Dual ballot effects on French presidential vote choice

Relatively little is known about how voters behave under dual ballot voting systems. Do voters follow different decision rules at each ballot? Do they weigh relevant considerations differently on the second ballot, as compared to the first ballot? Does political sophistication condition the way people vote on the first and second ballots? Using survey data from five French presidential elections, we examine these questions and find that voters in France do indeed treat first and second ballots differently. More precisely, we find that both partisanship and ideology matter more on the second ballot. Demographics, socioeconomic status, and political issues, on the other hand, weigh more heavily in the first round. Political sophistication, for its part, does not condition nor reinforce these effects.     

Direct Democracy and Political Efficacy Reconsidered

Some studies have contended that direct democracy has secondary benefits unrelated to its impact on policy. In particular, recent scholarship claims that the American ballot initiative process enhances political efficacy. We began with concerns about the logic and empirical methods underlying this conclusion. We connect this research to the broader political psychology literature and in doing so find little reason to expect a positive relationship between direct democracy and efficacy. Our other contribution is to subject the empirical claim to more extensive testing. In contrast to prior research, we draw from multiple data sources and consider sampling methods. The results consistently fail to indicate that direct democracy generally enhances political efficacy. We find cause for skepticism about the secondary benefits of the ballot initiative process.

Does Political Advertising Persuade?

Well over $1 billion was spent on televised political advertising in the U.S. in 2004. Given the ubiquity of the 30 second spot, one might presume that ads must affect viewers’ vote choices. Somewhat surprisingly, though, scholars have yet to make much progress in confirming this claim. In this paper, we leverage a comprehensive dataset that tracks political ads in the nation’s top media markets and a survey of presidential and U.S. Senate voters in 2004. We ask whether exposure to presidential and Senate advertising influences voters’ evaluations of candidates and the choices that they make at the ballot box. In the end, we find considerable evidence that advertising persuades—and that its impact varies depending on the characteristics of the viewer.

Does Anthropology Still Exist?

In response to Roger Sandall’s critical analysis, the problematic notion of culture in modern anthropology is examined in terms of cultural resistance to globalization. The example of McDonaldization is taken to be a potent instance of cultural globalization. Three conditions for successful cultural resistance to cultural standardization are proposed. The first is cultural in the shape of a strong aesthetic tradition of (national) resistance. This dimension involves some degree of cultural conservatism. The second condition is political, namely a viable and robust civil society that provides the basis for decisive (cultural) leadership. The third element is the involvement of the state in policies that promote and sustain a national heritage. Without this state involvement, global market conditions will largely shape the erosion of local and national cultures. Without a political response to cultural globalization, global market commodities will in all likelihood oust local goods and services. Those societies that lack both a strong aesthetic and an effective political leadership can offer little effective resistance to negative globalization and their local traditions are quickly destroyed. This argument is then examined in terms of a number of societies especially Turkey, China and Japan where the erosion of national cultures is proceeding rapidly. These critical assertions against global standardization require a strong first-order notion of culture which modern anthropology appears to be unable or unwilling to provide.

Voter Choice in the 1995 French Presidential Election

This study estimates a model of voter choice for the first and second ballots of the 1995 French Presidential election. Its objective is to characterize the relative importance of traditional bases of French voter choice such as social class relative to campaign issues and voter evaluations of the economy. The study also seeks to identify candidate-specific bases of voter choice. Multinomial logit analysis of voter choice among the four leading candidates reveals a stronger role for campaign issues than previous studies suggest. Voter-candidate ideological proximity is the strongest predictor of first and second ballot choice, followed by voter perceptions of candidate ability to address unemployment and political corruption. Demographic variables have limited explanatory power in both the first and second ballot models. The parameter estimates demonstrate considerable differences in the bases of voter choice across candidates, with the bases of voter choice for National Front leader Jean-Marie le Pen most distinct from those of the remaining candidates.     

