Ambassador David Bruce and “LBJ's War”: Vietnam Viewed from London, 1963–1968

Recent decades have seen growing historical interest in “second rank” officials who, whilst they do not play a leading role in government or political movements, can influence the way decisions are shaped and executed. At the same time, the interest of scholars in American policy during the Vietnam War shows no signs of abating. This article investigates the experience of one second rank official during the war, David Bruce, who was Ambassador to London during 1961–1969. Making particular use of Bruce's extensive diaries, it traces his shifting views on the war, looks at the extent to which he shared the outlook of other official,s and asks what influence, if any, he had on events. It argues that, whilst he always remained loyal to his own government and often mirrored the outlook of the Johnson Administration, Bruce had his own perspective on events, was consistently critical of American tactics on the ground, and, in Spring 1967, influenced by Robert McNamara, became an early advocate of retrenchment.     

Violence in Lenin's thought and practice: The spark and the conflagration

Drawing on Lenin's writings, the commentary of Soviet specialists, and the work of those who focus on the special character of violence, this article discusses Lenin's views on violence over his lifetime, his distinction among different types of violence, his policies and their results, and finally the doubts about his practices that he ultimately expressed near the end of his life. Beginning in the tsarist era with Lenin's campaign among his fellow revolutionaries to reject individual terror in favor of mass violence, it follows him into power as he put his tenets into practice and finally into his introspective retirement. It discusses how, oblivious to developing danger he unleashed mass violence and prodded it to action in the service of the revolutionary state; why he refused to incorporate safeguards against runaway violence; and how, as its deleterious effects became manifest, he continued to employ violence as both instrument of choice and substitute for legitimate authority. It shows that Lenin evinced an addiction to violence that caused him to overlook or foreclose other, less radical, political methods for accomplishing his goals. We see that Lenin's evident belief in the efficacy and controllability of violence blinded him to its potentially counterproductive and even disastrous effects. The state that resulted from Lenin's policies was not what he had envisaged, and not the result of a preconceived plan. But equally it did not emerge as the simple product of ineluctable circumstances defeating a hapless Lenin. Lenin made a series of policy choices ‐ none foreordained by circumstance ‐ which yielded an authoritarian state grounded in violence. These choices were explicitly contested by prominent contemporaries within and outside of the Bolshevik government, who correctly and vocally predicted the results which were becoming clearly visible during Lenin's tenure. Lenin chose to ignore the results, reject the alternatives and silence the critics, decisions he himself came to regret.     

Nourishing men's anger and inflaming the fires of hatred: Bayle on religious violence and the ‘Novus Ordo Saeclorum’

In 1697, the Huguenot writer Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) published his Dictionnaire historique et critique ‐ a one‐man encyclopaedia. The article entitled Macon drew attention to the cruel atrocities perpetrated during the French Wars of Religion. This article explains the context of Bayle's critique, arguing that he uses the example to reflect on the Gallican regime's renewal of persecution against his community, and on the notorious revocation by Louis XIV, in 1685, of the Edict of Nantes. As a long‐term remedy for state violence against a law‐abiding minority, he recommends deliberative freedom within a framework of government impartiality, thereby anticipating a new secular order. A new translation of Bayle's article Macon can be found in the appendix.     

Comments on James L. Gelvin's “Al-Qaeda and Anarchism: A Historian's Reply to Terrorology”

The article deals with the intellectual and philosophical background of Sartre's thought, which made him susceptible to the influence of left-wing totalitarian structures in general and to left-wing terrorism in particular. Consequently it is argued that Sartre's identification with Stalinism in his younger years, and his later sympathies with the infamous German Baader-Meinhof terrorist gang, were more than mere expressions of his personality, but rather part and parcel of his special blend of existentialism and philosophy. At the end of the article, Sartre's position in this matter is contrasted with the position of another existentialist French thinker, Sartre's contemporary, Albert Camus.     

Hard‐Core Toughie: Donald Trump’s Negotiations for the United States Presidency

This paper examines the negotiation tactics employed by Donald Trump in his 2016 presidential campaign. Drawing on data from multiple sources (interviews, debates, articles, books), our analysis begins with a brief overview of Trump’s personality and philosophy, which offers a basis for understanding his general negotiating approach. We then highlight six competitive tactics and four principles of persuasion that Trump employs, with specific examples of how he used them during the campaign with his primary negotiating counterparts – the other candidates, the Republican Party, the press corps, and the American electorate. Finally, we discuss some of the implications of his negotiating approach and preferred tactics in dealing with domestic and international issues as president of the United States.     

