How federalism influences welfare spending: Belgium federalism reform through the perspective of the synthetic control method

The question of whether and how federalism influences a country's welfare state has been a longstanding concern of political scientists. However, no agreement exists on exactly how, and under what conditions, federal structures impact the welfare state. This article examines this controversy. It concludes theoretically that the specific constellation of federal structures and distribution of powers need to be considered when theorising the effects of federalism on the welfare state. Using the case of Belgium and applying the synthetic control method, it is shown in the article that without the federalism reform of 1993, the country would have had further decreases in social spending rather than a consolidation of this spending in the years after 1993. In the case of Belgium, the combination of increased subnational spending autonomy in a still national financing system provided ideal conditions for a positive federalism effect on social spending to occur.     

The politics of Belgium: Institutions and policy under bipolar and centrifugal federalism

This volume seeks to provide an integrated understanding of the Belgian political system through the prism of comparative politics. The transformation of the political system from a unitary into a federal system is used as a connecting theme linking the contributions. The volume is divided in two parts. The first part touches upon the sociological and institutional determinants of policy-making in Belgium, such as the dynamics of the Belgian federal system, the consociational features of the Belgian polity, the presence of a Belgian political culture (or of two distinct political cultures), the fragmentation of its party system and the role of political parties. The second part addresses policy performance and policy reform within the context of Belgian federalism, with a focus on divergence in policy performance and administrative practices, social security as a contentious federal policy area, policy failure and corruption and the impact of EU policies on the domestic federal order.     

Drug policy and federalism

Supply restricting drug policy is inefficient from an economic point of view, but is nevertheless widely used. This paper explains this phenomenon as individually rational behavior for local government. Because supply restriction gives addicts an incentive to migrate it has an external effect. This effect makes a policy of supply restrictions individually rational but leads to socially wasteful competition between local governments in a federal system.     

Diversity,federalism and the nineteenth-century liberals

This paper provides an argument in favour of federal institutional design on the basis that it is more congenial to the preservation and promotion of normatively desirable societal diversity than its unitary alternative. Seeking inspiration in the work of three of the most influential liberal thinkers of the nineteenth century: John Stuart Mill; Alexis de Tocqueville; and Lord Acton, I construct a novel case for federalism that focuses on the inherent benefits of a dual/multi-layered governmental structure. Section one argues for the value of diversity, stating that it can both improve the authenticity of individually exercised autonomy, and improve the quality of individually espoused moral views. Section two considers the potential dangers posed by the unitary state to the flourishing of diversity through the centralisation of key institutions. Section three shows how the federal model sidesteps these pitfalls, and offers a more auspicious environment for the cultivation and enjoyment of diversity.     

Communism,federalism and Islam

Andreas Kappeler, Gerhard Simon and Georg Brunner (eds.), Muslim Communities Re‐emerge. Historical Perspectives on Nationality, Politics and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, trans, from the German and French by Caroline Sawyer, English edn. ed. Edward Allworth. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994. xiv+365pp. Append. Ind. Tables. £23.50 pbk.     

Asymmetric federalism and economic voting

Although federal arrangements adopt a multiplicity of forms across and within federations, this article suggests that some models of power division are better than others at enhancing clarity of responsibility and electoral accountability. This conclusion is the result of exploring responsibility attribution and economic voting in a state where decentralisation arrangements vary across regions: the Spanish State of Autonomies. Using electoral surveys and aggregated economic data for the 1982–2012 period, the empirical analysis shows that regional economic voting is most pronounced in regions where decentralisation design concentrated authority and resources at one level of government, whereas it is inexistent in regions where devolution followed a more intertwined model of power distribution. The implication of the empirical findings is that the specific design of intergovernmental arrangements is crucial to make electoral accountability work in federations.     

