The evolution of insanity standards

Health care professionals are often called upon as expert witnesses in insanity determinations. Most are familiar with the “insanity standard” applicable in the court in which they are called to testify. It might be helpful to understand that not all jurisdictions apply the same standard and how the different standards are related. This article is intended to address the problems associated with each insanity “test” presently in use and how “determining” insanity is an evolutionary process.     

The decision to provide discovery: an examination of policies and guilty pleas

Journal of Experimental Criminology - Prosecutors’ decisions to provide discovery can have vast implications for defendants. When prosecutors do not provide exculpatory information in the...     

Schizotypal personality disorder and the insanity defense

What constitutes a "mental disorder" for purposes of the insanity defense? Does mental disorder denote any diagnosable condition listed in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders? Is a mental disorder a disturbance wherein the functional criteria of the appropriate insanity law appear to be met? Or does insanity law define mental disorder apart from functional criteria of insanity? The answer to the last question is that some insanity laws attempt to define or qualify mental disorder, but many do not. Unclarities in the law leave room for unnecessary disagreements between expert witnesses even before the functional criteria for insanity are to be addressed. The potential for confusion is compounded when the defendant's disturbance is ambiguous, amphibious, or both. Schizotypal personality disorder is offered as an example of such a disturbance, and inferences are discussed.     

The social construction of criminal responsibility and insanity

This study examines the effects of judicial instructions (traditional American Law Institute [ALI] not guilty by reason of insanity [NGRI] instructions contrasted with ALI instructions supplemented with the guilty but mentally ill [GBMI] alternative) and case information cues (delusional content and planfulness) on student and community subjects' attributions of responsibility. GBMI instructions substantially reduced the probability of NGRI and guilty verdicts in response to vignettes portraying highly psychotic defendants and altered the pattern of variability in responsibility construal ratings. Variation in delusional content cues (self-defense versus non-self-defense) influenced ratings of criminal appreciation but did not affect the verdict distributions. Less planfully commited crimes resulted in higher proportions of insanity verdicts. However, individual differences in responsibility construals of the defendant and in attitudes toward the insanity defense were stronger predictors of verdicts than the design variables, suggesting that individual differences in social-moral cognition are at least as relevant to the attribution of responsibility as are case cues or legal frames of reference. Contrary to previous studies,Witherspoon death penalty attitudes were not related to verdicts, but people without conscientious scruples toward the death penalty were more likely to render guilty verdicts.     

The death-qualified jury and the defense of insanity

We predicted that people who are excluded from serving on juries in capital cases due to their opposition to the death penalty (excludable subjects) tend to place a greater value on the preservation of due process guarantees than on efficient crime control, and therefore are more likely to accept an insanity defense in criminal cases than are people who are permitted to serve on capital juries (death-qualified subjects). Subjects who had previously been classified as death-qualified or excludable read four summaries of cases in which the defendant entered a plea of insanity, and made judgments of guilt or innocence. In the two cases involving nonorganic disorders (schizophrenia), death-qualified subjects were significantly more likely than excludable subjects to vote guilty; in the two cases involving organic disorders (mental retardation and psychomotor epilepsy), there were no differences between the two groups. In addition, excludable subjects gave significantly higher estimates than death-qualified subjects of the proportion of defendants pleading insanity who really are insane.     

司法精神病辩护中证明模式的反思与完善

司法精神病辩护是刑事辩护制度中的一项重要内容.当前世界范围内存在两种精神病辩护证明模式:职权式精神病审查模式与对抗式精神病辩护模式.我国目前的精神病辩护证明模式属于职权式精神病审查模式,在实践中存在诸多问题值得反思.司法精神病鉴定因涉及精神病医学、心理学、法学等诸多领域的专门知识而呈现复杂性,而科学、合理的诉讼证明程序可以抵消司法精神病鉴定中的消极因素.我国职权式精神病审查模式应当吸收对抗式精神病辩护模式中的合理因素,在权力配置上逐渐限缩职权机关的权力,赋予当事人更多的权利;在证明责任上由辩护方承担推进责任,由控诉方承担说服责任;在证明标准上建立司法精神病鉴定启动与精神病辩护二元化的证明标准体系.     

Evaluation and treatment of insanity acquittees in the community

This paper describes the monitored outpatient treatment program for Psychiatry Security Review Board (PSRB) clients in the largest single community treatment agency in the Oregon system. We describe 161 persons referred to this agency for evaluation and treatment. Ninety-one PSRB clients received treatment and of this group 51% had their conditional release revoked by the PSRB. The most frequent cause of revocation was noncompliance with treatment. There were only 11 crimes committed during the study period, four of which were in the felony range. The majority of PSRB clients are chronically mentally ill persons. We discuss both the treatment approach and our results in light of a recently published research agenda for insanity acquittees.     

Demythologizing inaccurate perceptions of the insanity defense

Public opinion data show that the most prevalent concern expressed regarding the insanity defense is that it is a loophole through which would-be criminals escape punishment for illegal acts. This article examines the extent to which the public's perceptions of the insanity defense are consistent with newly collected empirical data. Specifically, it compares perceptions of the use, success, and outcomes associated with the insanity defense to data derived from a large-scale study of insanity pleas in eight states. The analysis reveals that the public overestimates the use and success of an insanity defense and underestimates the extent to which insanity acquittees are confined upon acquittal. The role of selective media reporting in the formation of public perceptions is discussed.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1992 meetings of the Society for the Study of Social Problems. Special thanks go to John Monahan and Joel Dvoskin for reviewing an earlier draft and to Sharon Steadman for providing editorial comments.     

Community standards of criminal liability and the insanity defense

Two experiments (N=71) compare lay standards of insanity to standards incorporated in American legal codes. In Experiment 1, case vignettes provided only legally relevant information about defendants' degrees of impairment in cognition or in behavioral control. Respondents' judgments of criminal liability ornot guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) reflected an exculpatory standard of substantial impairment in both cognition and control. In Experiment 2, case vignettes provided realistic information about defendants' psychiatric diagnoses; respondents had to infer levels of cognitive and control impairment. Results showed that respondents made highly idiosyncratic inferences based on diagnostic categories, but once made, these inferences predicted NGRI judgments. Implications of the concordance between laypeople's rules for assigning NGRI verdicts and the rules used in American legal codes are discussed.Daniel Bailis gratefully acknowledges the support of Public Health Service grant No. 5T32 MH18021-07 for Research Training in Social Psychology during the time in which the present research was conducted. John Darley wished to acknowledge the generous support of the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation and Princeton University. Study 2 presents work done for the Princeton University undergraduate thesis of Tracy Waxman. The authors are grateful to Norman J. Finkel, Valerie Hans, and three anonymous reviewers for comments on an earlier draft on this article.Northwestern University.     

Do lesser pleas pay?: Accommodations in the sentencing and parole processes

One of the important questions in the discussion of plea negotiation is whether a person who has received a labeling break by exchanging a plea of guilty for a reduced charge, really benefits in terms of the sentence he receives or the time he serves. The present study analyzes differences in sentence lengths or in actual periods of incarceration according to such variables as original charge, type of plea, conviction charge, and magnitude of charge reductions.The study shows that charge reduction may have pay-offs to the extent of directly reducing the maximum sentence possible and indirectly reducing the actual amount of time served. There are indications, however, that the parole process tends to neutralize the sentence differentials associated with charge reduction. The ratio between the time served and the sentence imposed tends to get higher as the magnitude of charge reduction increases.