论美国联邦最高法院宪法解释的创造性

美国联邦最高法院的宪法解释具有创造性,其主要表现在司法审查权、三重审查标准、选择性吸收理论、推翻先例和创造新的公民权利等五个方面。原旨主义和非原旨主义都会达至具有创造性的宪法解释,原旨主义具有天然的民主合法性,有时美国联邦最高法院会以原旨主义来掩饰它们具有创造性的宪法解释。宪法解释的创造性是一把双刃剑,有积极性的一面也有消极性的一面。美国联邦最高法院的宪法解释曾经也将永远具有创造性,只有如此它才能为宪法提供与时俱进的新意义。     

The changing legal environment of the juvenile court

The American juvenile court is in a state of legal flux. From its informal beginning in English chancery law, to its formal inception in the United States in 1899, the court has been exposed to a number of diverse, competing pressures. Since the Supreme Court case of In re Gault in the mid-1960’s, the whole underpinnings of the juvenile court have been so shaken that one must now ask whether or not the last vestiges of parens patriae have been swept away. If this is indeed the case, America should now seek alternatives to the present system of juvenile adjudication —for the sake of the child and for the sake of justice.     

"Pro-life" absolutes, feminist challenges: the fundamentalist narrative of Irish abortion law 1986-1992

This article asks how Irish abortion law developed to the point of stopping a young pregnant rape victim from travelling abroad to have an abortion in 1992 (Attorney General v.X). The author argues that this case, which ultimately saw the Irish Supreme Court overturn that decision and recognize the young woman's right to abortion, was the last chapter of the fundamentalist narrative of Irish abortion law. The feminist critique of that law needs to consider its particular fundamentalist aspects in order to clarify the obstacles posed to the struggle for Irish women's reproductive freedom. The author argues that a fundamentalist narrative ordered the post-colonial and patriarchal conditions of Irish society so as to call for the legal recognition of an absolute right to life of the "unborn." The Supreme Court's interpretation of the constitutional right to life of the fetus in three cases during the 1980s is evidence that Irish abortion law was constructed through a fundamentalist narrative until that narrative was rejected in the Supreme Court decision in Attorney General v. X.     

Originalism 2.0 Meets the First Amendment: The “New Originalism,” Interpretive Methodology,and Freedom of Expression

Constitutional originalism emerged as a legal and political movement in the last quarter of the twentieth century largely as a conservative reaction to perceived excesses of the Supreme Court of the United States. Early originalist attempts to formulate a coherent constitutional methodology were met with stinging criticism from many scholars. In recent years, a group of constitutional scholars has championed a different approach under the rubric “the New Originalism.” One of the key methodological innovations of New Originalism has been to reject the search for the intentions of the framer or ratifiers of constitutional provisions and instead seek to identify the “original public meaning” of such provisions. This article explores New Originalism in the context of the First Amendment speech and press clauses. The article also analyzes originalist opinions by Supreme Court justices to determine if New Originalism is affecting how the justices approach First Amendment interpretation.     

最高法院对外国法适用的上诉审查

最高法院位于一国司法体系的顶端,同时负有上诉终审裁判功能和发展法律的功能.最高法院是否应对外国法的错误适用进行上诉审查,各国实践和理论分歧甚大,从中可以概括出三种基本模式:拒绝审查模式、有限审查模式和全面审查模式.从最高法院的上诉裁判功能出发,为落实当事人的上诉救济权利,尤其是在我国二审终审和法官对外国法的查明和确定拥有主导权的语境下,最高法院应对外国法的错误适用进行上诉审查.外国法的适用与本国法律体系的发展并不割裂,相反两者具有实质关联,最高法院从其发展法律的功能出发,也应主动审查下级法院对外国法的错误适用.最高法院解释和适用外国法,有助于增进本国法律体系的包容和开放的精神.     

Public Reason Between Ethics and Law

Rawls says that public reason is the reason of the citizens of a democratic state and takes the Supreme Court in the USA as the exemplar of public reason. It differs from non public reason, which is used e.g., in universities and academic institutions. Rawls contrasts with Kant, which opposes the public reason of the scholar??or the philosopher??, who speaks before the world, to the private reason of state or church officials. The later, once they accept an authority, cannot think by themselves (selbst denken). A closer examination shows that Rawls is not so far from Kant as it seems, because he takes the constitutional judges not as they are, but as they should be. However Rawls still apparently refuses Kant??s unity of reason. Further investigation of the relations between ethical reason, democratic reason and legal reason is needed. Democratic reason is tantamount both to public reason and to legal reason in a modern constitutional state. It is a requirement of ethics but still not identical with ethical reason, since it is possible to accept democratic reason and to argue against it from an ethical point of view. There is just one good way of reasoning, in spite of the constraints that the sources of law and the rules of procedure impose on legal reasoning, compared with ethics. Such constraints are based on the democratic principle, which is again based on ethical reason, which at last both grounds and limits the constraints that law imposes on reason.     

