Future dynamics in Sino-Korea relations

This article argues that the basic interests of the major actors involved in the Korean problem converge on the cross-recognition and “two Koreas” formula. Seoul’s diplomatic normalization with Moscow, and North Korea’s ongoing negotiations with Tokyo, testify to this trend. Because of its sensitivity to North Korea’s dilemma and carefully measured policy, China has succeeded in sustaining North Korea’s trust while improving its ties with South Korea. Shaken by the changes in the international system and threatened by the rapidly growing economic capability of the South, North Korea’s overall foreign policy objective is shifting from unifocation to accepting the existing status quo, a movement toward a direction that China has been advising. A mostly likely breakthrough to the stalemate in Korea will come from the Pyongyang-Tokyo bilateral relations. Ironically, when the South feels more confident than ever before about the possibility of unification under its terms, the rest of world is moving toward the cross recognition it has advocated. Whether the two Koreas with over-lapping diplomatic relations with all four major powers surrounding the peninsula will be able to achieve the unification that all Korean people desire will largely depend on how the regimes manage inter-Korean relations in coming years.     

Cyberwarfare in the Korean Peninsula: Asymmetries and Strategic Responses

In this paper, we argue that the two Koreas’ intentions and actions on the cyber front point toward the possibility that they have engaged in cyber warfare against each other. From South Korea’s standpoint, a key concern has been North Korea’s advanced cyber warfare capabilities and alleged involvement of its substantial workforce in the Internet’s dark side activities. These issues need to be looked at the backdrop of the North’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. This paper draws principally upon theories and concepts from military strategy and warfare to examine the contexts, mechanisms, and processes associated with the cyber warfare in the Korean peninsula. We also compare the two Koreas in terms of various forms of asymmetries in cyber warfare and cyber attacks. Also highlighted in the paper are South Korea’s recent initiatives and actions to enhance cyber-offense and cyber-defense capabilities.     

North Korea’s foreign relations: Diplomacy of promotive adaptation

Dramatic changes in East Europe and the Soviet Union resulted in North Korea’s doubling its effort to shield and defend itself from disturbances emanating from the outside. Yet, President Kim Il Sung of North Korea has also opted for new diplomatic moves of realignment in existing ties with China and the Soviet Union and is also seeking new rleations with Japan and the United States. North Korea’s diplomatic adaptation in 1990–91, such as its balancing diplomatic acts vis-à-vis the major allies and adversaries, is examined, and so is the North Korean dilemma of reconciling national interests and ideology. While Pyongyang’s nonaligned nations diplomacy is temporarily stalled, its Un diplomacy is likely to be activated as a result of the simultaneous entry into the United Nations with South Korea in 1991.     

China’s Indochina policy

China has made virtually all the gains it can expect from the war in Cambodia. These include its regional influence, its relations with Thailand and the superpowers, and its punishment of Vietnam. Continued support for the universally condemned Khmer Rouge risks undermining China’s regional standing for no certain gain. It could forestall new possibilities for China in Phnom Penh and even in Hanoi. Thus, China will probably dump the Khmer Rouge when the time is ripe. Acceptance by China of the relities of Hun Sen’s Cambodia—provided it survivies—may be a not-too-distant prospect.     

An analysis of North Korea’s economic development with special reference to agriculture

The article examines North Korea’s record of economic development with special reference to agriculture. There has been some success in grain production using a centrally directed economy and the Juche method and Chungsan-ri spirit of farming. However, too much emphasis on grain production has resulted in shortages of other agricultural products, such as livestock and livestock products. A fundamental problem in North Korea is that the economy as a whole is supply-constrained, a common failing of planned economies.     

