The effect of local political culture on policing behaviors in the 1990s: A retest of Wilson’s theory in more contemporary times

In research on policing, James Q. Wilson was among the first scholars to suggest that local political culture constitutes a significant factor in explaining variation among law enforcement agency practices. Almost forty years after the publication of Varieties of Police Behavior, a classic study of police organizational behavior, Wilson’s monograph remains the basis of a widely held theory used to explain variation in police agency behaviors. More specifically, Wilson (1968) identified three distinctive styles of policing: the legalistic, the watchman, and the service styles. In his empirical work with these styles of policing, Wilson argued that local political culture was the major determinant of variation in policing styles. The purpose of this study was to retest the validity of Wilson’s argument in today’s policing environment. Using panel data collected among police agencies across the U.S. surveyed in 1993, 1996, and 2000, the authors found that there was little evidence to support the application of Wilson’s theory to the practices of contemporary police organizations.     

Local television news and voter support for law enforcement

Television has become “the” medium of the masses in contemporary America. However, there has been very little systematic investigation about television’s impact upon agents of political authority, such as municipal police agencies. This research analyzes potential linkages between voter support for local police and voter viewing habits of local television news. The impact of television news upon voter support for police is assessed in the context of a multivariate model, which includes media and non-media predictor variables. Voter “support” for a municipal police agency is deemed a multidimensional concept and is measured in absolute and relative terms. The findings of this exploratory study suggest that local television news has minimal or no impact (positively or negatively) upon voter attitudes toward local police agencies. The inability of mediaand non-media variables to explain voter support for municipal law enforcement indicates the need for a completely new paradigm to guide research in this niche of criminal justice.     

Rethinking nongovernmental organizations: Neoliberalism, “nonstate” actors,and the politics of recognition in the United States

This article builds on and contributes to the scholarship on social movements and the law by revealing the critical function of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in law and policy in neoliberal times. Building on frame theories in social movement literature, this essay uses the lens of NGO-produced advocacy for binational same-sex couples to consider more broadly the relationship between individual experience, subjectivity, and the discourses and practices employed by NGO actors. It offers an analysis of both how NGOs developed and utilized particular messaging strategies and rhetorical frames to discursively produce a normative image of their constituency, and how constituents navigated and made use of the framing strategies developed by NGOs in their own claims to state rights and recognition. This discussion thus highlights the potentials and the problematics of the NGO model in social movements' efforts toward legal and political change.     

Administrative Review in a System of Conflicting Values

An issue of continuing debate in the legal and social science literature is how best to control and validate the exercise of essentially legislative powers by administrative agencies. This study examines one mechanism of control, administrative de novo review of agency decisionmaking. It explores how this device functions in immigration bail administration, a system where there is a broad and vague delegation of detention and bail powers to government oficials in an area of law where there is no set of preferences as to how conflicting policy claims are to be weighed in decisionmaking. The study shows a system in turmoil. The de novo review body–the immigration court-frequently and substantially modifies the Immigration Service's initial bail decisions. Because there is no agreement on the norms to guide decisionmaking, these changes have little effect on ongoing agency activity and policies. Pronounced interagency conflict and extreme decisional disparity persist given limited institutional and political arrangements for dealing with this dissensus. The study explores in detail the institutional cultures and conflicting legal and social values that shape the practice and patterns of de novo review in this field of law and discusses the implications of such conflict for the full functioning of this external review device.     

Adjudicating Executive Privilege: Federal Administrative Agencies and Deliberative Process Privilege Claims in U.S. District Courts

Government transparency is a key component of democratic accountability. The U.S. Congress and the president have created multiple legislative avenues to facilitate executive branch transparency with the public. However, when the executive branch withholds requested information from the public, the federal judiciary has the power to determine whether agencies must release documents and information to requestors. When enforcing standards of executive branch transparency, judges must balance concerns of executive autonomy and judicial intrusion into administrative decisionmaking. While much judicial scholarship focuses on the decisionmaking on high courts, in the U.S. context, federal district courts play a key role in adjudicating transparency disputes. In this article, I examine case outcomes in disputes involving agency claims of deliberative process privilege over internal agency documents litigated between 1994 and 2004. I find that U.S. federal district courts largely defer to administrative agencies in transparency disputes. However, factors such as agency structure and the congruence between judicial and administrative agency policy preferences influence whether federal judges require executive branch officials to release requested information.     