最高人民法院在合宪性审查中的现状、困境与出路——兼对我国《立法法》第99条第1款解释

我国《立法法》预设了最高人民法院提请全国人大常委会进行合宪性审查的路径。从现有裁判文书来看,最高人民法院在实践中并未遵循我国《立法法》所预设的路径,而是在绝大多数案件中回避了合宪性审查诉求,同时又在个别案件中进行了合宪性审查,陷入了完全回避与直接审查的两难困境。造成这种困境的原因在于,我国《立法法》对最高人民法院在合宪性审查中的权力基础、权力行使程序缺乏清晰的规定。对此,亟待通过法律解释进行明确和细化,否则最高人民法院将无章可循,无法贸然提请全国人大常委会进行合宪性审查。为了化解最高人民法院面对的这一困境,有必要对我国《立法法》第99条第1款进行解释,推导出该条款在授予最高人民法院提请审查权时,还隐含着另一项未被释明的权力即预审权,其共同构成最高人民法院在合宪性审查中的权力基础;同时,为了使预审权与提请审查权的行使制度化,有必要对其行使程序进行细化,建立起预审-提请审查机制。     

Regulation of Cohabitation and Marriage in Canada

Marriage in Canada had lost much of its legal significance because of the extension of many of the incidents of marriage to unmarried cohabitants of the same or opposite sex. This process has resulted in large part from decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or marital status is constitutionally impermissible. In a decision that seemed to many a surprising reversal of this trend, the Supreme Court of Canada in 2002 ruled that legislators could constitutionally exclude unmarried couples from family property laws. The effect of this decision has been to revive the legal significance of marriage. At the same time, courts have resurrected the social significance of marriage by accepting the argument of same-sex marriage advocates that a "separate but equal" civil union institution would not respect the constitutional guarantee of equality and by endorsing the constitutional right of same-sex couples to the symbolic value of marriage as a public and legal celebration of a relationship. Same-sex marriages may now be legally celebrated in three Canadian provinces, and the federal government has made a commitment to open up civil marriage to same-sex couples across the country. While some same-sex couples and unmarried cohabitants have fought for spousal or marital status, others have sought to avoid the burdens associated with spousal status. After the same-sex marriage debate is concluded, Canada will be ready to move on to consider whether all of the legal privileges and burdens now assigned to those in conjugal relationships, whether married, unmarried, same-sex or opposite-sex, can be justified.     

The Impact of Supreme Court Activity on the Judicial Agenda

When the Supreme Court takes action, it establishes national policy within an issue area. A traditional, legal view holds that the decisions of the Court settle questions of law and thereby close the door on future litigation, reducing the need for future attention to that issue. Alternatively, an emerging interest group perspective suggests the Court, in deciding cases, provides signals that encourage additional attention to particular issues. I examine these competing perspectives of what happens in the federal courts after Supreme Court decisions. My results indicate that while Supreme Court decisions generally settle areas of law in terms of overall litigation rates, they also introduce new information that leads to increases in the attention of judges and interest groups to those particular issues.     

宪法解释主体论

宪法解释主体理论存有两种,即民主理论与自由宪政理论。本文对宪法的立法解释之是非与宪法的司法解释之是非作了分析说明,认为司法者而非立法者能更好地理解和解释宪法。重点对我国宪法解释的制度设计与理论之争及模式选择与建构进行了研究,认为在世界各国通行的三种模式中,立法解释模式与普通法院解释模式实际上被排除在了选择之外,惟一可行的模式就是欧洲模式:建立专门的宪法解释的法院或机构。     

Conforming to the rule of law: when person and human being finally mean the same thing in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence

The Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect people from discrimination and harm from other people. Racism is not the only thing people need protection from. As a constitutional principle, the Fourteenth Amendment is not confined to its historical origin and purpose, but is available now to protect all human beings, including all unborn human beings. The Supreme Court can define "person" to include all human beings, born and unborn. It simply chooses not to do so. Science, history and tradition establish that unborn humans are, from the time of conception, both persons and human beings, thus strongly supporting an interpretation that the unborn meet the definition of "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment. The legal test used to extend constitutional personhood to corporations, which are artificial "persons" under the law, is more than met by the unborn, demonstrating that the unborn deserve the status of constitutional personhood. There can be no "rule of law" if the Constitution continues to be interpreted to perpetuate a discriminatory legal system of separate and unequal for unborn human beings. Relying on the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court may overrule Roe v. Wade solely on the grounds of equal protection. Such a result would not return the matter of abortion to the states. The Fourteenth Amendment, properly interpreted, would thereafter prohibit abortion in every state.     

