The “Bestie di Satana” Murders

In recent years, satanic groups have been responsible for various types and degrees of crimes. We report the case of a number of murders committed in Italy by a group of young people calling themselves the “Bestie di Satana”. Forensic psychiatric assessment of the members of a satanic sect charged with the crime revealed that all the young people had a fragile, immature personality, a very low level of education and were socially disadvantaged. The trial of the members of the “Bestie di Satana” sect was concluded with the verdict of deliberate murder, and all the members were given long jail sentences. This report should lead us to explore social and cultural responses to juvenile satanism, statistically shown to be a relatively rare phenomenon but with a high criminal potential.     

The Idea of “Free Public Reason”

Abstract. In this paper the nature and the role of Rawls's idea of a “free public reason” are examined with an emphasis on the divide between the private and the public spheres, a divide which is the hallmark of a liberal democracy. Criticisms from both the so-called Continental tradition and the Communitarian opponents to liberalism insist on the ineffectiveness of such a conception, on its inability to establish a political consensus on democracy. But it would be a mistake to see a contractarian theory of justice, such as Rawls's justice as fairness, as grounding the social contract in a public use of reason. Such a contract would indeed be susceptible to endless conflicts and renegotiations and would never achieve consensus. Therefore, a distinction must be made between the values of justice that are present in and through the “original” contractual position and the that regulate the public sphere and guarantee its stability.     

The “Discourse” of International Law and Humanitarian Intervention

This essay analyzes the doctrine of “humanitarian intervention” in the frame of international law in the second half of nineteenth century and identifies the ground of legitimation of this intervention in the violation of presumed universal laws of humanity. The analysis emphasizes the transformation of the paradigm of “humanitarian intervention” into the current doctrine of the “responsibility to protect,” which under the rubric of “responsibility” legitimizes limitations on a state's sovereignty in cases where the state fails to guarantee the protection of its own population. This reconstruction of the genealogy of “humanitarian intervention” illustrates the continual exceptions to the principle of nonintervention, which means that the Westphalian principle of sovereignty has always been violated. Both doctrines—humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect—can be considered “hegemonic techniques” that use so‐called universal concepts in order to legitimize unilateral power interests.     

The Odyssey of the Regulatory State: From a “Thin” Monomorphic Concept to a “Thick” and Polymorphic Concept

This article assesses the “odyssey” of the regulatory state from a mere American thin and monomorphic concept to a global, thick and polymorphic concept that captures some of the more important features of the capitalist–democratic state. The burgeoning literature on the regulatory state presents a confusing number of images and characterizations that are increasingly conflicting, and it too often presents a monomorphic conception of the regulatory state. The article suggests that we need to define the regulatory state rather than merely characterizing it. And we need to do so in a manner that will allow us to move beyond the specific institutional features of a certain era, nation, region, or sector. Rather than contrasting regulation with distribution and redistribution, and contrasting the regulatory state with other forms of state, I treat the regulatory state as one morph of the polymorphic capitalist state, a morph that may help constitute other morphs (such as the welfare state and the developmental state) instead of replacing them. This in turn may help remove the artificial walls between the regulatory scholarly community and other social scientists, and promote more fruitful social science.