On the political and fiscal determinants of income redistribution under federalism and democracy: evidence from Germany

Several recent studies suggest that transfers from central to regional governments are motivated by political considerations. In this paper we examine if this is also the case for transfers from regional to central governments in the context of the German fiscal equalization system. We examine the factors that contribute to differences in tax revenues across German states. The evidence indicates that both fiscal incentives and political factors can explain these differences, although in Germany the former are more important. Moreover, accounting for fiscal institutions has important consequences for the empirical assessment of political influences on taxation. Overall we find that the political affiliation of the state governor is an important factor in explaining differences in state tax revenues. Thus, the right-wing party (CDU/CSU) is effective in relaxing the tax burden at the state level. In contrast, partisan alignment between the state government and the federal government loses its importance once fiscal conditions enter the empirical model.     

Belgian federalism: Towards complexity and asymmetry

From the beginning of the twentieth century, tendencies towards decentralisation began to take shape in the Belgian unitary state. They resulted in a federal concept in 1988. The constitutional reformers of 1988 worked out a strikingly original concept. Not only do the constituent parts differ thoroughly at the economic, social, ideological and linguistic‐cultural levels, but there is also an incredible degree of complexity and asymmetry among the newly‐created institutions themselves, as witness the extreme case of the political structures in the Brussels region. This sui generis can be understood only by looking at it against a background of the complex political evolution of the last few decades and in particular the equally complex process by which the 1988 government was formed.     

Intergovernmental councils and centralization in Australian federalism

ABSTRACT

This paper explores how a high level of vertical intergovernmentalism and a low level of horizontal intergovernmentalism reflect as well as contribute to a high degree of centralization in Australian federalism and in the role and activity of intergovernmental councils (IGCs). Pre-eminent among the latter is the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), which sits at the apex of a system of ministerial councils and attendant agencies. Policy coordination is the principal motivation behind the Commonwealth’s use of COAG. The States established their own horizontal body in 2006 but that faded quickly in an experience that confirmed the underlying realities of Australian federalism.     

Current challenges to multinational federalism in India

India’s multinational federation has experienced multiple challenges in the last 25 years, relating to the rise of coalition politics and the process of economic liberalization, both of which have increased the power of some of the states of the federation at the expense of others. The internal borders of India continue to be restructured, with the latest state, Telangana, created in 2014. India is often seen as a successful multinational federation, but it is important to recognize the limitations of this success, as well as the areas where the rise of an aggressive Hindu nationalism poses a powerful threat to India’s multinational federal democracy.     

Optimal federalism: A model of psychological dependence

Increased size, scope, and visibility of government may strengthen relations of psychological dependence, an unintended aggregate effect of liberal programs. Such an effect depends upon the dominant phenomenological world of the citizenry which intersects objective trends: dependence,éminence grise identification, or enlightened maturity.A model of self-conceptions and emotional syndromes characteristic of the two parties in a dependency relationship predicts there will be objectively inconsistent and unrealistic expectations and demands by both parties, inadequate rationality and program evaluation, and mutual frustration, mistrust, and disillusionment. Trends in American politics suggest the possibility of an increasing dependency substructure. If dependency relations are growing, then the political and administrative problems outlined can be expected to increase.I am indebted to Lynn Etheredge and Jeff Pressman for discussions which partially stimulated this hybrid of topics.     

The influence of federalism on fiscal policy making

Abstract. This article attempts to refine the statement that federal states face difficulties in fiscal policy making because of the territorial division of powers by comparing two federal countries, Canada and Germany. These two countries differ in terms of their type of federalism: Canada displaying a power-separation system and Germany corresponding to a power-sharing type. According to the authors, the territorial factor influences fiscal policy making through the distribution of taxing and spending powers as well as through patterns of intergovernmental relations. The use of fiscal policy instruments and the likely effects on conflict and cooperation in those two countries is discussed with empirical evidence. The authors come to the conclusion that federalism is indeed a constraint on fiscal policy making, but that the two types of power division face different obstacles and deal differently with fiscal problems. In the power-separation system of Canada, the federal government has encompassing competencies to use fiscal policy instruments unilaterally and without restraint, but faces a lack of concerted action with the provinces which reduces its scope of action in fiscal policy making. In the power-sharing system in Germany, concerted action facilitates macroeconomic stabilisation strategies but the compulsory negotiation system distorts the use of fiscal policy instruments by distributive bargaining.