Widening the Protection Gap: The 'Politics of Citizenship' for Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, 1948-2008

Lebanon has been a reluctant host to Palestinian refugees since1948. A mainstay of Lebanese policies vis-à-vis the Palestinianrefugees has been preventing their permanent integration andsettlement in the country. The question of naturalizing refugeesis one of the most contentious political issues in Lebanon today.Palestinian refugees tend to live in conflict-ridden environments,often at the margins of the host society. This first of allapplies to the camp-based refugees, who languish in dilapidatedand overcrowded camps. Unable to return to Palestine and marginalizedby the host society, they are caught in a legal limbo. In orderto understand the complex legal regime that governs their refugeestatus, it is necessary to examine their rights as refugeesin international law, regionally as hosted by Arab League statesand nationally as residents of Lebanon. The rights regime iscomplex and contributes to a critical ‘protection gap’for the refugees. This article demonstrates how this protectiongap was created and widened by historically contingent, international,regional and national legal rights regimes.     

Securitised development and Palestinian authoritarianism under Fayyadism

This article analyses perceptions of the Palestinian Authority’s post-2007 state-building project—popularly known as ‘Fayyadism’—by assessing academic and practitioner literatures on the topic, and by drawing on the findings of ethnographic fieldwork conducted at two sites in the West Bank: Balata and Jenin refugee camps. It argues that the ethnographic data reveals that despite the self-proclaimed institutional successes of Fayyadism, its achievements have failed to have a meaningful impact on the basic rights of Palestinians. These voices from below articulate the detrimental effects that Fayyadism has had on their resistance against Israel’s occupation, and by extension on their own protection and security. Criticisms focus on the absence of local legitimacy and accountability, and question the agenda of Fayyadism, its political basis and its trajectory as they relate to the Palestinian struggle for freedom.     

The unlikely terrorist: women and Islamic resistance in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories

Islamic resistance groups in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories have been accused of using terrorist tactics to achieve their aims. Although some critics suggest that such groups may also have hijacked the democratic agenda in ways that disadvantage women, their supporters claim that they are promoting a model of modernity that is empowering women. This article examines the reasons why some Lebanese Shi'i and Palestinian women support the resistance against Israeli invasion and occupation that is justified in terms of religion. Far from seeing the actions of Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories as acts of terrorism, many women welcome the resistance as it brings dignity and meaning to their lives and enhances feelings of national identification.     

Islamism in the Diaspora: Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon

In recent years there has been increasing academic interestin Islamism in the Middle East, not least in Palestinian Islamismchampioned by groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, whichare waging a war of attrition against the Israeli occupationof the West Bank and Gaza. There has been less concern withIslamism among the Palestinian refugees dispersed in MiddleEastern countries such as Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. The articleoutlines the sources of Islamism (‘political Islam’)among Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The rise of Islamismis a complex mix of contingent factors that is fuelled by socialand political deprivation and shaped by divergent views on Palestiniannationalism (secular vs. Islamist), the Islamist revival inLebanon and ‘strategic localization’ that turnsrefugee camps into battlefields between Palestinian factions.The Islamist groups cater for narrowly defined segments of therefugee population and have been unable to attract wider support.Instead, they cater for minor, camp-based constituencies whichcompete with secular groups for internal control of the campsand, by implication, of the Palestinian nationalist cause itself.     

The symbiosis between Palestinian ‘Fayyadism’ and Israeli ‘economic peace’: the political economy of capitalist peace in the context of colonisation

Abstract

Recent years have seen both the Palestinian Authority and Israeli government conveying the supremacy of economic approaches over politics to achieve peace and stability. More specifically, the encounter and symbiosis between Palestinian 'Fayyadism' as a professional application of neo-liberal approaches to state-building and economic development, and the Israeli strategy of 'economic peace' towards the Palestinians have shaped much of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict dynamic, with a particularly discernible materialisation in the West Bank. This article critically analyses this dynamic in light of the recently revived theory of 'capitalist peace', which, despite valid criticism, entails considerable similarities with the basic assumptions of 'Fayyadism' and 'economic peace'. While two key dimensions express this symbiosis—security co-ordination and economic normalisation—the article focuses mainly on the economic part, particularly the case of joint industrial zones, which exemplify the most extreme example of this symbiosis.     

