Constitutional democracy and the legitimacy of judicial review

It has long been argued that the institution of judicial review is incompatible with democratic institutions. This criticism usually relies on a procedural conception of democracy, according to which democracy is essentially a form of government defined by equal political rights and majority rule. I argue that if we see democracy not just as a form of government, but more basically as a form of sovereignty, then there is a way to conceive of judicial review as a legitimate democratic institution. The conception of democracy that stems from the social contract tradition of Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Rawls, is based in an ideal of the equality, independence, and original political jurisdiction of all citizens. Certain equal basic rights, in addition to equal political rights, are a part of democratic sovereignty. In exercising their constituent power at the level of constitutional choice, free and equal persons could choose judicial review as one of the constitutional mechanisms for protecting their equal basic rights. As such, judicial review can be seen as a kind of shared precommitment by sovereign citizens to maintaining their equal status in the exercise of their political rights in ordinary legislative procedures. I discuss the conditions under which judicial review is appropriate in a constitutional democracy. This argument is contrasted with Hamilton's traditional argument for judicial review, based in separation of powers and the nature of judicial authority. I conclude with some remarks on the consequences for constitutional interpretation.I am indebted to John Rawls and Burton Dreben for their helpful advice and their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

In Defence of Due Deference

The doctrine of deference permeates human rights review. It plays a role in defining Convention rights, in determining the nature of the proportionality test applied when analysing non-absolute rights, as well as in deciding the stringency of its application. The role of deference has recently been subjected to both judicial and academic criticism, some of which advocates the demise of the doctrine. This article develops a contextual account of deference that is justified for epistemic reasons, rather than reasons of relative authority. This conception is able to withstand current criticism and is modest enough to play a role in a range of different justifications and understandings of judicial review under the Human Rights Act. The article then provides a more detailed account of deference, taking account of the relative institutional features of the legislature, executive and judiciary, without running the risk that the court fails to perform its constitutional function of protecting individual rights.     

美国疑难宪法案件司法审查的两种模式及其补充——以“个案宪法权利”的证立为视角

疑难宪法案件的形成有其思想和规范渊源。司法审查必须补充演绎正当的大前提,即证立“个案宪法权利”的正当性。宪法解释学模式通过回溯道德权利的理论渊源重构个案中的宪法权利以支持宪法裁判;恢复性民主商谈司法模式主张将制宪者达成宪法原则的民主过程嵌入宪法裁判之中,寄希望法官间通过协商方式达成低限度的理论共识支持未完全理论化司法协议作为裁判的结果。程序主义宪法观将司法审查的合法性置于民主理论的语境中,使司法审查的合法性问题能够在民主的语境中得到缓解。宪法解释学模式的一元论与恢复性民主商谈司法模式的多元论欲满足司法审查所承载的立法与裁判的双重责任,必须将司法审查视为原则的论坛、公共理性的典范,以弥合重新道德化解释与重新民主化商谈之间的裂痕。     

Waldron, Waluchow and the Merits of Constitutionalism

In this article, I critically evaluate the positions of ProfessorsJeremy Waldron and W.J. Waluchow on the right-based merits ofentrenched constitutions and strong judicial review. I supportWaluchow in arguing that (i) prohibitions on the constitutionalentrenchment of rights and resultant prohibitions of strongjudicial review may be only superficially fair or democratic,since fair procedure alone can neither eliminate pre-existinginequalities nor ultimately take the autonomy vital to self-governanceseriously (whether individual or collective). Secondly, (ii)if deep dissensus fails to exist on all substantive mattersof rights, the constitutional entrenchment of rights combinedwith strong judicial review can indeed be achieved fairly. Ithen propose that (iii) the anti-constitutionalist concern aboutbeing governed by the ‘dead hand of the past’ isself-refuting, for the alternative is simply another constrainton autonomy. While this is largely consistent with Waluchow'sposition vis-à-vis Waldron's majoritarianism, I end byexpressing serious concerns regarding whether the common law(and the ‘constitutional morality’ that Waluchowclaims can be derived from it) can act as a sufficiently robustbasis for the protection of liberal and egalitarian rights.     

反对司法审查的核心理由

本文清楚地阐述了反对立法的司法审查的核心理由,适些理由是在特殊宪法体系下,封特殊决策和司法审查出现的历史的简洁讨论中得出的。本文批判司法审查基于两个基础：第一,文章主张没有理由认为由司法审查保护权利能比由民主的立法机关做得更好。第二,本文认为,除了产生的结果外,司法审查是民主但不正当的。然而,反对司法审查的理由也不是绝对或者无条件的。在本文中,这些理由以若干条件为前提,包括假定社会有着运作良好的民主机构,社会申的大部分公民认真对待权利（即使他们可能并不赞同他们拥有的权利）。文章末尾则讨论这些前提条件丧失时会出现的情形。     

