从安南秘书长的改革方案看联合国改革前景

从安南秘书长的改革方案看联合国改革前景●钱文荣联合国改革已成为当前国际社会普遍关注的焦点。安南秘书长的改革方案集数十种，其中多数系西方国家方案之大成。方案一提出，受到联合国全体会员国的强烈反响，或赞同，或谨慎欢迎，或嫌不足。安南未提及的安理会改革更是...     

南明与安南关系初探

南明初期，安南仍与南明政权保持了较好关系。随着清军逐步南进，安南开始改变对南明的态度。清军进入广西、云南后，虽然南明仍有永历政权，安南各政权已开始建立了与清朝的宗藩关系。这段历史反映了古代中越关系史中，不是正统观念，而是政治实力才是双方建立朝贡关系的基础。     

唐代中原与越南文人的友好往来诗

安南,隋代称为交趾郡。唐高祖武德五年(622年),改为交州总管府。唐高宗调露元年(679年),改交州都督府为安南都护府,以此改称安南。随着唐代经济文化的发展,安南与唐朝中央政权的联系进一步加强,中原文人旅居安南的逐渐增多,安南文     

安南资本主义萌芽的几个问题

越南古名安南。唐高宗调露元年。(公元679年),改交州为安南都护府,这是“安南”名称的由来。南宋隆兴二年(1164年)封其王为安南国王此后便称其国为安南。安南辖地包括今越南河内、兴安、北宁、南定、山西、海阳、义安、宁平、清化、河静、宣光、兴化、太原、谅山、高平、广安、广平、广治、广南、广义以及迤南地区。本文打算就一八○四年以前,安南地区资本主义萌芽的几个问题作初步的考察。     

唐诗《赠马植》、《题旅榇》与安南士人关系略说

唐代诗文对于研究7～10世纪越南历史和当时安南地区与中原地区士人之交往具有重要史料价值。唐诗《赠马植》被越南学者认为系9世纪佚名越南人所作。笔者从诗中用典、意境以及马植卸任安南都护职务的历史背景等分析，推测作者为马植本人，而非越南人。对于该诗意义的解读，笔者也提出一些与越南学者不同的看法。唐代安南地区文化逐渐发展，不少士人善吟诗作赋，但流传至今的并不多见。廖有方《题旅榇》即是其中一首。     

世界大事综览

2012年8月世界大事综述如下:一、安南辞去叙利亚问题特使,阿尔及利亚前外长接任。3日,联合国秘书长潘基文宣布,联合国—阿盟叙利亚危机联合特使安南将于月底任期结束后去职,不再担任特使。安南称,他退出的理由是叙利亚政府拒绝就"安南六点计划"作出妥协与让步,而叙利亚反对派也在持续不断地扩大军事     

论1406年明朝与安南战争的原因

中越边界相接,自古交往频繁,明代亦然。然而永乐四年(公元1406年)却发生明朝讨伐安南的战争,接着是安南20年的明属期。关于此战原因,我国学者过去碍于中越关系,很少探讨;越南学者则认为此战是明朝建立以来对安南采取侵略政策的结果,这是值得商榷的。明朝建立以来对安南到底采取什么政策?明太祖对安南主要采取招抚租平政策,他在洪武二年(公元1369年)颁示的“皇明祖训”中把安南列入15不征国之列,在历次遣使招谕安     

每月大事综述

每月大事综述甘爱兰１９９８年２月大事：（一）安南成功调解海湾危机。伊拉克武器核查危机引发的美伊对抗箭拔弩张。伊拉克难作出让步，美国态度强硬，要求伊“全面和无条件地”同意武器核查，并迅速在海湾水域部署重兵，不断发出动武威胁。２０日，联合国秘书长安南访伊...     

三跪九叩与五拜三叩：清朝与安南的礼仪之争

清朝定鼎中原后,以三跪九叩的拜天之礼取代了明朝的五拜三叩之礼,这一礼仪也适用于朝贡之国与清朝的礼仪。已习惯了五拜三叩的安南从此与清朝进行了长达百年的礼仪之争。其间清朝使臣出使安南时,对此礼仪之争采取了并不一致的态度。引起双方关注的主要有杭奕禄使团和德保使团,杭奕禄使团与安南的争执使安南专门就礼仪之争问题向清廷上了奏章,德保使团的争执使双方最终解决了礼仪之争。     

从安南报告看联合国改革前景

2005年3月21日,安南秘书长正式向第59届联大提交了关于联合国改革的全面报告———《大自由:实现人人共享的安全、发展和人权》(以下简称安南报告),①并敦促各会员国在今年9月召开的联合国首脑会议上达成共识,实施改革。今年恰逢二战结束与联合国成立60周年,也是联合国改革进程中的决定性一年。安南报告如被国际社会采纳,将对21世纪的国际关系产生极为深远的影响。鉴此,本文拟就安南报告各要点及联合国改革前景加以分析。首先,关于穷国的发展问题。安南报告将发展与“免于匮乏”的自由放在“三大自由”之首,较准确地反映了当今世界南北之间…     