History writing and securitization of the other: the construction and reconstruction of Palestinian and Israeli security discourses

In conflict situations the protagonists are driven by rival visions of the past. The protracted conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is a particularly extreme case to illustrate this point. In protracted conflict like the Israeli–Palestinian conflict historians themselves are acting as combatants. In this regard, the article argues that history writing, particularly in the cases of protracted conflicts, constitutes an important part of the construction and reconstruction of security discourses whether by supporting mainstream security discourses or by challenging them. By discussing the role of history writing in the securitization process, this article aims to contribute to the centuries-long debates over the history-writing–politics nexus by taking a security studies perspective.     

Democratization,Instability, and War: Israel's 2006 Conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah

In 2006 Israel resumed military operations in the Gaza Strip and conducted a war in Lebanon following attacks by Hamas and Hezbollah, respectively. Due to the elections that had recently taken place in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon, these events seem to support the argument that democratizing nations are particularly war-prone. Yet the dynamics this perspective identifies as dangerous were largely absent. To address this puzzle, this paper offers three arguments. First, democratization enhanced the power of groups openly hostile to Israel, increasing Israel's perception of threat. Second, democratization was threatening because it occurred within highly divided societies governed by weak state institutions that allowed radical groups to attain political power. Finally, Israel's response to the increased threat posed by these groups was ultimately counterproductive because it further eroded the capacity of the Palestinian and Lebanese governments, heightened polarization within both societies, and therefore exacerbated the same conditions that made democratization threatening to begin with.     

Curious Victory: Explaining Israel's Suppression of the Second Intifada

The article examines Israel's successes and failures during the Second Intifada. It argues that Israel's advances came from an effective counterterrorism campaign involving a mix of military operations, defensive measures, and in particular improved intelligence gathering. Domestic resilience also proved strong in the face of a brutal terrorism campaign. Yet long-term victory remains elusive for Israel. Deterrence, always difficult against terrorist groups, is growing harder for Israel. Hamas's control of Gaza, and the mistrust and hatred sown during the Second Intifada, have hindered a political deal between Israel and moderate Palestinians. Much of what went into successful counterterrorism, notably the security barrier and the aggressive campaign of raids and arrests, does not jibe with most visions of what peace would look like and makes a deal harder to achieve. To make a peace deal work, Israeli counterterrorism must change, with measures including relocating parts of the security barrier, bolstering moderate Palestinian politicians, and working with, as opposed to undermining, Palestinian security forces in the West Bank.     

The intifada: Palestinian adaptation to Israeli counterinsurgency tactics

In December 1987 the uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip significantly changed the nature of the Palestinian threat to Israel and pushed the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians into the forefront of the Palestinian‐Israeli conflict. This article examines the effects of the Israeli counterinsurgency tactics on the Palestinian strategy from the period of 1967 through 1987. It proposes that the implementation of Israel's counterinsurgency policy since 1967 was a crucial factor in creating the conditions for revolution and influencing the Palestinians’ adaptation of their tactics, culminating in the intifada.     

American military presence in Europe

Despite the efforts put into negotiations, they have created a self-perpetuating cycle of disappointment, frustration and empty dialogue. With contradictory Palestinian and Israeli agendas – Palestinians negotiating for an independent state, an end to occupation, etc., and Israel negotiating primarily over security concerns – one must question the reason behind prolonged negotiations. Is US mediation, accused by many of extreme bias towards Israel, to blame? Or are negotiations an Israeli objective to execute a particular political agenda? In spite of the international community's recognition of establishing an independent Palestinian state, the current reality on the ground undermines any creation of one. This reality was allowed only by the strategic prolonging of negotiations. A particular focus on the proceedings following the Oslo Accords explains how Palestinian--Israeli negotiations have been used to pursue a specific objective.     