论宪法社会基本权的分类与构成

社会基本权是宪法基本权利体系中的重要组成部分 ,区别于自由权。到目前为止 ,它还是一个比较笼统的概念和指称。依据文献研究方法 ,兼采理论与司法实务见解 ,社会基本权应进一步区分为 :经济权利、狭义的社会权利和文化权利 ,且不同类型的权利在各国得到承认和普遍化的程度不相一致。与自由权相比 ,各种社会基本权还只停留在指导原则和宪法委托阶段 ,其司法救济程度还比较低 ,主要依赖立法裁量和行政措施     

Horizontal Effect and the Constitutional Constraint

This article offers a new interpretation – the ‘constitutional constraint’ model – of the duty the Human Rights Act imposes on the courts to give horizontal effect to European Convention rights through the common law. The model requires courts to develop the common law compatibly with the Convention, but only where compatibility can be achieved by incremental development. We argue that models requiring more than incremental development are unsustainable; that deep constitutional norms compel the constraint of incrementalism, which is preserved under the HRA; and that by virtue of section 2 of the HRA, Convention rights function as principles rather than hard‐edged rights in this context. This further undermines the idea that the courts must strictly apply Convention rights and cannot allow them to be overridden by non‐Convention factors. The final section explores the nature of incrementalism in this context and the impact of the model on the doctrine of judicial precedent.     

作为根本法的宪法:何谓根本

根本法是盛行于17世纪英国的一个古老概念,表达了统治者须受制于外在权威这一理念,后在主权概念的冲击下衰落。18世纪美国复兴这一观念,根本法成文化为宪法,它强调约束主权的根本法与约束个人行为的普通法律之间的区别,发展了法院实施宪法保障根本法地位的机制,完成了根本法的法律化。德国根本法是真实和实定的协定。根本法概念其后注入基本权保障元素。我国民国和新中国宪法学都继受了这一概念。新中国宪法学理论的根本法观念侧重于强调宪法与普通法律的区别、宪法作为普通法律的立法基础、宪法的优位地位,但基本权保障未得到应有重视,司法实施宪法保障根本法的机制亦不健全。鉴于宪法的政治性,须重新恢复根本法和普通法律的区别,完成当代司法审查和现代宪法维护社会基本价值的使命。     

State Courts, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Protection of Civil Liberties

Advocates of federalism, both in the United States and elsewhere, often cite the potential for enhanced protection of individual civil liberties as an emerging rationale for a federal system dividing governmental responsibilities between central and regional governments and central and regional judiciaries. Echoing this, some judicial officials and scholars, confronting an increasingly conservative U.S. Supreme Court, have called for state supreme courts to use the state constitutional grounds to preserve and increase the protections of the Bill of Rights. Using event count analysis, we examine state search-and-seizure cases for 1981 to 1993 to ascertain under what circumstances state courts would use this opportunity to eliminate Supreme Court review. We find that the relative ideological position of the state supreme courts and the U.S. Supreme Court often prevents, or does away with the need for, liberal courts to use the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine to expand the rights of criminal defendants and that state supreme court justices react more predictably in the assertion of constitutional protection law than the general consensus suggests.     

论合宪性解释方法

虽然合宪性解释方法在概念上会存在些许差别,但其所遵循的合宪性推定逻辑是相通的,即都体现了司法权对立法权的谦抑。合宪性解释方法中所含括的单纯解释规则,如果不与冲突规则在学理上加以区分,则很容易对合宪性解释产生认识上的偏差。目前合宪性解释方法所模本的欧陆经验,从源流上来说,最早其实可溯及至早期美国合宪性推定的理论与实践,并与回避宪法方法一脉相承。通过合宪性推定可以发现,合宪性解释方法可以从宪法方法与法律方法两个层面展开。把握其内在理路及权力逻辑,方可使其具有本土可能性。     

论人民代表大会制度下司法对规范的违宪审查

为了建构我国的民主政治体制,切实保障公民权利的实现,树立宪法的最高权威,充分发挥司法权的内在功能,克服立法机关违宪审查机制的弊端和微效,我国应参考世界通行做法,导入司法对规范的违宪审查制度。20年来,决策层总是以司法违宪审查制度与人民代表大会制度相抵触而拒纳,这是对人民代表大会制度的误读。其实两者不矛盾,可以共存。综合各种因素考虑,我国最好建立宪法法院与普通法院相结合的司法对规范的违宪审查制度。     

越权原则在英国的命运

越权原则是英国行政法的基本原则，曾在司法审查中对行政机关的控制和监督方面发挥着十分重要的作用。但近年来随着英国行政法的迅速发展，越权原则表现出不少缺陷，一些学者和法官对它提出了质疑，主张废弃该原则；但持正统理论者则坚持捍卫越权原则，认为摒弃它将产生不良后果。由此在英国引发了一场关于越权原则的争论。这场争论是本世纪英国行政法迅速发展之后对有关行政法理论的深刻反思，它不仅关系到法院对行政行为审查的理论基础，而且根本上关系到英国行政法的宪法基础。     

