Sexual Desire and the Importance of Marriage in Kant's Philosophy of Law

In his moral writings, Kant states that moral duty cannot be derived from “the special characteristics of human nature.” This statement is untenable if one takes seriously Kant's moral views on sexual desire. Instead close study reveals that considerations based on both morality and nature play a role here. The combination of these two elements leads to inconsistencies and difficulties in Kant's understanding of sexual desire, but they enable us to better understand the importance Kant attributes to marriage within his philosophy of law.     

Kant and Habermas on International Law

The purpose of this article is to present a critical assessment of Jürgen Habermas' reformulation of Kant's philosophical project Toward Perpetual Peace. Special attention is paid to how well Habermas' proposed multi‐level institutional model fares in comparison with Kant's proposal—a league of states. I argue that Habermas' critique of the league fails in important respects, and that his proposal faces at least two problems. The first is that it implies a problematic asymmetry between powerful and less powerful states. The second is that it entails creating a global police force that has an obligation to intervene against egregious human rights violations worldwide, and that this seems incompatible with the idea that every person has an innate right to freedom. There are important normative constraints relevant for institutional design in the international domain that Habermas does not take sufficiently into account. However, this does not mean that Kant's league cannot be supplemented with more comprehensive forms of institutional cooperation between states. On the basis of my assessment of the multi‐level model, I propose a hybrid model combining elements from Kant and Habermas.     

Why Reflective Equilibrium? I: Reflexivity of Justification

In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. My enquiry into this topic comprises three parts. In this first part, I raise the issue of the reflexivity of justification and question whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice.     

Why Reflective Equilibrium? II: Following Up on Rawls's Comparison of His Own Approach with a Kantian Approach

In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. My enquiry into this topic comprises three parts. In the first part (Eng 2014a), I raised the issue of the reflexivity of justification and questioned whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice. In this second part, I shall outline a Kantian approach that represents a paradigmatic alternative to Rawls.     

Why Reflective Equilibrium? III: Reflective Equilibrium as a Heuristic Tool

In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. In the first part of this enquiry (Eng 2014a), I raised the issue of the reflexivity of justification and questioned whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice. In the second part (Eng 2014b), I outlined a Kantian approach that represents a paradigmatic alternative to Rawls. In this third and final part, I shall argue that Rawls's reflective equilibrium cannot justify the choice of itself and that in the broader perspective thus necessitated, we cannot escape the metaphysical issues integral to the Kantian approach.     

Agency,Authority, and the Logic of Mutual Recognition

The “Cartesian” model of the rational subject is central to the political philosophy of Hobbes and Locke and is “transcendentally” affirmed in Kant's account of ethics and legality. An influential body of Hegelian inspired critique has suggested, however, that the dialectical deficiencies of the dominant models of Liberalism in late modernity inhere in this “atomistic” or “self‐supporting” characterisation of the individual. The “atomistic” perspective appears as an obstacle not only to the coherent articulation of the compatibility of liberty and equality, but also to the attempt to express the mutuality of recognition between agents that might offer a genuinely communal conception of constitution and subject. Employing as a frame of reference Alan Brudner's analysis of these issues in his comprehensive Constitutional Goods (Brudner 2004) it is argued that legal and political theory might usefully adopt an understanding of Hegel's notion of “recognition” (Anerkennung) in this regard without drastic phenomenological reconstruction of the Cartesian or Kantian subject.     

Age spots: Gender sensitivity and the Hutchins Commission

The language of the Hutchins Commission report, A Free and Responsible Press, written in 1947, is sexist. The language flaws the report, but certainly does not destroy its value. Language must be separated from content, such as in Plato's and Kant's writings. Although the Hutchins Commission uses unfortunate language, its message goes beyond mere toleration to a supererogatory duty: The ideal of the marketplace of ideas shall be made concrete. Just as Plato's vision of women ruling in equal numbers has yet to become reality and just as Kant's ethical vision of every human's liberation from mistreatment has yet to be realized, the Hutchins Commission's call for a chorus of voices remains unfilled. The call has been echoed and in some case intensified, such as in Carol Gilligan's work on the voices of women. But the goals remain undiminished beacons that remind us—educators as well as the media—that we still have much work ahead in order to achieve inclusiveness.     