The Epistle of Ya'qu¯b ibn Isha¯q al-Kindi¯ on the Device for Dispelling Sorrows

Although less technical philosophically than many of al-Kindi¯'s known treatises, this Epistle remains basic for understanding the spirit that underlies his thinking. Socratic, yet very Kindian in spirit, this Epistle displays its author's tendency to harmonize Greek philosophy and Islam, particularly as this relates to ethics, and his belief in man's free will and reason. To him, sorrows may be caused either by our own actions or by the actions of others. It is up to us to choose to do or not to do what saddens us. Through reason we can eliminate some of the causes of sorrow when we perceive the intellectual world, and derive from it things desired. Though this Epistle has a significant share of the linguistic and stylistic complexities characteristic of al-Kindi¯'s writing, it is hoped that the present translation will facilitate its comprehension. Its title in Arabic is Risa¯ la Ya'qub b. Isha¯ q al-Kindi¯Fi¯al-Hi¯la li-Daf' al-Ahza¯n.     

American policy toward Beijing, 1989–1990: The role of president Bush and the White House staff

The Tiananmen massacre of June 1989 created a major crisis in U.S. policy toward China. President Bush and his aides on the National Security Council staff took the lead in formulating the U.S. response to the crisis. The president took charge personally in dealing with various issues during the next two years. He strove hard to maintain a balanced policy that would allow for continued U.S. involvement with the people and leaders of China. In the crisis atmosphere of 1989–1990, the president appeared to judge that it was important to narrow sharply the circle of officials who would manage U.S. policy toward China. In part, this was because the president was attempting to strike a difficult balance in U.S. policy. On the one hand, he was attempting to elicit positive gestures from Beijing's beleaguered leaders in the wake of Tiananmen. On the other hand, he was attempting to avoid what he judged were overly punitive and counterproductive U.S. measures against China, which were being pressed on the administration by U.S. leaders in the Congress, media and elsewhere. The president and his close advisors took steps to ensure that State Department and other U.S. officials avoided comment on the most sensitive policy issue of 1990—the extension of most-favored-nation tariff treatment to China. By the end of 1990, however, the president's policy efforts had not stilled congressional debate or restored a consensus in U.S. China policy. President Bush still labored under the misperception in many quarters that he was less interested than others in human rights in China, was overly attentive to the interests of Chinese leaders, and stressed excessively China's alleged strategic importance for the United States. In fact, the Chinese government's relatively constructive role in world affairs, especially over such vital issues as the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf crisis, appeared to do more to win U.S. support for the president's carefully balanced approach to China than the efforts by administrative leaders to explain the policy.     

The Politics of Professionalism in Russia

A political scientist examines the ways in which the word "professional" constructs group identities in the world of politics. Applying discourse analysis to 34 texts generated by interviews with prominent members of Russia's political class in the Gorbachev, first and second Yel'tsin, and Putin administrations as well as the democratic opposition, this article seeks to determine how the word "professional" has been used by past and present members of Russia's political class. Two opposing discourses that constitute its meanings are outlined. The study's results are framed in a dynamic model of change in Soviet and Russian political communication.     

India in the Asia–Pacific: Rising Ambitions with an Eye on China

It is almost a conventional wisdom now that the centre of gravity of global politics has shifted from Europe to the Asia–Pacific in recent years with the rise of China and India, gradual assertion by Japan of its military profile, and a significant shift in the US global force posture in favour of Asia–Pacific. The debate now is whether Asia–Pacific will witness rising tensions and conflicts in the coming years with various powers jockeying for influence in the region or whether the forces of economic globalization and multilateralism will lead to peace and stability. Some have asked the question more directly: Will Asia's future resemble Europe's past?1 ¹See Aaron Friedberg, “Will Europe's Past be Asia's Future?” Survival, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Autumn 2000), pp. 147–159. View all notes It is, of course, difficult to answer this question as of now when major powers in Asia–Pacific such as China, India and Japan are still rising and grappling with a plethora of issues that confront any rising power in the international system. But what is clear is that all major powers are now re-evaluating their policy options vis-à-vis the Pacific.

This paper examines India's foreign policy in the Pacific as it has emerged on the last few years. First, the emerging balance of power in Asia–Pacific will be examined in light of the theoretical debate on the issue followed by a broad assessment of the role that India envisages for itself in the region. Subsequently, India's relationship with the three major powers in Asia–Pacific—China, Japan, and the US is analysed. Finally, some observations will be made about the future trajectory of Indian foreign policy in the region.     