The Renewed ‘Struggle for Syria’: From the War ‘in’ Syria to the War ‘over’ Syria

ABSTRACT

Syria is generally considered a case of non-intervention. One of the dominant (since the 1990s) kinds of intervention, namely multilateral humanitarian intervention, failed, as did other attempts by a select group of countries to implement a ‘red line’ concerning the use of chemical weapons. However, in this case, there is no sharp dichotomy between intervention and non-intervention. In lieu of an intervention that would tilt the balance and coordinate help to halt massacres, various rival and uncoordinated international and regional interventions overlapped over time, fuelling a market for violence. ‘Weakened interventionism’, as opposed to principled and hierarchical intervention, has manifested itself in Syria in a model recalling “the struggle for Syria” of the 1960s in a new, contemporary setting.     

The Radical Crescent: The United States,the Palestine Liberation Organisation,and the Lebanese Civil War, 1973–1978

This analysis examines the efforts by the Palestine Liberation Organisation [PLO] to formalise relations with the United States before and after the October 1973 Arab–Israeli War. It details the public and private attempts by PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat to present the organisation as a legitimate partner for negotiations with Israel. However, the American secretary of state and national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, hindered the PLO’s diplomatic initiatives during the Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford administrations. Kissinger viewed the PLO as an impediment to his efforts to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict through separate peace agreements, rather than a comprehensive solution. Despite Washington’s objections to the PLO, the organisation had regional and international legitimacy, its stature aided by its political and ideological allies. Yet these ties also contributed to the PLO’s involvement in the Lebanese civil war. Kissinger encouraged Syria’s June 1976 invasion of Lebanon to weaken, if not destroy, the PLO as an independent actor. Although the PLO survived Syria’s intervention, Kissinger’s actions and agreements limited the diplomatic initiatives of the Jimmy Carter Administration.     

Understanding the Islamic State’s competitive advantages: Remaking state and nationhood in the Middle East and North Africa

While many researchers have examined the evolution and unique characteristics of the Islamic State (IS), taking an IS-centric approach has yet to illuminate the factors allowing for its establishment in the first place. To provide a clearer explanation for IS’s successes and improve analysts’ ability to predict future occurrences of similar phenomena, we analyze IS’s competitive advantages through the lens of two defining structural conditions in the Middle East North Africa (MENA): failure of state institutions and nationhood. It is commonly understood that the MENA faces challenges associated with state fragility, but our examination of state and national resiliency shows that Syria and Iraq yield the most deleterious results in the breakdown of the nation, suggesting that the combined failure of state and nation, as well as IS’s ability to fill these related vacuities, is a significant reason IS thrives there today. Against this backdrop, we provide a model of IS’s state- and nation-making project, and illustrate IS’s clear competitive advantages over all other state and non-state actors in both countries, except for Kurdish groupings. We conclude with recommendations on how policy-makers may begin halting and reversing the failure of both state and nation in Iraq and Syria.     

Turkish–Syrian relations in the wake of the Syrian conflict: back to securitization?

This paper analyses the bilateral relations between Turkey and Syria since the breakout of the popular uprising in 2011, with particular reference to a securitization–desecuritization framework. The author inquires whether Turkish policymakers have securitized the Syrian civil war and framed it in security-laden discourse in the time period under review. Turkey extended strong support to the demonstrations and invested efforts towards a regime change. Assad’s response was unfriendly. Both the Assad regime’s policy vis-à-vis Turkey and the repercussions of the civil war in Syria posed serious threats to Turkish national security. However, based on the analysis of official statements by Turkish authorities during the crisis, the author argues that Turkey avoided framing the Syrian refugee crisis in security terms, whereas border violations, such as the downing of a military aircraft by Syrian regime forces, were defined as threats to national security. The paper further discusses the reasons for Turkey’s selective approach to issues concerning bilateral relations with Syria.     

Russia as a Gravity Pole of the GCC’s New Foreign Policy Pragmatism

Abstract

Despite the obvious differences over the Syrian crisis and Iran, the GCC countries do not seem to be distancing themselves from Russia politically. To a large extent that is due to Russia’s growing military role (in Syria) and military cooperation (with Iran), as well as the diminishing role of the United States under Obama. Having accepted the situation in Syria (after the fall of Aleppo) as a fait accompli, the GCC’s elites seem to be looking at Russia as a powerful player able to reduce the scope of Iran’s expansion in the region. Their approach involves a carefully established mechanism of economic interaction exploiting Russia’s need for GCC finances and arms acquisitions.     