Pakistan's endgame in Kashmir

Although Pakistani leaders often describe the dispute over Kashmir as the “core issue” between India and Pakistan, Pakistani policy is driven by a deeper fear of India and about Pakistan's national identity. Pakistan's approach to the resolution of the Kashmir dispute has been characterized by a series of tactical moves, lacking a coherent strategy or a planned end game. Only a sustained peace process can address the multiple factors that give rise to Indian and Pakistani suspicions about each other's intentions and Pakistani tactics designed to prolong the conflict in the hope of eventually altering the status quo. Pakistan does not have a clearly thought out endgame in Kashmir and attending to its insecurities could be one of way of ensuring the emergence of a realistic endgame without violence.     

The Spread of Military Innovations: Adoption Capacity Theory,Tactical Incentives,and the Case of Suicide Terrorism

What explains the adoption of military innovations? In this article, we assess the empirical validity of adoption capacity theory by reconsidering one methodologically important case analyzed by Michael Horowitz: the diffusion of suicide terrorism. We show that, when addressing problems in Horowitz's research design, the case of suicide terrorism fails to support adoption capacity theory. We argue that, in order to account for the diffusion of this innovation, one needs to take into consideration the tactical incentives to overcome technologically superior enemies. The results of our quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that terrorist groups fighting against very powerful states in terms of conventional capabilities are more likely to employ suicide attacks than those fighting against poorly equipped ones. Our findings are important because they provide systematic evidence in support of Kalyvas and Sànchez-Cuenca's argument that suicide terrorism is driven by tactical considerations and because they provide confidence in the external validity of Berman and Laitin's hardness of targets hypothesis. Our results also question Lyall and Wilson's finding that highly mechanized armies are inherently inadequate to win counterinsurgency operations. The superior conventional capabilities of a counterinsurgency army might in fact make traditional insurgent tactics ineffective and thus give insurgents an incentive to adopt suicide attacks.     

Beyond the Blank Cheque: Arming Iran during the Ford Administration

When President Gerald Ford decided to maintain and deepen arms relations with Iran, he cemented a momentum that became near impossible for a successor to break by continuing the policy of his predecessor Richard Nixon. Nixon had given the Shah of Iran a “blank cheque” to purchase whatever American arms he desired—short of nuclear weapons. Although Ford’s authority would be challenged by members of his own Administration and a Congress seeking to claw back some of its authority, the need to support allies in the Middle East against the threat of the Soviet Union, even during a time of détente, remained paramount.     

Libya's Diplomatic Success in Africa: The Reemergence of Qadhafi on the International Stage

This article traces the development of Libya's African policy between 1996 and 2001, during which Qadhafi extricated his country from its pariah position to become a prominent player on the African stage. It analyzes the motives behind Libya's diplomatic encroachment into Africa, the tactics used by Qadhafi to crown this African policy with success, and the benefits garnered to Libyan interests far beyond the regional setting. The discussion is presented mostly from the Libyan point of view. Thus, particular emphasis is placed on the systematic and extensive coverage of Tripoli's African policy in the Libyan media. However, non-Libyan Arab and African sources are also thoroughly reviewed.     

Framing Peace Policies: The Competition for Resonant Themes

Political organizations make use of culturally resonant symbols to bring their message to the public. In response to a political organization's use of a culturally resonant symbol, competing political organizations attack the connection between that organization's message and the symbol. Rochon and Wolfsfeld propose a process for the movement of policy justification symbols from interest groups and social movements to governments. This article examines this process in the context of the struggle among the Israeli nationalist movement, the Israeli peace movement, and the Israeli government, identifying a typology of tactical frames applicable to research beyond the Israeli context: denial, incorporation, and end run. Press releases by these political competitors show a specialization of tactical frames by social organization. Nationalists prefer to deny the validity of competing resonant symbols. Peace activists prefer to invent or search for new symbols, in an end run. Governments tend to absorb and redirect symbols initially used by the competing movements to justify government actions. An analysis of the political opportunity structures and organizational conditions that determine a political organization's tactics for attacking resonant frames is conducted.     