法律解释如何统一——关于司法解释权的法律统一解释功能的思考

目前我国宪法解释权以及法律统一解释权处于一种权力真空状态,人们希望最高人民法院能填补这一权力空白.然而根据我国宪法所规范的国家权力结构,最高人民法院是无力承担起这一重任的.最高人民法院的法律统一解释功能是有限的,只能统一各级法院的审判解释.我国的司法改革应着眼于通过构建合理的审判制度、判例制度以及合理划分最高人民法院与各级法院解释范围,完善最高人民法院的司法统一解释功能.     

美国隐私权的宪法保护述评

美国隐私权的宪法保护建立在其独特的司法审查的基础上,有其独特的特色,不仅体现在通过最高法院对宪法的司法解释回应了公民权利运动对隐私权保护的要求,而且宪法对隐私权的保护具有开放性,虽然美国宪法对隐私权的保护受制于社会传统伦理道德和政府的政策,但是通过消极的个案判决方式从基本人权的角度确立了宪法对自决权意义上的隐私权的保护。     

First Amendment Showdown: Intellectual Diversity Mandates and the Academic Marketplace

Once described as a quintessential marketplace of ideas by the Supreme Court of the United States, the academic marketplace has been criticized recently for institutionalizing a left-leaning ideology within its curriculum and academic discourse. As a result, national activists and organizations have been calling on state legislatures and university administrators to adopt policies and report on steps taken to encourage intellectual diversity and protect political and cultural minorities from faculty bias and academic retribution in the classroom and other university settings. But who would win a constitutional showdown between the academy and those seeking to infuse academic discourse with alternative viewpoints? Based on an analysis of the First Amendment concerns at stake in this ongoing controversy, this article concludes that university administrators should have the upper hand in such a constitutional challenge given the specific characteristics and selective nature of the academic marketplace.     

An Analysis of Policy‐Based Congressional Responses to the U.S. Supreme Court's Constitutional Decisions

While Congress can attempt to overrule constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court by initiating the constitutional amendment process, an amendment is rarely a practicable option. Instead, Congress regularly tries to modify the impact of constitutional decisions with ordinary legislation. I analyze policy‐based responses to the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions that were initiated in Congress between 1995 and 2010. For each responsive proposal, I consider the relationship between the proposed legislation and the Court's legal holding and the relationship between the proposal and the public policy associated with the Court's decision. I find that Congress enjoys considerable success in reversing the policy impacts of the Court's decisions but is limited in its ability to overcome the Court's legal rules.     

POSTAL 2 plays in US court - Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants Association

In an unprecedented legal development, the case of violence in video games has now reached the highest American court. The US Supreme Court is set to decide whether states can restrict minors from buying violent video games in the case of Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants Association. The decision could have serious implications on the future of First Amendment rights and children’s ’welfare. To resolve Schwarzenegger, the Justices will need to decide how much First Amendment protection should be extended to violent video games and whether minors have a greater constitutional right to violence than they do to obscenity.     

Climate Change Litigation,Obsession and Expertise: Reflecting on the Scholarly Response to Massachusetts v. EPA

Climate change litigation is an obsessive preoccupation for many legal scholars. Three different “narratives” can be identified for why scholars find such litigation important to study: litigation is a response to institutional failure, legal reasoning holds authority, and litigation is a forum for the co‐production of facts and social orders. The nature and consequences of these narratives are considered in the context of the first U.S. Supreme Court “climate change” case—Massachusetts v. EPA (2007). This analysis has implications for both how scholars understand their expertise in this area, and how they should foster it.     

A Doctrine at Risk: Content Neutrality in a Post-Reed Landscape

Although the Supreme Court of the United States has deployed the content-neutrality doctrine at least twenty-three times in the last decade, two recent cases — McCullen v. Coakley and Reed v. Town of Gilbert — demonstrate that disagreement among the justices over the meaning of the doctrine is endangering its utility for First Amendment jurisprudence. This article describes the manifestations of this disagreement and suggests that without further clarification about the doctrine's nature, purpose and application, the venerable First Amendment canon may soon either lose practical tenability or disintegrate into constitutional oblivion. Such an outcome, the article suggests, is both ill advised and avoidable. By taking several practical steps, the Supreme Court can go a long way toward preserving the doctrine's usefulness for upholding legitimate government interests and protecting the freedom of expression.     

Guantánamo Bay: Towards Legality?

This article outlines the US Supreme Court's approach to the habeas corpus entitlements of suspected terrorists detained in Guantánamo Bay and argues for the extension of constitutional habeas corpus rights to them. The article considers two ways in which the Supreme Court might carry out this task: first, 'the territorial approach' (based on domestic legal principles of 'unincorporated territories' and principles of leasehold), and secondly, 'the extraterritorial approach' (based on international purposive approaches to the reach of human rights treaties exemplified by the European Court of Human Rights' Article 1 jurisprudence). For reasons of effectiveness of protection, the Article expresses a clear preference for the latter. The House of Lords decision in R (Al-Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence (2007) is proposed as a template for such a development. Finally the article refutes arguments rejecting such a development based on the 'trade-off thesis' and perceptions of judicial competence.