If you like the alternative vote (a.k.a. the instant runoff), then you ought to know about the Coombs rule

We consider four factors relevant to picking a voting rule to be used to select a single candidate from among a set of choices: (1) avoidance of Condorcet losers, (2) choice of Condorcet winners, (3) resistance to manipulability via strategic voting, (4) simplicity. However, we do not try to evaluate all voting rules that might be used to select a single alternative. Rather, our focus is restricted to a comparison between a rule which, under the name ‘instant runoff,’ has recently been pushed by electoral reformers in the US to replace plurality-based elections, and which has been advocated for use in plural societies as a means of mitigating ethnic conflict; and another similar rule, the ‘Coombs rule.’ In both rules, voters are required to rank order candidates. Using the instant runoff, the candidate with the fewest first place votes is eliminated; while under the Coombs rule, the candidate with the most last place votes is eliminated. The instant runoff is familiar to electoral system specialists under the name ‘alternative vote’ (i.e., the single transferable vote restricted to choice of a single candidate). The Coombs rule has gone virtually unmentioned in the electoral systems literature (see, however, Chamberlin et al., 1984). Rather than considering the properties of these two rules in the abstract, we evaluate them in the politically realistic situations where voters are posited to have (at least on balance) single-peaked preferences over alternatives. Evaluating the two rules under this assumption, we argue that the Coombs rule is directly comparable in that Coombs is always as good as AV with respect to two of our four criteria and it is clearly superior to AV with respect to one of the four criteria, namely criterion (2), and is potentially inferior only with respect to criterion (3). Key to this argument are two new propositions. The first new result shows that, under the posited assumption, for four alternatives or fewer, AV is always as likely or more likely to select the Condorcet winner than plurality. The second new result shows that, under the same assumptions, the Coombs rule will always select the Condorcet winner regardless of the number of alternatives.     

Party-related primacy effects in proportional representation systems: evidence from a natural experiment in Polish local elections

We study the primacy effects that occur when voters cast their votes because a candidate or party is listed first on a ballot. In the elections that we analyzed, there are three potential types of such effects that might occur when voters vote for (1) the first candidate listed on the ballot in single-member district (SMD) elections (candidate primacy); (2) the first party listed on the ballot in open-list proportional representation (OLPR) elections (party primacy); or (3) the first candidate on a party list in OLPR elections (list primacy). We estimated the party primacy effect (2) and established that there was no interaction between (2) and (3). A party primacy effect is especially difficult to estimate because parties’ positions on ballots are typically fixed in all multi-member districts (MMDs) and it is impossible to separate the first-position “bonus” from a party’s normal electoral performance. A rare natural experiment allowed us to estimate the primacy party bonus between 6.02 and 8.52% of all votes cast for the 2014 Polish local elections. We attribute the large size of such bonus to the great complexity of voting in the OLPR elections, especially the much longer ballots, voting in many simultaneous elections, and ballot design as a booklet rather than a sheet.

     

Tacit co-operation in three-alternative non-cooperative voting games: A new model of sophisticated behaviour under the plurality procedure

Two models, one due to Farquharson and the other to Niemi-Frank, attempt to account for sophisticated voting behaviour when the voters' preference orderings are common knowledge and communication among Voters is impossible. Having subjected these two models to experimental testing, we have found them lacking. Hence, we propose a new model of sophisticated voting for 3-alternative n-person non-cooperative games under the plurality procedure, which can be extended to other voting procedures and more than three alternatives.The model assumes that voters whose first preference is (one of) the Condorcet winner(s) will (tacitly) co-ordinate their strategies and vote for their first preference, and specifies the conditions under which voters whose second preference is (one of) the Condorcet winner(s) will vote for their second (rather than their first) preference. Consequently, our model predicts that: (i) if there is a single Condorcet winner he or she will be elected; (ii) if there is more than one Condorcet winner the final outcome will be a tie between them; and (iii) when there are cyclical majorities with a single maximin alternative, this alternative will be elected.     

Testing Zaller’s Reception and Acceptance Model in an Intense Election Campaign

The paper provides a test of Zaller’s reception and acceptance model. The theory describes conditions under which a political message is received, and, if received, accepted or rejected. The study deals with the 1988 Canadian election that was fiercely fought over one central issue, the Free Trade Accord with the United States. We use the 1988 Canadian Election Study campaign rolling cross-section survey, and we test Zaller’s propositions about who is most likely to receive and then accept party messages. Our findings provide little support for the model. We suggest that when an issue is hotly debated in an election campaign voters who receive party messages are able to connect these messages to their values and predispositions whatever their level of political awareness.

