significant positive effect on tax morale.     

Partisan technocratic cycles in Latin America

Given their powerful positions in presidential cabinets, technocrats are an important transmission mechanism for explaining economic policy choices, but have received less attention compared to other well-established channels such as elections or democratic tenure. I incorporate the role of technocratic advisors into a domestic policymaking framework. Specifically, I contend that left governments tend to appoint technocrats, or ministers with mainstream economics training, to signal their commitment to sound governance to the electorate. This partisan technocratic pattern, however, is conditioned by a country's place in its business cycle. During periods of high growth, left governments are more likely to align with their partisan preferences and appoint heterodox advisors that drift from fiscal discipline. Employing an originally constructed data index, the Index of Economic Advisors, I conduct a statistical test of 16 Latin American countries from 1960 to 2011, finding partisan shifts in technocratic appointments and fiscal governance that are conditioned by national business cycles.     

Social Security privatization in Latin America

The new, partially privatized social security system adopted by Chile in 1981 has attracted attention in many parts of the world. Since then, a number of Latin American countries have implemented the Chilean model, with some variations: either with a single- or multi-tier system, or with a period of transition to take care of those in the labor force at the time of the change. The single-tier version consists of a privatized program with individual accounts in pension fund management companies. Multi-tier systems have a privatized component and retain some form of public program. This article describes each of the new programs in Latin America, their background, and similarities and differences among them. Much more information is available for Chile than for the other countries (in part because Chile has the oldest system), enough to be able to evaluate what, in most cases, is the most accurate information. That is often not the case for the other countries, especially when dealing with subjects such as transition costs and net rates of return (rates of return minus administrative fees). No country has copied the Chilean system exactly. Bolivia, El Salvador, and Mexico have closed their public systems and set up mandatory individual accounts. Argentina has a mixed public/private system with three tiers. In Colombia and Peru, workers have a choice between the public and private programs. Uruguay created a two-tier mixed system. Costa Rica has a voluntary program for individual accounts as a supplement to the pay-as-you-go program and has just passed a law setting up mandatory accounts containing employer contributions for severance pay. All of the countries continue to face unresolved issues, including: High rates of noncompliance--the percentage of enrollees who do not actively and regularly contribute to their accounts--which could lead to low benefits and greater costs to the governments that offer a guaranteed minimum benefit; Proportionately lower benefits for women and lower earners than for men and higher earners; A minimum required rate of return among the pension fund management companies (in most of these countries) that has resulted in similarity among the companies and the consequent lack of meaningful choice; and High administrative fees in most of these countries, which reduce the individual's effective rate of return. To what extent these issues can be mitigated or resolved in the future is not yet clear. In general, a definitive assessment of the Chilean model and its Latin American variations will not be possible until a cohort of retirees has spent most of its career under the new system.     

Design and implementation issues in Swedish individual pension accounts

Sweden's new multipillar pension system includes a system of mandatory fully funded individual accounts. The Swedish system offers contributors more than 600 fund options from a variety of private-sector fund managers. However, in the most recent rounds of fund choice, more than 90 percent of new labor market entrants have not made an active choice of funds and thus have ended up in a government-sponsored default fund. The Swedish system offers a number of lessons about implementing a mandatory individual account tier. Centralized administration keeps administrative costs down but requires considerable lead time. A very large number of fund options are likely to be offered unless strong entry barriers are in place. Engaging new labor market entrants in fund choice is likely to be difficult. A significant percentage of those making an active fund choice may choose funds that are very specialized and risky. Finally, special care must be devoted to designing a default fund and continual consumer communication.     

Fiscal Decentralization and Federalism in Latin America

In contrast to years of centralization when the national governmentdominated the states and municipalities, fiscal decentralizationis now taking place throughout Latin America. This study considersthe reasons for this change. Fiscal decentralization meritsseparate attention because the financial independence of subnationalgovernments ultimately determines their success and power. Competingpolitical and economic explanations are tested on a sample of17 countries between 1985 and 1995. While federalism is a significantpredictor of greater fiscal decentralization, other factorssuch as presidential power, structural adjustment, level ofdevelopment, and country size also determine the level of fiscaldecentralization.     

Latin America in the time of the Nazis

Jorge Camarassa, Odessa al Sur. La Argentina como refugio de nazis y criminales de guerra. 3rd edn. Buenos Aires: Editorial Planeta, 1996. 350pp. Notes. Bibl. Ind. Illus. 22 pesos.

Cárdenas, Vargas, Perón and the Jews, special issue of Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies/Revue canadienne des études Latino‐Americains et Caraibes, vol. 20, nos. 39–40, 1995.

German and Italian Jewish Scientists in South America, special issue of Ibero‐Amerikanisches Archiv: Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaften und Geschichte, vol. 21, nos. 1–2, 1995.

América Latina y la Segunda Guerra Mundial, two special issues of Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe, vol. 6, nos. 1–2, 1995.     

The Origins of Institutional Crises in Latin America

Institutional instability and interbranch crises pose a fundamental challenge to democracies in Latin America and the developing world more generally. Combining a standard game theoretic model of crisis bargaining with a unique dataset on courts, executives, and legislatures for 18 Latin American countries between 1985 and 2008, the article develops a strategic account of how interbranch crises emerge and evolve. In addition to providing the first systematic picture of the frequency, type, and location of interbranch crises for the region, the article demonstrates that the decision to initiate an interbranch crisis is influenced by the allocation of institutional powers, public support for the targeted branch, and the expectations of success based on recent experiences. Building on these results, the article identifies several novel directions for future research on institutional instability.     

The politics of vice-presidential selection in Latin America

It has become common for presidential candidates in Latin America to pick running-mates from outside of their own political parties in the form of political independents or politicians from other parties. As witnessed in several recent cases, this has added a new dynamic to Latin American presidentialism, not least in situations of political crisis. Drawing on a new database, the present paper enquires into the factors that may lead prospective presidents to select such “external vice-presidents”. The findings show that the logics behind selecting either a politician from another party or a political independent as running-mate differ. While the size of the presidential candidate's own party explains the decision to select vice-presidential candidate from another party, the choice of an independent is determined by the fragmentation of the party system. Furthermore, there is evidence that previous experiences of vicepresidential succession makes the selection of an independent running-mate more likely, possibly as a attempt to guard against challenges to the future presidency. Generally, presidential hopefuls tend to pick external running-mates who lack a strong political following, which also indicates that electoral logic is often mitigated by concern for the stability of the eventual presidency.