The Idea of “Free Public Reason”

Abstract. In this paper the nature and the role of Rawls's idea of a “free public reason” are examined with an emphasis on the divide between the private and the public spheres, a divide which is the hallmark of a liberal democracy. Criticisms from both the so-called Continental tradition and the Communitarian opponents to liberalism insist on the ineffectiveness of such a conception, on its inability to establish a political consensus on democracy. But it would be a mistake to see a contractarian theory of justice, such as Rawls's justice as fairness, as grounding the social contract in a public use of reason. Such a contract would indeed be susceptible to endless conflicts and renegotiations and would never achieve consensus. Therefore, a distinction must be made between the values of justice that are present in and through the “original” contractual position and the that regulate the public sphere and guarantee its stability.     

Rawls's Political Liberalism. A Reassessment

Since Rawls's Political Liberalism is by now the subject of a wide and deep philosophical literature, much of it excellent in quality, it would be foolhardy to attempt to say something about each of the major issues of the work, or to sort through debates that can easily be located elsewhere. I have therefore decided to focus on a small number of issues where there is at least some chance that a fresh approach may yield some new understanding of the text: Rawls's distinction between “reasonable” and “unreasonable” comprehensive doctrines; the psychological underpinnings of political liberalism; and the possibility that political liberalism might be extended beyond the small group of modern Western societies that Rawls's historical remarks suggest as its primary focus. I also include a discussion of the much‐debated issue of civility and public reason, which could hardly be avoided given its prominence in the book's reception. This paper should therefore be read not as a comprehensive account of the work but as one person's attempt to grapple, very incompletely and imperfectly, with a book that is as great as any philosophy has seen on this topic of great human urgency.     

Social Justice and Individual Ethics*

Abstract. If one is committed to a “Rawlsian” conception of justice, is one not also necessarily committed to a “Christian” personal ethics? MOE explicitly, if one believes that social justice requires the maximinning of material conditions, should one not use one's time and resources as well as one can in order to assist the poorest? The paper offers a very partial answer to these questions by arguing for the following two claims: (1) Contrary to what is implied by some egalitarian critics of Rawls, the idea of a well-ordered society does not require maximin-guided choices at the individual level, and hence leaves room for legitimate incentive payments. (2) Despite Rawls's own neglect of this fact, a limited form of patriotism does constitute an individual “natural duty” following from a commitment to maximin social justice.     

Justice and Well‐Orderedness: Saving Rawls from Luck Egalitarianism

This paper develops a full account of Rawls's notion of a well‐ordered society and uses it to address two luck egalitarian objections to his principles of justice. The first is an internal criticism which claims that Rawls's account of justice is better captured by a responsibility‐sensitive egalitarian account. The second is an external objection according to which, regardless of the alleged inconsistency between Rawls's principles and his account of justice, we should reject those principles in favour of a responsibility‐sensitive criterion because it better captures our moral intuitions about distributive justice. The argument presented answers both objections by defending the value of well‐orderedness and showing the difficulties of responsibility‐sensitive egalitarian conceptions in realizing this ideal.     

Public Reason,Neutrality and Civic Virtues

In this paper I argue that political liberalism is not the “minimalist liberalism” characterised by Michael Sandel and that it does not support the vision of public life characteristic of the procedural republic. I defend this claim by developing two points. The first concerns Rawls's account of public reason. Drawing from examples in Canadian free speech jurisprudence I show how restrictions on commercial advertising, obscenity and hate propaganda can be justified by political values. Secondly, political liberalism also attends to the identity, and not just the interests, of its citizens. It attempts to cultivate certain virtues of character. But it does so in a way that does not entail the acceptance of a comprehensive or perfectionist doctrine. Rawls's defence of neutrality of aim does not mean the state should be neutral towards all the views its citizens espouse. I conclude that political liberalism shares little with the doctrine Sandel claims is embedded in American law.     

Comparative vs. Transcendental Approaches to Justice: A Misleading Dichotomy in Sen's The Idea of Justice

This paper examines the distinction drawn by Amartya Sen between transcendental and comparative theories of justice, and its application to Rawls' doctrine. It then puts forward three arguments. First, it is argued that Sen offers a limited portrayal of Rawls' doctrine. This is the result of a rhetorical strategy that depicts Rawlsian doctrine as more “transcendental” than it really is. Although Sen deploys numerous quotations in support of his interpretation, it is possible to offer a less transcendental interpretation of Rawls. Second, the dichotomy between transcendental and comparative approaches to questions of justice is partly misleading, insofar as any plausible moral doctrine has both transcendental and comparative elements. Transcendental elements are necessary to avoid the confusion between the general acceptance of a norm, value or principle and its justification. A comparative view highlights the conditions of application of the doctrine to the real world, taking into account the possibility of moral dilemmas, evaluative disagreements and limited resources, while proposing possible provisos and caveats to the risk of the doctrine being self‐defeating. Third, although the transcendental approach is useful, it is argued that in elaborating this dichotomy Sen overlooks the merits of the third way between comparative and transcendental doctrines, what he calls “conglomerate theory,” and also the possibility that his doctrine (the capability approach) might be considered as an example of such a theory. The paper concludes with the argument that conglomerate theory does not aim to produce complete moral orderings, but rather a comparative approach with transcendental elements, as a form of weak transcendentalism.     