Conflict over Israel: The Role of Religion,Race, Party and Ideology in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1997–2002

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the contours of support for the state of Israel in the House of Representatives from 1997 to 2002. In an analysis of votes and cosponsorship decisions, we find that when Congress considers innocuous resolutions of support for Israel, support is consensual and nonpartisan. However, as the violence escalated between Israel and the Palestinians in the 106th and 107th Congresses (1999–2001), the House increasingly considered bills and resolutions that directly engaged the Palestinian issue and forced legislators to take a side in the ongoing conflict. This transformed the politics of support for Israel and increased the level of conflict among legislators. With that, new partisan, ideological, religious, and racial cleavages emerged. Democrats, liberals, and African Americans started to identify with the Palestinians—not Israel—as the oppressed group. At the same time, religious and ideological conservatives and Republicans started to identify with Israel as a just state under attack from lawless individuals considered to be outside the Judeo-Christian tradition. At least with regard to Israel, this suggests that the development of U.S. foreign policy, which is often characterized as an elite-driven pursuit of national interests, is heavily marked by domestic ethno-religious forces.     

Power-sharing after the Arab Spring? Insights from Lebanon’s Political Transition

Abstract

The article looks at the legacy of consociationalism in Lebanon with the aim of illuminating some insights on the linkages between power-sharing and conflict resolution in the post-2011 Middle East. It highlights three core dilemmas or governance traps that have recurred in Lebanon’s political dynamic: the power-sharing formula’s proneness to deadlock, its dependence on the external environment as an avenue for partisanship and sectarian leverage, and its weak responsiveness to demands from below. The article shows how these dilemmas are tightly linked to the politics of sectarianism. While Lebanon’s postwar transition (1990 onward) serves as a backdrop for exploring these dilemmas, emphasis is placed on the performance of Lebanon’s political system in the post–Arab Spring era. The aim is to assess whether Lebanon’s consociational performance has matured over time. The Lebanese experience brings into sharper focus the limitations of sectarian power-sharing. Still, it provides useful insights for reshaping the debate on power-sharing in divided societies of the Arab world.     

The Arab League in Lebanon: 2005–2008

Contrary to expectations, the Arab League has emerged as an active player in the Middle East region over the past decade. The League's roles in negotiations to end the 2006 Israel–Lebanon War and in the brokering of the 2008 Doha Agreement between warring Lebanese factions present two instances of ‘partial’ and ‘direct’ contributions to success in resolving major extra-systemic and minor internal conflicts. These developments are part of a global trend of the regionalization or decentralization of security in the post-Cold-War context.     

The Arabs in Israel: Identity,criminality and the peace process

The basic datum that criminality among the Palestinian Arabs of Israel is nearly double the average among the population in general begs some hard questions and answers. It is suggested here that, besides the regular crimes endemic in Israeli society of which Arabs and Jews alike partake, there is a category of criminal activity that is peculiar to the Arabs, under the heading of ‘ideological’, namely nationalistically and/or religiously induced. It is suggested here that the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians does not necessarily reduce the rate of criminality among Israeli Arabs. Quite the contrary, in some cases it might increase criminal partnerships between Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line divide even when the peace process is alive and kicking; and when it is not, things might even get worse with the Israeli Arabs increasingly identifying with their brethren across the border in their struggle against the right‐wing government of Israel from which they are totally alienated.     

Security and discourse: the Israeli–Palestinian water conflict

When conflictive viewpoints are discursively strengthened, they develop into a ‘conflict discourse’ with a specific discursive structure which perpetuates conflict, like the discursive securitisation of an issue for varying audiences. When they are weakened, however, societal discourse can potentially change so that agreement becomes possible again, thus achieving discursive conflict transformation. This article analyses the Israeli and the Palestinian water discourse. On both sides, the dominant discourse structures underscore the conflictive issues regarding the distribution of water between Israelis and Palestinians, thus making communication, let alone negotiation, downright impossible. While Palestinians regard the natural water resources as sufficient in principle and the existing scarcity as entirely politically induced, Israelis perceive the natural water resources as absolutely scarce while receiving major de-securitisation impulses from the possibility of desalination. In the respective (minor) counter-discourses, however, possible starting points for dialogue and conflict resolution are visible.     

Something old,something new: security governance in Iraq

The lack of a coherent security paradigm capable of explaining the concerns of both traditional and ‘new’ security is evident from the US-led occupation of Iraq. Security is the critical element in Iraq's reconstruction, and understanding the multiple meanings and relationships through which it is exercised is essential for empirical and analytical reasons, yet policy is flawed and the debate remains polarized. Thus Washington assumes that conventional security can be provided—and US power employed—independently of the relationship in which it is to be exercised, whereas Iraqi concerns focus on security at the level of the individual. The result can be seen in the paradigmatic examples of coalition operations in Basra in 2003 and Falluja in 2004. This article suggests that the interaction between coalition authorities and Iraqis, and, by extension, conventional and new forms of security, is best understood in terms of power relations; a comprehensive understanding of security must incorporate a relational dimension.     

