State‐Building and the European Union's Fight against Corruption in the Southern Caucasus: Why Legitimacy Matters

This article asks under which conditions the state‐building efforts of external actors in areas of limited statehood are likely to be effective. We argue that the legitimacy of the specific norms promoted by external actors among local actors is crucial for their success in strengthening state capacities. International efforts need to resonate with prevalent social norms. To substantiate this argument, we focus on the European Union's (EU) anticorruption programs and their implementation in one of the most corrupt regions in the world, the Southern Caucasus. We show that legitimacy can explain why the EU's fight against corruption helped reduce corruption in Georgia but not in Armenia. In both countries, political elites could selectively use anticorruption programs as an instrument against political opponents, using enhanced state capacities to stabilize the incumbent regime. Only in Georgia, however, was the fight against corruption facilitated by sustained domestic mobilization for anticorruption policies that added pressure on political elites “from below.”     

Not Just Steering but Weaving: Relevant Knowledge and the Craft of Building Policy Capacity and Coherence

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Debt Issued Through Others: Conduits,Joint Powers Authorities,and Borrowing Costs in California Local Governments

The issuance of debt is a complicated and time‐consuming task requiring governments to pay substantial fixed transaction costs. Conduit financings, where one entity issues debt on behalf of a government, including bond pools, where multiple governments issue debt together, are methods that offer the potential to reduce the burdens of participating governments, ideally lowering their costs. But conduit hosts have costs of their own to cover and may not be able to offer a cost advantage to their participants. In this paper we examine debt issued under the Marks Roos Act of 1985, a law created to facilitate pooling but actually used for conduit financing. We seek to determine how issuers fare using this mechanism rather than issuing by themselves. We examine issuance costs and borrowing costs (true interest cost) and find both to be significantly lower for those governments that issued by themselves.     

Why Governments Innovate: Adoption and Implementation of Open Source Software by Four European Cities

ABSTRACT

A growing number of governments will consider and even choose to migrate to an alternative operating system that uses Free/Open Source Software (FOSS). This research examines why governments choose to migrate and what factors affect implementation. Drawing on a comparative case study of four cities, I find that governments decide to migrate for a range of factors, but are driven more by democratic values such as independence and self-determination than by a desire to cut costs or save money. I also find that implementation is affected by a variety factors but in particular by information technology's place within a city's organizational structure.     

Why Overcoming Prejudice is Not Enough: A Rejoinder to Richard Rorty

Abstract

Misrecognition, taken seriously as unjust social subordination, cannot be remedied by eliminating prejudice alone. In this rejoinder to Richard Rorty, it is argued that a politics of recognition and a politics of redistribution can and should be combined. However, an identity politics that displaces redistribution and reifies group differences is deeply flawed. Here, instead, an alternative ‘status’ model of recognition politics is offered that encourages struggles to overcome status subordination and fosters parity of participation. Integrating this politics of recognition with redistribution enables a coherent Left vision that could redress injustices of culture and of political economy simultaneously.     

State Welfare Options: Why Are Some States Tough?

In implementing PRWORA, why have some states chosen the most stringent or toughest policy options allowed by the new law? A considerable literature on state policy decisions addresses this topic. The most consistent finding is that “tough states” are those with a conservative ideology and historically high rates of welfare use by minority populations. These conservative policies impact all welfare recipients in the state, regardless of race or sex.     

Counterpoint Essay: Nine Reasons Why the CFO Act May Not Achieve its Objectives

The goals of the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990 are numerous and highly ideal. While these goals are commendable, several potential roadblocks to their achievement may exist. This article points out nine such potential reasons why, in practice, the CFO Act's goals may not be obtainable.     

What Wins Votes: Why Some Politicians Opt Out of Clientelism

In a context where clientelism is widespread, why do some politicians choose not to condition the delivery of goods and services to citizens on individual political behavior? I argue that the answer to this question lies in the heretofore unexamined electoral costs of clientelism: clientelism decreases support from nonpoor constituents even while it generates votes from among the poor. Taking into account these costs and other factors that shape politician incentives, I posit that the interaction between political competition and poverty will explain variation in clientelism. I test this claim using an original measure of clientelism that assesses mayoral involvement in social policy implementation in Argentine municipalities. The results of statistical analysis suggest that high levels of political competition are compatible with clientelism when poverty is also high. Only when high competition is coupled with low rates of poverty does clientelism decline.