Totemism of the Modern State: On Hans Kelsen’s Attempt to Unmask Legal and Political Fictions and Contain Political Theology

This paper argues that the writings of Hans Kelsen deserve more attention from those engaged in the debate on secularization and political theology. His lifelong struggle with various forms of legal‐political metaphysics is an identifiable thread in many of his writings. Kelsen’s concern with the theological‐political issues found in the theory of the state (Staatslehre) is far from being marginal. Kelsen claims that his theory aims at resolving the traditional dualism of law and state prevailing in the Staatslehre and contributes  to an “uncompromising destruction of one of the most effective ideologies of legitimacy.” Kelsen maintains that the contents of this “ideology of legitimacy” derive from both political metaphysics and the deep‐seated ancient ways of thinking on nature and society. In order to illustrate this thesis, I propose calling this phenomenon “totemism of the modern state.”     

Lost in the System or Lost in Translation? The Exchanges between Hart and Ross*

According to the received opinion there is a theoretical incompatibility between Herbert Hart's The Concept of Law and Alf Ross's On Law and Justice, and, according to the received opinion, it stems above all from Hart's emphasis on the internal point of view. The present paper argues that this reading is mistaken. The Concept of Law does not go beyond On Law and Justice in so far as both present arguments to the effect that law is based on a shared understanding between participants in a project perceived by every participant to be a project in common. The paper demonstrates that there are substantive parallels between Hart's combination of “acceptance” or “acknowledgement” and a “critical reflective attitude” and Ross's combination of “motivation” or “feeling” and a “coherent whole of meaning and motivation.” The main conclusion is that the views of norms and normativity put forward in The Concept of Law and On Law and Justice are very close in essential respects, and, more specifically, that the two works are at root identical in their representation of the basis of normativity in reality.     

CRIMINOLOGY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND THE WAR ON CRIME

This detailed assessment reviews the nation's “war on crime” during the past ten years, examines what has heen accomplished in that period, and outlines the likely prospects for the future. Although important and tangible progress in improving criminal justice has been made. it has not produced relief from high crime rates. In fact, “things are worse than ever.” For the future, there will be both more advances and frustrations in the war on crime. It is emphasized that the progress achieved so far has been to create a more efficient and fairer rystem of justice and that we should take pride in this. If not eclipsed by the quarterly release of crime statistics, we can maintain our momentum and gain even more significant improvements in the next decade.     

In Defense of Kant’s League of States

This article presents a defense of Kant’s idea of a league of states. Kant’s proposal that rightful or just international relations can be achieved within the framework of such a league is often criticized for being at odds with his overall theory. In view of the analogy he draws between an interpersonal and an international state of nature, it is often argued that he should have opted for the idea of a state of states. Agreeing with this standard criticism that a league of states cannot establish the institutional framework for international justice, others also suggest an alternative stage model interpretation. According to this interpretation, Kant’s true ideal is in fact a state of states, whereas the league is merely introduced as a temporary and second best solution. In contrast to both the standard criticism and the stage model interpretation, I argue that fundamental normative concerns count in favour of a league rather than a state of states. I also argue that Kant’s defense of such a league is consistent with his position on the institutional preconditions for just interaction in the domestic case because of crucial relevant differences between the state of nature among individuals and the external relations between states.     

The “Central Meaning” and Path Dependence: The Madison-Meiklejohn-Brennan Nexus

Justice William J. Brennan's opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan is widely recognized for many reasons, including, as articulated by Professor Harry Kalven, that it put “the First Amendment right side up for the first time” by identifying its “central meaning.” That meaning is the constitutional protection of speech critical of government and its officials – speech vital in a self-governing democracy. Justice Brennan's approach was derived, in part, from the writings of James Madison, to whom the justice refers generously throughout the opinion, and Alexander Meiklejohn, to whom Justice Brennan gave credit only after the fact. This article examines the philosophical lineage from Madison to Meiklejohn to Brennan, and does so through the lens of path dependence, a perspective that advocates that history matters. A critique of path dependence emerges.     

On the Puzzle Surrounding Hans Kelsen's Basic Norm

Whereas fundamental norms in the juridico‐philosophical tradition serve to impose constraints, Kelsen's fundamental norm—or basic norm (Grundnorm)—purports to establish the normativist character of the law. But how is the basic norm itself established? Kelsen himself rules out the appeals that are familiar from the tradition—the appeal to fact, and to morality. What remains is a Kantian argument. I introduce and briefly evaluate the Kantian and neo‐Kantian positions, as applied to Kelsen's theory. The distinction between the two positions, I argue, is reflected in an ambiguity in the use of the term “regressive.”     