Peculiar Institutions: Slavery,Sectionalism, and Minority Obstruction in the Antebellum Senate

This article examines obstruction in the U.S. Senate, focusing on political conflict in the antebellum period. I consider different theories that predict when obstruction should occur and conduct individual‐level analysis of the use of and support for dilatory tactics. The analysis investigates how the costs of obstruction, the probability that obstruction succeeds, the policy preferences of the senator, and the salience of legislation relate to decisions to obstruct. I find that both sectional and partisan factors influence obstruction, with the former being especially important for legislation related to slavery. In particular, Southern senators' concerns about being in the minority led them to obstruct to protect their interests in slavery.     

The Effects of Juvenile Transfer to Criminal Court on Incarceration Decisions

The present study examined the effects of institutional pressures on homeland security preparedness among law enforcement agencies in Illinois. The data come from the Illinois Homeland Security Survey (IHSS). Specifically, the study employed three theories to explain homeland security preparedness: contingency theory, resource dependence theory, and institutional theory. We hypothesized that institutional pressures will lead to isomorphism as agencies attempt to conform to institutional expectations about appropriate activities in a homeland security era. To evaluate these theories and their impact on homeland security practices, the authors used confirmatory factor analysis. The IHSS data lend strong support to the application of organizational theory as a lens through which homeland security preparedness can be understood. Institutional pressures, such as professional and government publications, training, professional associations, and the actions of peer agencies, significantly influenced municipal and county agencies in Illinois. Funding, while often thought important to encourage preparedness, was not a significant predictor. The results of this analysis advance our understanding of homeland security preparedness via institutional theory by suggesting that the larger environment is salient.     

Budgetary support for police services in U.S. municipalities: Comparing political culture, socioeconomic characteristics and incrementalism as rival explanations for budget share allocation to police

Only limited research was available on the important question of the likely determinants of changes in budgetary allocations to municipal police agencies over time. Within that rather limited set of studies, three distinct perspectives on hypothesized key determinants of funding levels for police could be identified—namely, the local political culture, the nature of socioeconomic conditions, and the prevalence of incremental budget decision-making processes. This study employed a longitudinal data set derived from municipal clerk surveys administered in four waves to the same cross-section of U.S. cities in 1993, 1996, 2000, and 2003. The authors examined the relative utility of these three hypothesized determinants through the use of a two-way random-effects panel model. The findings for 188 U.S. municipal governments suggested that the incremental budgeting aspect of annual budgeting in municipal governments largely explained the variation in share of allocation to police agencies in these cities, with political culture and socioeconomic conditions demonstrating only weak effects at best.     

Delegation Dilemmas: Coalition Size,Electoral Risk,and Regulatory Governance in New Democracies

This article addresses the determinants of regulatory agency design in multiparty‐coalition governments. Previous research has mainly focused on U.S. institutions, producing context‐specific findings. We found electoral uncertainty, government turnover, and coalition size to be key factors explaining the bureaucratic autonomy of 31 state regulatory agencies recently created at the subnational level in Brazil. The legislative support that chief executives enjoy only acquires explanatory power when it is interacted with government turnover. Because Brazilian governors have great ability to build oversized majority coalitions, coalition strength influences the governor's strategy when the governor faces credible threats from rival elite groups.     

Honey v. Vinegar: Testing Compliance-Gaining Theories in the Context of Freedom of Information Laws

Freedom of information laws are useful to the extent that they are followed. This study, based on compliance-gaining theories, employs two field experiments to examine the effect of persuasion tactics and litigation threats on agency adherence to public records laws. In Study 1, a journalist requested use-of-force reports from all police agencies in a state, mailing agencies either friendly or threatening letters, randomly assigned. In Study 2, a journalist requested superintendent contracts from school districts, mailing agencies randomly assigned versions of friendly, neutral or threatening letters. In both experiments the threatening letter resulted in slightly higher response rates, lower copy fees and faster response times, however, the friendly letter resulted in more helpful behavior from agencies. The article concludes by discussing implications for journalists, compliance-gaining theory in a legal realm, and freedom of information.     