A short review

Abstract

As the title indicates, Zhou En-lai is the link which joins together the two distinct parts of this brief work. The first section by Davison and Selden is a short interpretive history of the Chinese revolution from the Opium War to 1975, highlighting Zhou's participation in and contributions to it. The second section contains reprints from New China Magazine of Zhou's 1971 talks with Americans on selected topics including class struggle in the socialist period, slogans, the Cultural Revolution, and U.S.-China relations.     

Military Change in Asia

Asia's growing share of the global economy provides one of the strongest themes in contemporary analysis of international affairs. The remarkable economic achievements of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan over the past 50 years have been compounded more recently by the rise of the Chinese and Indian economies. While the significance of this change in the way international wealth is shared was beyond doubt before the onset of the current global financial crisis, many commentators expect that when the world eventually emerges from the crisis Asia's share of the global economy will have grown even further.

This shift clearly has strategic importance: economic decisions made in Asia, whether by governments or business, are now more important for the rest of the world than they have been for centuries. If military power were moving in the same direction, and at the same pace, the strategic consequences would be even greater.

This paper examines trends in Asian military spending and modernisation. It begins with a summary of defence spending among Asian countries.1 In this paper the term “Asia” is used to include the 22 countries from Pakistan to Japan. It does not include Afghanistan or any of the countries of central Asia, or Russia, Australia, New Zealand, or the Pacific Island countries. As explained above, data is not equally available for all 22 countries. View all notes It next considers the nature of the capabilities and equipment they are acquiring, and comments on the way in which forces are being structured, commanded, and managed. It then comments on the range of different factors that are driving military spending and modernisation in Asia, and offers particular comment on China in this regard. The paper then concludes with brief comments on United States and Australian military spending and development.     

Russia in the Post-Western World: The End of the Normalization Paradigm?

If the relative decline of the West and the great power shift defined as "the rise of the rest" are approaching, there are important implications for Russia's foreign policy. Drawing on the work of Russian and Western commentators, this article offers a preliminary assessment of the post-Western world's implications for Russia and its foreign policy. The challenge of the emerging post-Western world and the manifestations of the West's declining hard and soft power dimensions are described; several schools of Russian thought on current international conditions and Russia's own domestic capabilities are identified and analyzed; and Russia's potential to act as a post-Western great power is assessed.     

King Faisal ibn Abdul Aziz Al Saud in the arena of world politics: a glimpse from Washington, 1950 to 1971

This paper aims to draw a portrait of King Faisal, as it emerges from the records of the various presidential administrations of the USA. The records which were available to me usually originate from the encounters of the heads of state and their ministers on the occasion of official visits. Despite ceremonial protocol and diplomatic courteousness, the encounters always also had a personal touch of character and emotion. Therefore we do not simply look at the portrait through an American mirror. No doubt, the documents at hand do contain specific perceptions of King Faisal and of Saudi society by the various administrations in Washington. On the other hand, the mere fact of the King's physical presence and verbal performance in those encounters brings authenticity to the fore. Because of the fairly wide range of topics on the political agenda of such state visits, the portrait sheds light on King Faisal's personality, public appearance and sense of humour, on his statesmanship as well as on his diplomacy and commitments in the arena of Middle Eastern politics and of international relations at large. Since it seems to me that the year 1966 is of particular significance for an assessment of King Faisal's political legacy in the Middle Eastern arena, I have depicted his visit in Washington and meeting with President L.B. Johnson in June of that year for a more comprehensive treatment. In contrast, Faisal's personal encounters with Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy and later on—twice—with Richard Nixon are dealt with more cursorily.1 The sources for this paper were not really collected in any systematic fashion. Rather, they came my way in the course of a research project with a different, although related topic (see Helmut Mejcher, Sinai, 5 giugno 1967. Il conflitto arabo‐israeliano (Bologna: Società editrice il Mulino, 2000). On the other hand, it is not a random collection either. As I said before, the documents focus on the diplomatic highlights of official visits of the King and Crown Prince in Washington. View all notes     

INDIA'S MYANMAR POLICY AND THE ‘SINO-INDIAN GREAT GAME’

Recent literature has aimed to “deconstruct” the notion of a “Sino-Indian rivalry” in Myanmar. The argument is that China's leverage in Myanmar far outweighs India's, and that the Tatmadaw nevertheless prevents either country's manipulation of Myanmar. In contrast this article argues that the idea of a “Sino-Indian Great Game” still marks the Indian debate, thinking and policy on Myanmar. China's continued rise will remain a main driver behind India's Myanmar policy, and Myanmar will remain geostrategic relevant to India.