Mobilizing the Seldom Voter: Campaign Contact and Effects in High-Profile Elections

Decades of research suggests that campaign contact together with an advantageous socioeconomic profile increases the likelihood of casting a ballot. Measurement and modeling handicaps permit a lingering uncertainty about campaign communication as a source of political mobilization however. Using data from a uniquely detailed telephone survey conducted in a pair of highly competitive 2002 U.S. Senate races, we further investigate who gets contacted, in what form, and with what effect. We conclude that even in high-profile, high-dollar races the most important determinant of voter turnout is vote history, but that holding this variable constant reveals a positive effect for campaign communication among “seldom” voters, registered but rarely active participants who—ironically—are less likely than regular or intermittent voters to receive such communication.

Women’s Right to Asylum: Protecting the Rights of Female Asylum Seekers in Europe?

Criticisms have been made against international laws and conventions on asylum and refugees, arguing that these have been based on a male model of definition, which have ignored women’s persecutions. This article will argue that recent developments in European asylum policy have the potential to deepen this discrimination and to further reduce the rights of female asylum seekers. Although there have been some positive developments in jurisprudence that have recognised that gender-specific persecution may be the basis for granting asylum, these advances remain relatively sporadic and are undermined by the operation of random and discretionary exercises of power by bureaucrats and decision makers in many cases. Further, although new developments in asylum policy are in theory “gender neutral,” differences in the material circumstances of men and women who arrive to seek asylum may mean in effect that the implications of these policies are deeply gendered.

Electoral Democracy during Wartime: The 2004 U.S. Election

The U.S. election of 2004 affords an opportunity to investigate how wartime affects presidential voting. The conventional wisdom is that wartime presidents always get reelected, but previous studies have not examined how citizens' attitudes on the war affect their voting. The papers in this special issue investigate this process, looking at how attitudes on the Iraq War, the larger War on Terrorism, and the so-called cultural war affected attitudes toward the presidential candidates and voting. The studies use a wide variety of datasets and survey questions, showing that the different aspects of the war resonate with different voters and that some of the effects of wartime are indirect through increasing the salience of leadership in the election. Wartime presidents do not get reelected automatically; they have had success in reelection because of how they use the war to build an image that can get them reelected.

Human Rights in US Courts: Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation after Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain

In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (1980), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that victims of human rights violations could sue their oppressors civilly in US courts under an eighteenth century law now called the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). Controversy raged over the Filartiga decision and the proper interpretation of the ATCA for 24 years. Then in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004), the Supreme Court issued its first ATCA decision. This essay analyzes the effect of the Sosa decision on the development of human rights law in US courts. I find that while the federal judiciary is responding to some of the Supreme Court’s directives, lower courts still retain a great deal of discretion in handling ATCA cases.

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The unfortunate natural experiment in ballot design: The Scottish Parliamentary elections of 2007

The 2007 Scottish Parliamentary elections were notable for the extensive variation across constituencies in rejected ballots (ranging from 1.90% to 12.09%). This paper uses an unfortunate natural experiment to identify the influence of ballot design on the occurrence of rejected ballots, or ‘residual votes’. In two electoral regions, visual prompts were removed and instructions were abbreviated on the (already poorly designed) ballot papers. Using zero-truncated negative binomial regression to model total residual votes as well as constituency and regional undervotes and overvotes, we find clear evidence that these changes made a major contribution to the extent of residual votes in constituencies within those regions. The findings emphasise that ballot design is not a trivial subject that can be neglected by electoral administrators.     

Representational roles and representative/constituency agreement: The democratic national party convention of 1976

Representational Role Theory is applied to presidential nominating conventions. Delegates to the 1976 Democratic convention are compared to the voters who selected their slates in 10 key presidential preference primaries. Because of party rule restrictions on delegates' behavior, representational roles are not pertinent to what is typically the most important decision of the convention, the first ballet vote for the party's presidential nominee. However, role orientations appear to be useful in understanding two other sets of decisions: (1) the creation of the party platform and (2) voting for the party's presidential nominee in the event that the nomination requires more than one ballot. Other than the first ballot, the Delegate role is not very popular among convention delegates.     