The Mutability of Public Reason

Rawls's “public reason” has not been without its critics. One criticism is that public reason is “conservative.” Public reason must rely on those beliefs that are “widely shared” among citizens. But if public reason relies on widely shared beliefs, how can it change without departing from those beliefs, thus violating public reason? In part one of my essay, I introduce the conservatism objection and describe two unsatisfactory responses to it. Part two argues that there are aspects of public reason which diminish the force of the conservatism objection: first, that public reason is historical, and second, that it is mutable.     

La Naissance de l’Auteur: Origines Politique et Juridique d’un Concept Littéraire

Si le concept d’auteur est une notion centrale de la littérature et de la théorie littéraire, il s’agit d’abord d’une notion juridique qui a été mobilisée par les philosophes modernes, en particulier Hobbes et Spinoza, dans le but politique et scientifique de lutter contre le régime traditionnel des autorités et de défendre la liberté de pensée contre les interprétations normatives des docteurs de la loi et de la religion. L’article remonte aux origines politiques et juridiques de l’auteur-législateur moderne et retrace sa marche vers la Souveraineté.     

Why Reflective Equilibrium? III: Reflective Equilibrium as a Heuristic Tool

In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. In the first part of this enquiry (Eng 2014a), I raised the issue of the reflexivity of justification and questioned whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice. In the second part (Eng 2014b), I outlined a Kantian approach that represents a paradigmatic alternative to Rawls. In this third and final part, I shall argue that Rawls's reflective equilibrium cannot justify the choice of itself and that in the broader perspective thus necessitated, we cannot escape the metaphysical issues integral to the Kantian approach.     

A few thoughts about the role of imprisonment in the political economy of penal reforms, 1770–1830

Résumé Cet essai se veut une réflexion d'ordre théorique et épistémologique sur les conditions d'analyse de l'émergence des institutions carcérales au 19e siècle. Une brève critique des principales tendances historiographiques dans ce secteur amène l'auteur à déplorer à la fois le gradualisme et le particularisme qui entache la plupart des études concernant la mise en place de la prison moderne. On insistera ici sur la nécessité de bien évaluer l'ampleur des changementsen cause dans cette mutation institutionnelle, notamment dans leur dimension politique. On se met ainsi mieux à même de mesurer à quel point la prison moderne est le résultat contradictoire des idéaux nostalgiques d'un monde en décomposition tout autant que des aspirations à la liberté moderne.      

State Tasks and Human Rights

This paper analyses the change in the notion of fundamental and human rights in Germany and throughout the European Union during the process of European integration. This change, that can be summarized in the formula “from human rights to state tasks,” signifies the integration and partial amendment of the French Revolution's ideals (liberté, égalité, fraternité) with the new ideals of security, diversity and solidarity. These new ideals make it necessary for the state to play a positive role in devising, for example, a policy of minority recognition and a long list of social rights. These rights are often translated into merely generic “norms on state objectives” and not directly binding law in force. This means that such rights increasingly become a political and legislative issue making it more difficult for the Courts to offer guarantees. 1 Abstract by Giorgio Bongiovanni.
     

Recycling offenders: Re-incarceration trends in Québec federal penitentiaries

Résumé Les statistiques fédérales au Canada comme aux états-Unis démontrent une croissance alarmante des retours en détention, au cours de la mise en liberté sous condition. Le modèle de gestion du risque qui émerge actuellement dans le contexte d’une ?nouvelle pénologie? semble mener inévitablement à l’augmentation de ces taux de retour. L’étude présentée dans cet article examine le processus de libération et le taux de retour qui en découle, enprivilégiant l’analyse desprises de décision et les mécanismes de gestion des détenus. Dans cette optique, les auteurs ont suivi, pour une période d’un an, tous les hommes libérés des pénitienciers du Québec en 1993. L’analyse a mis en évidence que le modèle de gestion de risque est à base du processus de gestion des détenus et semble avoir uneffet notable sur le ?recyclage? des délinquants. De plus, le type de libération et le type des condition de libération, plut?t que le nombre de condition, font de certains détenus des candidats plus vulnérables aux mécanismes de gestion derisque. Les ?retours? à la suite de manquements aux conditions de mise en liberté sont importants et le système carcéral s’alimente donc de plus en plus de ses propres libérés.      