You can lead a horse to water …: A case study of a police department's response to stricter drunk-driving laws

We present a case study illustrating the complexity of the process that determines how vigorously local police agencies enforce recent drunk-driving laws. Police enforcement practices are influenced most strongly by the play of local factors in a system of “games.” The local forces exerting greatest influence are 1) the local demand for drunk-driving enforcement, 2) the police leadership's priority for DUI enforcement, 3) the police leadership's capacity for command and control of the organization, and 4) the disposition of the local police culture regarding drunk driving and related work issues. In “Melville,” the study site, there is little external demand for drunk-driving enforcement, and police management tries to suppress it while making only symbolic gestures of support. Management's capacity to control street-level enforcement practices is limited, however, and a small cadre of officers generates a disproportionate number of arrests for personal financial gain (bounty), giving the department a much higher arrest rate than the department desires. Thus Melville's responsiveness to the state's drunk-driving law is not due to external political pressure or formal policy, but rather to the inability of local authorities to impose their will on street-level practices. Melville's case suggests that the degree to which police implement a new criminal law may be entirely independent of efforts to ensure political accountability and organizational control.     

Trade secrets versus Cost Benefit Analysis

We argue that administrative agencies should base their decisions on Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) for two reasons: first the well known ex ante effect that CBA make public decisions more rational and second the little discussed ex post effect that the agency’s CBA provides valuable information to judicial or political bodies controlling the agency. The ex post purpose of CBA implies (judicial review of administrative decisions) or requires (political review) the public availability of the CBA. A conflict between this public availability and the protection of trade secrets arises, if the costs or benefits of a decision depend on information which are trade secrets. As a solution to this conflict, we propose a nonpublic in camera court procedure which leaves little discretion to the agency.     

Inside a Cultural Agency: Team Ethnography and Knowledge Exchange

This article undertakes an auto-critical analysis of the research team's ethnographic study of Cultural Enterprise Office (CEO), a Scottish creative business support agency. We discuss the team's composition and how this relates to other analyses of ethnographic teamwork. Our research is situated in the wider policy context of the “creative-economic” turn in the UK's research funding. This has been accompanied by increased emphasis on “knowledge exchange” and “impact” in the drive for greater accountability in higher education. The team's evolution in the course of undertaking research is illustrated by reference to four “pivotal moments,” which illustrate how we “performed” knowledge exchange.     

Why study the future of criminal justice?

To a large, extent criminal justice agencies arereactive in nature and thus are at the mercy of evants beyond their control. The author suggest that use of futures research and forecasting methods, followed by development of policy alternatives through futures planning techniques, will aid agencies in becomingproactive —being able to anticipate future trends and develop and choose among alternative policies demed most beneficial to achievement of the goals and objectives of the agency. Some techniques of futures research are discussed as is the efficacy of presentation of findings in the form of scenarios.     

Integrity,culture, and scale: an empirical test of the big bad police agency

Building on Klockars et. al. (2000) analysis of survey data on police agency integrity, this analysis develops an economic model of police corruption within police agencies. Empirical estimates of the economic model are consistent with Klockars et. al. (2000) in that there is no evidence to support the traditional theory that police agency corruption is attributable to the “individual bad-apple.” Independent of other factors, the present analysis shows that police culture fosters corruption. Furthermore, the present analysis shows that incentive structures within police agencies increase the problem of corruption as the scale of police agency operation increases. Policies that would promote higher levels of integrity are considered.     

The Politics of Appointment and the Federal Courts'Role in Regulating America: U.S. Courts of Appeals Judgeships from T.R. to F.D.R.