The article describes the historical legacy of India's relationship with Myanmar, discusses the role of China in Indian Myanmar policies, and examines the effects of Myanmar's democratization process. While the Myanmar playing field has changed, Indian perceptions of a “Sino-Indian Great Game” are lasting.     

ASEAN's Albatross: ASEAN's Burma Policy,from Constructive Engagement to Critical Disengagement

Abstract

Following the abortive “Saffron Revolution” of autumn 2007, Burma's ASEAN partners were subject to the timeworn criticism that the grouping persistently fails to act against its pariah member due to its near-religious adherence to the norm of non-interference. Conversely, this paper argues that ASEAN's policy towards Burma has never been one of strict non-interference, but has always been premised on the claim that ASEAN can encourage political change there. Moreover, the non-interference principle has come under increasing pressure since the Asian financial crisis. The article tracks the evolution of ASEAN's policy, from the adoption of constructive engagement in 1988, through the gradual frustration of ASEAN's designs, to its present position of critical disengagement, arguing ASEAN's failure to take a stronger line has less to do with any binding “norms” than with the interests of the region's predominantly illiberal elites and the grouping's increasing difficulties in achieving meaningful consensus.

We don't set out to change the world and our neighbors. We don't believe in it. The culture of ASEAN is that we do not interfere.

(Goh Chok Tong, Prime Minister of Singapore, 1992) ¹ 1. “Myanmar's Monsters,” The Economist, February 29, 1992. All newspaper and magazine references sourced from www.lexisnexis.com except where otherwise indicated.

ASEAN is trying to democratize Myanmar.

(Nguyen Dy Nien, Foreign Minister of Vietnam, 2004) ² 2. “Japan, Vietnam, EU agree to find ways to resolve ASEM row,” Kyodo, July 2, 2004.

Germany's Constitution and participation in international peacekeeping operations

In this article, Torsten Stein, Professor of Constitutional, European and Public International Law and Director of the Institute of European Studies at the University of Saarland, Saarbrücken, traces the constitutional development that has enabled Germany to take part in a meaningful way in United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKO). As in Japan, Germany's post-war Constitution (Basic Law) was held to prohibit such participation. Germany's Federal Constitutional Court, however, has found an interpretation of the Constitution that - without amending the Constitution or any other pertinent legislation - allows a "German solution" which reconciles the putative post-war prohibitions with Germany's obligations as a member of the United Nations. Stein, who is also a Colonel in the German Air Force Reserve, warns that the "five conditions" contained in Japan's 1992 Peacekeeping Operations Law are unrealistic in view of present day PKO, but envisages an interpretation of the Japanese Constitution that might follow the German example.     