From a Pluralism of Grounds to Proto‐Legal Relations: Accounting for the Grounds of Obligations of Justice

In this paper I discuss critically Mathias Risse's paper “Responsibility and Global Justice.” First, I argue that for Risse's pluralist account of the grounds of justice to hold together, there is need to presuppose a monist standpoint which ultimately contributes to grounding principles of justice. Second, I point out that Risse's understanding of obligations of accountability and justification is rather narrow in that it functions as an addendum to obligations of justice. Conversely, I will suggest that the obligation of accountability plays a deeper role: The conditions that ground it feature at the same time among the grounds of obligations of justice. Accordingly, the kind of relation that gives rise to a duty among agents to account for their actions must be in place when obligations of justice obtain. Following on from these remarks I will adumbrate an alternative account of the relation which grounds (enforceable) obligations of justice.     

DIRE ET SE DIRE AU FÉMININ

The decree of 21st of June 1993 sets out how to express the female gender in profession names and function titles in official and administrative publications of the Communauté française de Belgique. It has helped to change mindsets. The guide Mettre au féminin (“Express the female gender”) allows civil servants to fulfil the requirements of the decree and helps promote the usage of the female gender in the French language. First published in 1994, it has been reviewed and re-edited in 2005. Even if the visibility of women in language usage is on the increase, it faces not so much linguistic but ideological obstacles. Le décret du 21 juin 1993 installe la féminisation des noms de métier et des titres de fonction dans les textes officiels et administratifs de la Communauté française de Belgique. Il aide les mentalités à progresser. Le guide Mettre au féminin permet aux fonctionnaires de respecter le décret et sert à promouvoir l’emploi du féminin dans l’usage de la langue française. Paru en 1994, il est mis à jour en 2005. Même si la visibilité des femmes dans l’emploi de la langue augmente, elle rencontre des obstacles non pas linguistiques mais idéologiques.     

Why Reflective Equilibrium? I: Reflexivity of Justification

In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. My enquiry into this topic comprises three parts. In this first part, I raise the issue of the reflexivity of justification and question whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice.     

Principles of economic union: An extension of John Rawls's theory of justice

In this article I identify the principles of justice by which an economic union is to be constituted. For this purpose, I extend John Rawls's constructivist theory of justice to economically integrated societies. With regard to the principles identified, I defend a twofold claim. First, the principles of economic union generated by this extended procedure of construction can serve as common points of reference for the subjects of an economic union. Second, these principles cannot come into conflict with similarly constructed prior principles of social justice and international justice.     

Why Reflective Equilibrium? II: Following Up on Rawls's Comparison of His Own Approach with a Kantian Approach

In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. My enquiry into this topic comprises three parts. In the first part (Eng 2014a), I raised the issue of the reflexivity of justification and questioned whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice. In this second part, I shall outline a Kantian approach that represents a paradigmatic alternative to Rawls.     

À la Recherche de l’Arbitraire. Du Droit à la Sémiotique et Retour

La notion d’arbitraire s’est imposée en théorie du droit—où il est question des moyens d’éviter l’arbitraire du juge ou du souverain—et en sémiotique, où la thèse de l’arbitraire du signe est associée à Saussure, un des pères de la “sémiologie”. Pourtant, aucune définition positive n’existe de l’arbitraire, ou du moins aucune ne s’est encore valablement imposée. Le présent article se propose de trouver les raisons pour lesquelles un concept si présent dans la théorie pâtit d’un tel manquement.     

Reflections on Punishment from a Global Perspective: An Exploration of Chehtman’s The Philosophical Foundations of Extraterritorial Punishment

In this review essay, I offer reflections on three themes. I begin by exploring Alejandro Chehtman’s expressed methodological commitments. I argue that his views move him closer to Lon Fuller and away from the thin accounts offered by HLA Hart and Joseph Raz. Moreover, to make sense of his views, he must offer a more normatively robust theory of law. Second, I turn to his use of Raz’s theory of authority. I argue that Chehtman fails to distinguish between Raz’s views and his own, but more importantly, I maintain that his discussion of Raz is superfluous: in the course of “unpacking” Raz’s views, he leads us back to his own core theses. Finally, I explore Chehtman’s ability to deal with perennial worries that plague any attempt to offer a justification for International Criminal Law in general, and the International Criminal Court in particular (i.e., “victor’s justice”, “show trials”, “peace vs. justice”). I argue that unless Chehtman is able to demonstrate that the enforcement of International Criminal Law is able to impart dignity and security on the most vulnerable, his account will be significantly weakened.     

Moral Realism and Kantian Constructivism

Abstract. This paper questions nearly every major point Christina Lafont (2004 ) makes about “the validity of social norms” and their relation to moral realism and Kantian constructivism. I distinguish realisms from theories of objective or subjective knowledge, then from cognitivism. Next, I distinguish Kant and constructivism from Rawls' political constructivism. Finally, I propose clues for an alternative theory of moral constructivism.