The US View of the Transforming Strategic Context in the MENA

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently reiterated US support for the expansion of the Abraham Accords and called for renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. As highlighted by this volume’s authors, the Accords are the most significant regional peacemaking achievement in decades, having already reduced Arab-Israeli tensions—particularly at the government level—and provided opportunities for Arab states to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians. The changing regional security architecture can only be welcomed by the United States. Yet, due to political authoritarianism in the region, the Accords may fall short of their potential if the economic gains fail to reach marginalized populations. This essay contends that trade relations that support job creation and access to water and energy may increase public support. Just as a return to Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is important, political reform in the Arab countries is needed to make the Accords successful by bringing more economic benefits to the Arab streets and ensuring that there will not be a “Cold Peace.”     

The Security Imperative in Counterterror Operations: The Israeli Fight Against Suicidal Terror

ABSTRACT

Israel has had a long tradition of fighting international and Palestinian terror. This article looks at how Israel counterterrorism strategy and tactics have developed since the establishment of the State in 1948. By initially providing a working definition of terrorism, the article then goes to show how Israel has sought to defend itself from different Palestinian terror tactics. This article shows how Israeli security forces have struggled safeguarding, and sometimes disregarded Palestinian human rights. This article concludes by arguing that given the responsibility of democratic governments of defending their citizens from imminent terror attacks, such governments often find themselves paradoxically violating human rights. Despite attempts to reduce such human rights abuses, governments will never do so at the expense of their own security.     

Old (Molotov) cocktails in new bottles? “Price-tag” and settler violence in Israel and the West Bank

In the early morning of July 31, 2015, masked attackers threw firebombs into two Palestinian homes in the West Bank village of Duma, south of Nablus, killing three Palestinian civilians. Contrary to claims by Israeli and Palestinian politicians, this attack was neither an isolated anomaly nor just another incident of settler violence. Instead, it was the latest attack in an important but largely unknown phenomenon called “price-tag,” in which a loosely connected group of young Israelis called “hilltop youth” burn Palestinian mosques and destroy property in hundreds of attacks accompanied by threatening graffiti that references Israeli settlers, outposts, and anti-Arab slogans. Using an original dataset of price-tag incidents and interviews with key actors, we demonstrate that the perpetrators, targets, and strategies of price-tag are different than previous patterns of settler violence. Whereas previous settlers saw the Israeli state as legitimate and largely decided to cooperate with it, the hilltop youth have decided to confront it by using price-tag attacks to deter settlement withdrawals and chain-gang the state into a conflict with the Palestinians. This analysis of the strategic logic of price-tag reveals its potential to shift the political landscape within and between Israelis and Palestinians.     

Influencing Negotiation Willingness in the Middle East: The Potential Contributions of Private Actors

Numerous efforts to solve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict through diplomacy have taken place over the last four decades. To shed light on this dilemma in this article, the role that private actors and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can play to enhance the negotiation willingness of nonstate armed groups was examined. It was argued that the NGOs in particular could play key roles in promoting the negotiation willingness of nonstate actors and also in influencing their internal dynamics and increasing their cohesion. Specifically, we examine two pairs of efforts to resolve the conflict in Israel and Palestine: the “Road Map” and the track two Geneva Initiative of 2003, and the Olmert Peace Plan and Jimmy Carter's visit to the Middle East in 2008. In the first pair, NGO efforts yielded unexpected results. The Palestinians were ready to compromise even though the deal offered by the Israelis did not seem very generous. In the second pair, the reaction of the Palestinians to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's generous peace offer seemed especially puzzling, illustrating, the internal dynamics between the Palestinian factions. Negotiation willingness was closely related to cohesion, and that cohesion plays an important role in conflict negotiations. President Jimmy Carter's efforts in 2008 to enhance cohesion among the Palestinians illustrated the potential that NGOs have to complement official negotiations.