Historians and political scientists have noted that appointments of judges to the U.S. Courts of Appeals are not determined by senatorial courtesy alone. What has not been adequately explained is why and when a president defers to a senator's choice rather than seek to control the selection. This article attempts to understand the politics of federal appellate court appointments. The author first identifies a major change in the work of the courts of appeals during the years 1900-1945—the growth in review of the actions of newly created federal regulatory agencies. Then, by examining Justice Department files and presidential correspondence, he discoveres three patterns of appointment emerging in the same period. The patterns vary with presidential perceptions of the role of the federal government and of the courts of appeals' ability to affect accomplishment of administration goals. Appointments during the first years of the presidencies of Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt and during the Harding and Coolidge administrations were dominated by patronage concerns. Those administrations yielded to the recommendations of senators and demonstrated no interest in the policy-making potential of these courts. In the two other patterns the White House played a more active role, with senators more often deferring to the president's selection. Concerns about professionalism dominated selections in Taft's and Hoover's administrations: because they recognized the policy importance of those judgeships but saw the role of government as limited, they sought judicial craftsmen who would make policy only incrementally. Policy concerns dominated selections during Wilson's administration and the latter years of both the Roosevelts' administrations: Justice Department officials screened nominees to determine their policy orientation, because federal appellate court judgeships were perceived as crucial policy positions that could affect the president's ability to implement his reform programs.     

Intra-party delegation in the Portuguese legislature: assigning committee chairs and party coordination positions

In European parliamentary democracies political parties control candidate selection, maintain cohesion in the legislature and support governments. In addition to these classic functions, parties also organise the legislature delegating power to legislators, specifically as committee chairs and party coordinators. Delegation is inherently dangerous, involving potential agency loss. Parties, however, have ex-ante and ex-post institutional mechanisms to deal with agency problems. In this paper, a case study is made of the Portuguese legislature, arguing that parties make use of their pivotal role in selecting legislators as committee chairs and party coordinators to keep tabs on legislators to thwart shirking from the party line. This paper finds that political parties use incumbency as an ex-ante screening mechanism of committee chairs and party coordinators in looking for reliable signals of past behaviour to decrease uncertainty. Additionally, evidence suggests that extra-parliamentary party structure is used as an institutional arena for ex-post control of party coordinators.     

Dissent,Legitimacy, and Public Support for Court Decisions: Evidence from a Survey‐Based Experiment

Scholars often argue that whereas unanimous rulings should boost public support for court decisions, dissents should fuel public opposition. Previous studies on public responses to U.S. Supreme Court decisions suggest that unanimity does in fact bolster support. However, a recent study has also found that dissents may increase support among opponents of a court decision by suggesting evidence of procedural justice. By examining how individuals react to dissents from the Supreme Court of Norway, this article is the first study outside the U.S. context of the public's reaction to unanimity and dissent. Breaking with the common notion of the negative effects of dissent on public support, the article shows that when the Supreme Court handles cases of higher political salience, the formulation of dissenting opinions can be a meaningful way of securing greater support for its policy outputs by suggesting evidence of procedural justice. Contrary to recent studies, however, this positive influence of dissent is irrespective of individuals' ex ante policy views.     

Competition by regulation in energy markets: the case of Turkey

A fundamental question facing the regulatory and competition authorities is whether to delegate competition policy issues of utilities to regulatory agencies or competition authorities. While, some countries prefer ‘light handed regulation’ by competition authorities, others grant substantial power to independent regulatory agencies. Turkey followed the liberalization wave in electricity with a regulatory reform in 2001. Recently, a slight shift of tide has appeared in previously liberalized markets. Electricity markets are the forefront example of this change of course. A similar trend is apparent in Turkey as well. Increasing pressures on prices and excess demand have created more reasons for active government involvement. As political factors weigh in, economic considerations take a secondary place in electricity markets. In order to show the tension between political and economic preferences, we use the Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks criteria of welfare economics metaphorically. This paper discusses the scope of competition policy in the Turkish electricity industry. We focus on the issue of regulatory governance. The absence of a well established institutional environment reduces the potential role of competition policy in the industry and increase political meddling in all segments of the Turkish electricity market. By looking into changes in prices, market power and new entry closely, we discuss the relative success of the regulatory reform in the electricity industry. We conclude by emphasizing the consequences of a passive competition authority in establishing a competitive electricity market.