Fora de l'umbracle,de Joan Brossa: una petita revolució personal del maig del 68

Avui dia Joan Brossa és conegut sobretot per la seva poesia visual, però abans dels anys setanta poca gent sabia que el poeta i dramaturg català, tot i conrear-la des de 1941, tenia també una obra plàstica. El 1963 es produeix el primer transvasament de poesia visual dins un llibre de poesia literària: El saltamartí. Uns anys després, el 1968, Brossa compon Fora de l'umbracle, un autèntic aiguabarreig de poemes visuals i literaris que es converteix en el preàmbul de les publicacions visuals de l'any 70. L'article tracta d'aquest poemari, que romangué inèdit fins al 2012 i constitueix un autèntic reflex de l'esperit del maig francès del 68. El llibre és revolucionari perquè (a) inicia la revolució lletrista tipogràfica brossiana; (b) es fa ressò de la revolució política i social que el maig del 68 significà per a tota Europa; i (c) en gran mesura sintetitza la revolució poètica conceptual que Brossa havia començat el 1950 amb Em va fer Joan Brossa BrossaJ.1951. Em va fer Joan Brossa. Barcelona: Edicions Cobalto [Google Scholar]. D'una manera desprotegida (fora de l'umbracle) Brossa ens mostra la realitat despullada de l'Europa del 68 des de perspectives que van més enllà de les avantguardes europees de postguerra.1^?1. Aquest treball forma part del projecte “La poesia experimental catalana des de 1959 a 2004,” subvencionat pel Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación: FFI2010-18880 (subprograma FILO) i també ha rebut un ajut de l'Agrupació de Recerca de Ciències de l'Educació de la Universitat de Barcelona.     

Putin and the Public Chamber

In 2004, Putin created a Public Chamber to enhance state-society dialogue and civilian oversight of the state system. Drawing on interviews with individuals active in Russian civil society or the foreign donor community, this article investigates the Public Chamber's role in legitimating Putin's regime. It examines the vision of state and civil society in the doctrine of "sovereign democracy"; Kremlin strategies for enforcing the narrow parameters this vision gives the public sphere; the model of civil society the Chamber provides, and its actual workings. The Public Chamber's ability to legitimate the regime is considered in the context of civil society's status in Russia.     

Post‐War Reconstruction and the New World Order: The Origins Of Gough Whitlam's Democratic Citizen*

Gough Whitlam's father was one of Australia's most significant public servants. Deputy Crown Solicitor and Crown Solicitor at a time of great constitutional and international change, Frederick Whitlam maintained an unusually advanced perspective on the use of international instruments to protect rights and to expand powers of nationhood. Gough Whitlam's war‐time experiences in the Air Force, in particular during the referendum campaign to expand Commonwealth Powers to aid post‐war reconstruction, cemented these aspects as central to his developing notions of democratic citizenship. In his 1973 Sir Robert Garran Memorial lecture, fourteen years after his father had delivered the inaugural oration, Gough Whitlam acknowledged the influence of his father as a “great public servant” committed to public service and the developing institutions of internationalism: “I am Australia's first Prime Minister with that particular background”. This paper explores “that particular background”. I have never wavered from my fundamental belief that until the national government became involved in great matters like schools and cities, this nation would never fulfil its real capabilities. ¹ 1 E.G. Whitlam, Sir Robert Garran Memorial Oration, “Australian Public Administration under a Labor Government”, Royal Australian Institute of Public Administration, 12 November 1973, < http://www.whitlam.org/collection/1973/ > accessed 31 October 2006.
     

THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO PAKISTANI AND IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: A STUDY IN PARADOX

This article explores the paradox in the reaction of the United States to the two different proliferation cases: Pakistan's proliferation and Iran's weaponization effort. The article tries to find answer to the following key question; why the United States, as one of the guardians of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) which would prefer to see a region that is entirely free of weapons of mass destruction, ultimately has accepted Pakistan's proliferation, while imposed considerable amount of pressure to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The paper posits that number of factors explain such differences; first, and at the theoretical level, Pakistan was never considered an “irrational” and “messianic” state like Iran, but regarded as a country with a certain degree of cold-war type nuclear rationality. Second and at the applied level, while Pakistan was a US ally with not having a history of challenging the United States, Iran has been considered enemy and a threat toward the US interest.

Third, while Pakistan's nuclear arsenal was viewed as a defensive mean against overwhelming strength of India, Iran's possible nuclear arsenal considered to be for offensive uses against the United States and Israel. The fourth factor pertains to the consequences of proliferation, which is what happens when Iran's neighboring countries may feel threatened by Iranian nuclear weapon and proceed to develop their own arsenal. Fifth factor deals with the possible Iran's temptation to give some nuclear material to a terror group in which made the United States serious in preventing Iran's weaponization. Last but not least, Israel was not involved to pressure and agitate against Pakistan, while it was applied a tremendous pressure against Iran to prevent it from achieving nuclear weapons.