The rules of capitalism

This paper discusses the background to the Palestinian elections and highlights the fact that they are the first democratic elections since 1996. It discusses the reasons for Hamas's participation and the problems it faced. It also examines what issues the electoral candidates needed to touch on in order to win the election. The paper highlights the fact that Fatah's days are over because of widespread corruption. It touches on how Hamas now needs to deal with the international community and how it can compromise with Israel. The paper emphasises that Hamas is the people's choice and that, because it has many obstacles ahead of it, the international community needs to allow it time and to monitor its progress, watching how it deals with being in the real political realm.     

The terrorists' dilemmas: Some implicit rules of the game 1

Abstract

Knowledge of certain dilemmas faced by terrorists may serve to narrow the options available to the opposing parties and aid in varying government response to terrorist acts. Such dilemmas are the identification with violence, the problem of attacking or seeking a negotiated incident, choice of level of terror, maintenance of one's objectivity within a group characterized by conformity, and retaining one's identity as a historic victim.     

When the doctor gets infected. Medical workers who harbor the AIDS virus may face new rules

Growing public anxiety has prompted federal officials to consider a controversial shift in policy: asking medical workers to take tests for HIV infection.     

Parties, rules and government legislative control in Central Europe: The case of Poland

A distinguishing feature of Central European polities is a strong policy-shaping role of parliaments. This article demonstrates how party political and procedural factors set the scene for the executive's loss of legislative control in Poland. Parties undermine the governmental grip because of their limited internal cohesion and competitive coalitional strategies. Parliamentary rules reinforce such party effects. The executive can shield its bills from amendments by relying mainly on partisan controls, not formal privileges. But, as an analysis of over 300 bills shows, when party discipline and coalition cooperation are in short supply, partisan controls are ineffective as instruments of legislative control.