司法最低限度主义——评桑斯坦的《就事论事——美国最高法院的司法最低限度主义》

为证立司法审查制度的正当性,美国学界以往司法审查理论认为,代议制民主过程不可信任,必须由司法权对民主立法进行有效的宪法监督,以保障民主价值目标的实现.桑斯坦则认为,民主过程固然不可信任,但由于司法能力的有限性,最高法院应采取一种最低限度主义的裁决方法,一次一案式地裁决具体案件,避免原则性判决,将社会价值选择问题交由民意机关互动协商解决,以减少错误判决可能导致的严重社会后果,同时培养民意机关的民主协商精神和公民的参政素质,塑造一个健康民主的社会.与其他司法审查理论相比,司法最低限度主义更有效地论证了司法审查制度的正当性.不过,这一理论本身也有其缺陷.     

Constitutional Directives: Morally‐Committed Political Constitutionalism

About 37 state constitutions around the world feature non‐justiciable thick moral commitments (‘constitutional directives’). These directives typically oblige the state to redistribute income and wealth, guarantee social minimums, or forge a religious or secular identity for the state. They have largely been ignored in a constitutional scholarship defined by its obsession with the legitimacy of judicial review and hostility to constitutionalising thick moral commitments other than basic rights. This article presents constitutional directives as obligatory telic norms, addressed primarily to the political state, which constitutionalise thick moral objectives. Their full realisation—through increasingly sophisticated mechanisms designed to ensure their political enforcement—is deferred to a future date. They are weakly contrajudicative in that these duties are not directly enforced by courts. Functionally, they help shape the discourse over a state's constitutional identity, and regulate its political and judicial organs. Properly understood, they are a key tool to realise a morally‐committed conception of political constitutionalism.     

论美国联邦最高法院宪法解释的创造性

美国联邦最高法院的宪法解释具有创造性,其主要表现在司法审查权、三重审查标准、选择性吸收理论、推翻先例和创造新的公民权利等五个方面。原旨主义和非原旨主义都会达至具有创造性的宪法解释,原旨主义具有天然的民主合法性,有时美国联邦最高法院会以原旨主义来掩饰它们具有创造性的宪法解释。宪法解释的创造性是一把双刃剑,有积极性的一面也有消极性的一面。美国联邦最高法院的宪法解释曾经也将永远具有创造性,只有如此它才能为宪法提供与时俱进的新意义。     

政治问题理论的衰落与重构

政治问题作为可推翻的"自然推定",属于可诉性理论的阻却事由要件。其理论发轫于联邦党人对宪法"特定条款"的阐述。为了应对将政治问题理论区分为经典形式与审慎形式所带来的司法操作性难题,布伦南大法官通过描述政治问题的六个特征,构建了政治问题的确认标准。然而,法院在适用政治问题确认标准的过程中所形成的政治问题理论的循环悖论,以及学界对政治问题理论存在合理性的质疑使得其经典形式出现变异、审慎形式日渐消亡。在激励相容理论基础上重构政治问题理论,可以尝试化解学界对政治问题免于司法审查理论基础的种种非议。     

司法审查：一种动态民主的机制

从代议民主的角度看,司法审查和民主之间确实存在着矛盾,美国司法审查的几种理论路径不能解释清楚司法审查正当性的问题,伊利的程序主义理论回避司法审查合法性的实体问题即国会立法违背宪法的客观标准为何,宪法文本的不确定性使得司法审查的客观标准成为一个难题,但是如果从动态的民主参与方面看,对国会立法进行违宪审查的目的是建立一种动态的参与民主机制,在代议民主和大众之间建立沟通的桥梁,使民众的话语得到张扬,让民主运转起来,故美国确立司法审查的理论基础是动态的参与民主机制。     

美国隐私权的宪法保护述评

美国隐私权的宪法保护建立在其独特的司法审查的基础上,有其独特的特色,不仅体现在通过最高法院对宪法的司法解释回应了公民权利运动对隐私权保护的要求,而且宪法对隐私权的保护具有开放性,虽然美国宪法对隐私权的保护受制于社会传统伦理道德和政府的政策,但是通过消极的个案判决方式从基本人权的角度确立了宪法对自决权意义上的隐私权的保护。     

论法院对基本权利的保护

为公民基本权利提供保护,是现代国家合法性的重要来源。普通法院在基本权利保护中发挥着重要作用。德国虽然设立了宪法法院,但保护公民基本权利的职责仍主要由其他法院承担。在没有设立宪法法院的国家,通过普通法院更是为基本权利提供司法保护的唯一途径。我国法院应当通过三种方式为基本权利提供司法保护:如果法律有保护基本权利的具体规定,法院应当直接适用法律;如果法律对基本权利的保护只作了抽象规定,法院应当对有关抽象立法进行合宪解释之后予以适用;如果法律没有作出保护基本权利的任何规定,法院可以直接适用宪法的基本权利条款。