Challenging Privatization: A Conceptual and Theoretical Argument

This is the second of a three-part polemic against the destruction of state owned enterprises in China (the first, “Against Privatization: A Historical and Empirical Argument”, is published in JCPS 13:1, 2008). It critically examines the ideology of privatization and argues for alternative guidelines of reform. The central contention is that a healthy market economy does not require domination of private property; rather it relies on apposite political-legal-ideological power and regulatory-monitoring regimes of accumulation and distribution socially legitimated within a given public culture. Rejecting the fallacies of ownership determinism and precision requirement on property rights for morality and efficiency, this essay clarifies distinction between the notion of exclusive properties and the vision of their socialized utility and management. Justifications for reforming state and private sectors alike in accordance with a unifying commons of social defense and feasibilities of innovative reform measures and policy proposals in that direction, will be elaborated in a third essay titled “Overcoming Privatization: A Strategic and Institutional Argument”.

Status polarization of social welfare attitudes

This paper tests two competing theories of status polarization of social welfare attitudes. One theory, which can broadly be termedsocial-psychological, sees status polarization as a function of identification with social groups. The other, which can be termedeconomic, sees policy preferences as a function of the individual's expected utility from various policies. Using CPS data for the years 1956–1984, we find that the utility maximizing hypothesis has much more explanatory power for the middle and late 1970s. Social class identification, on the other hand, rivals utility maximization as an explanation of policy preferences during the years 1956–1964 and shows a slight resurgence in 1982 and 1984. These results suggest little prospect for a revival of the New Deal party coalitions, barring strong political leadership that defines issues in class terms and polarizes the electorate.     

Transcending Thatcherism? Ideology and the Conservative Party Leadership Mandate of David Cameron

This paper examines the voting motivations of Conservative parliamentarians in the final parliamentary ballot of the Conservative Party leadership election of 2005. By constructing a data set of the voting behaviour of Conservative parliamentarians in the final parliamentary party ballot, and by determining the ideological disposition of the 2005 PCP this paper examines the ideological disposition of the candidates' vis-à-vis their electorate. The paper identifies the increasing Thatcherite nature of the PCP across three dominant ideological divides of contemporary British Conservatism-economic, European, and social, sexual and moral policy. Through such an analysis the paper demonstrates how the modernising David Cameron, who came first in the final parliamentary ballot and then won the membership ballot, transcended the traditional ideological voting motivations of candidates' vis-à-vis their electorate. Most significantly, the paper demonstrates that the European ideological policy divide was not a factor in the succession contest, unlike the succession contests of 1990, 1997 and 2001.     

When Did Health Care Become a Campaign Issue?

Most people mistakenly assume that health care first became a major political issue in 1945 because President Harry S. Truman’s special address to Congress on Nov. 19 of that year marked the first time a sitting president publicly endorsed a national health-care program. But the question of whether—or to what extent—it is the responsibility of government to subsidize health care for its citizens has been around for a much longer amount of time. Now that health care has become a major focus of domestic political debate, especially in light of the impending presidential election, this article, modified from an entry in the forthcoming Encyclopedia of Campaigns, Elections, & Electoral Behavior (Sage Publications), serves to inform the reader of the origins and history of health care as a campaign issue.

What They Do Does Matter: Incumbent Resource Allocations and the Individual House Vote

It is reasonable to presume that House incumbents through their behaviors and resource allocations (e.g., trips home, staff, etc.) are responsible for their electoral success. The empirical case for the resource allocation hypothesis, however, rests primarily upon the support of a few experimental design studies. The remainder of the evidence from 25 years of tests of this hypothesis, at the district and individual-levels, is littered with null findings. Scholars suggest two methodological obstructions hinder alternative hypothesis findings: simultaneity bias (in district and individual-level studies), and restricted variance on the allocation measures (in individual-level studies). In this investigation I apply methodological remedies for these hindrances-nonrecursive analyses on a pooled (1960–1976) NES elections data set. I uncover the strongest evidence yet that incumbents benefit electorally from their resource allocations (here: bills sponsored and cosponsored, staff, and district offices). In addition to this main result, I also discuss the influence generational replacement has on resource allocations and the vote.