H. L. A. Hart on Legal Obligation*

Abstract. The author discusses Hart's concept of legal obligation, especially his contention that there is an obligation to obey the law which is peculiarly legal, i.e., non-moral. This view is held to be mistaken. What is denied is that legal rules, merely by their being issued, offer a justification for the use of coercion to ensure compliance with them. Although moral and other social (customary) rules are considered self-justifying, that is not the case of legal rules. Any analogy between these two types of rules in justifying their implementation by force is deemed wrong.**     

Hart Interviewed: H.L.A. Hart in Conversation with David Sugarman

Within the English-speaking world, H.L.A. Hart (1907–1992) is regarded as the twentieth century's foremost legal philosopher. He revived the moribund discipline of jurisprudence, reorientating it so that the qualities associated with analytical philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century² were applied to the investigation of the most fundamental concepts of law and to major public issues, notably, the complex relation between law and morality. As a colleague, teacher, mentor, and author, he exercised a profound influence, an influence that extended to the 'real world' and 'real issues'. From the late 1950s onwards, he championed a new humaneness in punishment, speaking and writing for a right to abortion and against the death penalty and the prosecution of people because of their sexual preferences. His exploration of the balance between the modern welfare state and individual liberty - in particular, the legitimate use of state power to impose standards of private morality -produced an eloquent and highly influential manifesto for modern political liberalism. As Tony Honore, his close colleague at Oxford, put it,'He was the most widely read British legal philosopher of the twentieth century and his work will continue to be a focus of discussion.³     

Law Is the Command of the Sovereign: H. L. A. Hart Reconsidered

This article presents a critical reevaluation of the thesis—closely associated with H. L. A. Hart, and central to the views of most recent legal philosophers—that the idea of state coercion is not logically essential to the definition of law. The author argues that even laws governing contracts must ultimately be understood as “commands of the sovereign, backed by force.” This follows in part from recognition that the “sovereign,” defined rigorously, at the highest level of abstraction, is that person or entity identified by reference to game theory and the philosophical idea of “convention” as the source of signals with which the subject population has become effectively locked, as a group, into conformity.     

Positive Law and Systemic Legitimacy: A Comment on Hart and Habermas*

Abstract
The author revisits H. L. A. Hart's theory of positive law and argues for a major qualification to the thesis of the separation of law and morality based on a concept of systemic legitimacy derived from the social theory of Jurgen Habermas. He argues that standards for assessing the degree of systemic legitimacy in modern legal systems can develop through reflective exercise of "critical legality," a concept coined to parallel Hart's "critical morality," and an expanded understanding of the "external" and "internal" perspectives on legal systems. Following Habermas, he argues that modern positive law must retain systemic legitimacy. After suggesting criteria for measuring systemic legitimacy, the author concludes that the concept provides a useful approach to contemporary problems of "lawless" regimes and "law's imperialism."     

Legal Paternalism and Legal Moralism: Devlin, Hart and Ten*

Abstract
H. L. A. Hart in his Law, Liberty, and Morality (1963) defended the view that legal paternalism and legal moralism can be clearly distinguished from each other. Hart also stated that while legal moralism is always unacceptable, paternalistic laws are often justifiable. In this paper it is argued that Hart held the right view for the wrong reasons. Hart defended legal paternalism by claiming, against J. S. Mill, that for various psychological reasons individuals do not know their own interests best. It will be shown in the paper that if this view is taken, it is impossible to reject legal moralism. The fact that paternalism is sometimes justifiable while moralism is not can be more firmly founded on a distinction made by C. L. Ten (1971). Ten's point is that in matters which concern only the individuals themselves, their actions cannot be legitimately restricted by appeals to the consequences of their action alone. Paternalistic control can be justified only if the decision-making abilities of the controlled individual are temporarily diminished.     

法律的"概念"澄明——评H.L.A.哈特《法律的概念》

日常语言分析哲学家并新分析实证主义法学的创始人哈特,在《法律的概念》一书中,从语词用法的日常语言分析入手,通过法律"游戏"中第一性规则与第二性规则之结合作为关键的"法律"概念纵向语境把握,以及"主权者"、"命令"、"正义"、"道德"诸概念讨论之"法律"概念横向比较,成功地将法律"概念"的理解由对于某种具有确定客观属性的法律实体的认识转向了日常语言层面的澄明,开创了一个全新的日常语言分析法学流派.     

Lost in the System or Lost in Translation? The Exchanges between Hart and Ross*

According to the received opinion there is a theoretical incompatibility between Herbert Hart's The Concept of Law and Alf Ross's On Law and Justice, and, according to the received opinion, it stems above all from Hart's emphasis on the internal point of view. The present paper argues that this reading is mistaken. The Concept of Law does not go beyond On Law and Justice in so far as both present arguments to the effect that law is based on a shared understanding between participants in a project perceived by every participant to be a project in common. The paper demonstrates that there are substantive parallels between Hart's combination of “acceptance” or “acknowledgement” and a “critical reflective attitude” and Ross's combination of “motivation” or “feeling” and a “coherent whole of meaning and motivation.” The main conclusion is that the views of norms and normativity put forward in The Concept of Law and On Law and Justice are very close in essential respects, and, more specifically, that the two works are at root identical in their representation of the basis of normativity in reality.     

Radbruch and Hart on the Grudge Informer: A Reconsideration

Hart's defense of the separation of law and morality is partly based on his refusal to accept Radbruch's solution of the well‐known grudge informer case, in his famous article “Statutory Injustice and Suprastatutory Law.” In this paper, I present a detailed reconstruction of the “debate” between Radbruch and Hart on this case. I reach the conclusion that Hart fails to address the issue that was Radbruch's primary concern, namely the legal position of the judiciary when dealing with criminal statutes. I suggest that Hart's separation thesis cannot be upheld in the face of this concern. In my argument, Hart's mistaken understanding of the verdict of the Oberlandesgericht Bamberg that he refers to plays a crucial role.     

G. A. Cohen's Conception of Law: A Critique*

This note will challenge G. A. Cohen's view of the interaction between legal systems and economic structures; such interaction raises the so-called problem of legality, which Cohen sets out to solve in the eighth chapter of Karl Marx's Theory of History (Cohen 1978, 216–47). In the course of this note, we shall interrogate the presumed rigor of Cohen's theory of base/superstructure relations, to which his understanding of law is central. His approach will not be simply destroyed, but will be resituated in a network of problems that can highlight a certain fissure between his aspirations and his performance.     

英汉写作对比——显性与隐性

英汉语因各自的社会历史、文化背景、心理特征、思维模式以及文字的独特性而呈现出巨大的差异。本文通过对这两种语言表达差异的分析,论述了英汉语的文化和写作中的词法、句法、语篇以及修辞手段的显性与隐性状态。     

法律实证主义的功利主义自由观:从边沁到哈特

法律实证主义的一个重要维度是功利主义自由观,这功利主义与自由主义具有紧密的内在关联,实证主义法学其实就是一种自由主义法。