Price v. Time Revisited: The Need For Medium-Neutral Shield Laws In An Age Of Strict Construction

Journalists were alarmed when, in 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied shield-law protection to Don Yaeger, an investigative reporter for Sports Illustrated, in a libel suit by fired football coach Mike Price. Yaeger is a journalist, and Alabama's shield law offers absolute protection even when a journalist is a party to a case. The court's decision turned on the fact that Alabama's seventy-three-year-old statute does not include the word “magazine.” This article shows that this hole in the “covered medium” language of Alabama's statute is not uncommon among the nation's thirty-six shield laws and that the Eleventh Circuit's strict reading of the statute's text is not at odds with current trends in statutory interpretation. Those two facts, combined with the rise of the Internet as an important vehicle for journalism, suggest the time is ripe to scrutinize and modernize shield laws, some of which have been on the books for more than a century.     

Instituting Authority. Some Kelsenian Notes

A rule of recognition for a legal order L seems utterly circular if it refers to behaviour of “officials.” For it takes a rule of recognition to identify who, for L, counts as an official and who does not. I will argue that a Kelsenian account of legal authority can solve the aporia, provided that we accept a, perhaps unorthodox, re‐interpretation of Kelsen's norm theory and his idea of the Grundnorm. I submit that we should learn to see it as the vanishing point rather than the final basis of validity in a legal order. To prepare the ground for this proposal, I will briefly explore the claim to authority that is characteristic of politics. Then I sketch a multi‐layered canonical form of the legal norm, including their “empowering” character (Paulson) in terms of performative operators. I show how it leads to a “perspectival” account of the basic norm. In conclusion, I briefly point to the example of sovereignty and acquis communautair in international law to illustrate this view     

ON AMBIGUITY IN PERCEPTIONS OF RISK:IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL DECISION MAKING AND DETERRENCE*

Deterrence theorists and researchers have argued that the critical dimension of sanction certainty is its level—increasing the certainty of punishment from a lower to a higher level will inhibit criminal conduct. However, the true certainty of punishment is rarely known with much precision. Both Sherman (1990) and Nagin (1998) have suggested that ambiguity about the level of punishment certainty is itself consequential in the decision to commit or refrain from crime. Here, we investigate this proposition. We find some evidence that individuals are “ambiguity averse” for decisions involving losses such as criminal punishments. This finding means that a more ambiguous perceived certainty of punishment is a greater deterrent of some crimes than a nominally equivalent but less ambiguous one. However, this effect depends on how large an individual's risk certainty perception is initially. That is, we find evidence for “boundary effects” (Casey and Scholz, 1991a, 1991b) in which this effect holds for lower probabilities but reverses for higher ones. For higher detection probabilities, individuals become “ambiguity seeking” such that a less ambiguous detection probability has more deterrent value than a nominally equivalent but more ambiguous detection probability. Results are presented from two distinct, but complementary, analysis samples and empirical approaches. These samples include a survey to college students with several hypothetical choice problems and data from the Pathways to Desistance study, a longitudinal investigation of serious adolescent offenders transitioning from adolescence to young adulthood.     

Parenting without Protection: How Legal Status Ambiguity Affects Lesbian and Gay Parenthood

Through the lens of lesbian and gay parenthood we ask how individuals who experience “legal status ambiguity”—that which emerges when legal fluctuations combine with divided attitudes, ignorance of the law, and autonomous institutional gatekeepers—exercise their legal rights and responsibilities. The results from thirty‐one interviews with lesbian and gay parents in Oregon and their six adult children suggest that the state's fluctuating legal and social climates for lesbian and gay parenting between 1985 and 2013 presented significant challenges for two generations of same‐sex parents. Although both cohorts created and utilized a range of legal and social mechanisms to assert their legal rights, they found these rights to be controlled as much by gatekeeper perspectives as by legal force. After the 2015 Obergefell ruling on marriage equality, lesbian and gay parenting status remains a site of ongoing legal and social contestation, providing insight into the risks and challenges of legal status ambiguity.