Solitude in Europe for the communists

The Russian government sincerely believes that Assad’s removal from power would trigger the expansion of jihadism and instability in the Caucasus and southern Russia. Moscow is deeply concerned about the rise of Islamists in the Middle East, including Qatar and Saudi Arabia's efforts to support the most radical factions in Syria. At the same time, the obvious absence of the ideological background behind current Russian-Syrian relations makes them a trade item. Thus, official guarantees that the jihadists will not export their revolution elsewhere accompanied by promises to preserve some Russian economic positions in post-Assad Syria will probably create the necessary ground for the emergence of a compromise stance on Syria (including the issue of foreign intervention).     

The Arab Uprisings and the Geopolitics of the Middle East

The contest between Saudi Arabia and Iran played out in Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, postwar Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Yemen and Bahrain, has shaped the geopolitics of the region since the 2003 US invasion and occupation of Iraq. The Arab uprisings intensified this geopolitical contest and spread it to Syria. The sectarianisation of the region’s geopolitical battles, and the instrumental use of some of the uprisings for geopolitical ends, has hardened sectarian sentiments across the region, complicated post-authoritarian democratic transitions, and, at least in Syria’s case, transformed its popular uprising into a veritable civil war.     

Orchestrating peace in South Sudan: exploring the effectiveness of the European Union’s mediation support

ABSTRACT

Previous research has primarily focused on the EU’s high-profile involvement as direct mediator in peace negotiations. Conversely, less attention has been devoted to the EU’s support to third parties’ mediation efforts, which is a significant component of its mediation activities. Addressing this research gap, this article develops a conceptual framework for the systematic analysis of EU mediation support, identifying key mediation support techniques and the conditions for their success. In terms of mediation support techniques, the EU may rely on “endorsement”, “coordination”, “assistance”, and “lending leverage” to empower and steer third party mediators in line with its mediation objectives and values. We illustrate the utility of the conceptual framework for the EU’s support to IGAD in mediating in South Sudan’s civil war. We find that the EU has contributed significantly to IGAD’s empowerment in terms of endorsement, coordination, assistance, and lending leverage. Simultaneously, our analysis also points to important challenges in the EU-IGAD relationship, which relate to challenges concerning strategic engagement with IGAD’s internal politics that are marked by diverging interests and ties of its member states to the conflict parties.     

Failed agreements and their impact on subsequent mediation onset and success in intrastate conflicts

ABSTRACT

What impact do failed mediated agreements have on subsequent mediation onset and success? The question of mediation onset and success is undoubtedly important, given that mediation is one of the international community’s preferred conflict management tools, but its voluntary nature leaves room for the conflict parties to (dis)agree to talks and possible settlements. Existing research suggests that previous mediation outcomes can affect subsequent mediation efforts positively or negatively – depending on the outcome in focus. This article argues that failed agreements – an outcome of mediation that has not been accounted for in existing literature – underscore the persistence of the commitment problem, and therefore the hazards of sharing private information. Consequently, the conflict parties question the utility of mediation, and the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset decreases. If subsequent talks take place despite the failed agreement, the conflict parties refrain from sharing private information, and reaching an agreement becomes thus less likely. Drawing on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) Managing Intrastate Conflict in Africa data set and the UCDP Peace Agreement data set, the results strongly underline the negative impact failed agreements have on subsequent mediation onset, and thereby show that agreement longevity is crucial not only for peace duration but also for leaving the door open to subsequent talks.     

We do negotiate with terrorists: navigating liberal and illiberal norms in peace mediation

The normative framework in mediation processes is growing. Mediators are increasingly expected by their mandate-givers to incorporate liberal norms such as inclusivity into their overall strategy. However, in the wake of the terrorist attacks that took place on 11 September 2001, and the policy shifts that accompanied the “Global War on Terror”, mediators find themselves simultaneously pressured to design mediation processes actively excluding armed groups proscribed as terrorists and consequently incorporating this illiberal norm of “exclusivity”, barring proscribed groups’ access to negotiations. This article asks what consequences this development has on the normative agency of mediators, based on if and how they incorporate proscribed armed groups into their mediation strategies. It argues that the dichotomy between liberal and illiberal norms has important consequences on a mediator’s normative agency. First, the dichotomy constrains mediators to a single normative standard, rendering only liberal and illiberal views possible. Second, the assumption that liberal norms are “good” and illiberal norms are “bad” engenders a double dichotomy that greatly constrains a mediator’s normative agency. Third, these constraints on a mediator engender new mediation practices such as outsourcing and risk-sharing in an attempt to salvage normative agency. The article contributes to scholarship on norms, terrorism and mediation through providing a more nuanced view of normative parameters in mediation practice.