René Massigli's Mission to London, 1944–1954

René Massigli's considerable contribution to French diplomacy began during the First World War. After being closely involved with many significant developments in French foreign policy during the inter-war years, Massigli then served alongside Charles de Gaulle during the Second World War. Informed by his experience of the 1930s, he adopted a view of western European security that saw him determined to promote greater co-operation between France and Britain to withstand a potential German resurgence and a looming Soviet threat. But following France's efforts after 1950 to promote European integration based on Franco-German co-operation, Massigli re-defined his role of ambassador and openly challenged French initiatives such as the Schuman Plan and, in particular, the European Defence Community, not only because they did not include Britain, but also because they threatened his view of French security. This analysis assesses Massigli's strategic vision and his attempts to overcome the underlying constraints.     

Reluctant Appeaser: Douglas Hailsham and the German Problem 1932–1938

This article considers the ministerial career of Douglas Hogg, first Viscount Hailsham, during the 1930s and, in particular, his attitude towards the appeasement of Germany. Although Hailsham was a leading Conservative in the inter-war period and held key posts during the 1930s, his role in Britain's policy of appeasement has been overlooked. He was consistently wary of the Nazi menace and as Secretary of State for War from 1931–1935 he urged a firm line towards Hitler's Germany. As the decade progressed, however, the inescapable realities of Britain's international predicament drove Hailsham to support the government's appeasement policy, at least until September 1938. Although he forecast the near inevitability of the Second World War, he could not devise a viable alternative to the appeasement of Germany. Hailsham's experience thus offers a significant addition to the historiography of appeasement and to understanding the distinctions between “appeasers” and “anti-appeasers.”     

“Under the Influence of Mahan”: Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt and their Understanding of American National Interest

This article explores links in the grand strategic outlook of Theodore Roosevelt and Franklin Roosevelt, with particular reference to the influence upon both men of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. It focuses upon an episode during Franklin Roosevelt's tenure as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, when he was in direct correspondence with both Theodore and Mahan on matters of grand strategy and naval policy. The paper argues that Theodore Roosevelt proved a crucial conduit in the formulation of Franklin Roosevelt's grand strategic outlook, both through his promulgation of Mahanian thought and his support of Franklin's correspondence with the Admiral. This in turn would be important later during Franklin Roosevelt's leadership of the United States.     

Anatomy of a government massacre: Abuses of hostage‐barricade protocols during the Waco standoff

A systematic evaluation of the FBI's crisis negotiations with the Branch Davidians during a 51‐day standoff in 1993 is conducted. The analysis uncovers extensive violations of basic hostage‐barricade standards and protocols. The violations appear shortly after negotiations began indicating a premature disregard for the publicly declared goal of a peaceful resolution. Failed negotiations subsequently were cited by FBI officials as a rationale for organizing a violent and dangerous CS gas assault on the barricaded group, resulting in the destruction of the religious community and the deaths of 74 people. The violations do not appear to be random, incidental, or the result of disorganization, as officials claim. The data indicate that the FBI's on‐scene commanders and tactical component of the Hostage‐Rescue Team (HRT) contributed largely to the failed negotiations through methods of increased tactical pressure and psychological warfare providing justification for the high‐risk assault. The thesis is advanced that the HRT command may have pursued furtively what some insiders call a ‘Western’ view of hostage‐barricade incidents ‐ i.e., that negotiations should be used as a means of manipulating people into positions where a tactical solution can be executed. In this context, the standoff is analyzed as a government massacre. Possible motives for this state violence are linked to the sect's defiant posture, aspects of police culture, effective demonization of the sect, and the disturbing trend of ‘militarization’ within law enforcement.     

Demanding Their Rights? Collective Identity and the Tactics of Older Persons’ Organisations at the UN

ABSTRACT

Recent scholarship in International Relations focuses on the tactics of international non-government organisations and transnational advocacy networks, with scholars mostly explaining the diverse and dynamic tactics of organisations working on similar issues. Based on multiple qualitative data sources, this article explores why the members of a transnational advocacy network, comprising organisations of, and representing, older persons, that are calling for a UN Convention on the Rights of Older Persons adopt tactics that are static, uniform and surprisingly softly-softly, despite their modest gains since the issue was put on the UN’s agenda nine years ago. The article demonstrates many of the existing explanations for tactical choices, but it extends what we know by importing the concept of collective identity from social movement studies. It argues that the older persons’ network has a weak collective identity that is conservative in nature, which influences the tactics deployed at the UN.     

“As Far as His Army Can Reach”: Military Movements and East–West Discord in Germany, 1945

This article explores the diplomatic implications of United States troop movements in Germany before and after V-E Day. Existing accounts emphasize American good will and Soviet refusal to cooperate, pointing to the example of an American convoy en route to Berlin in June 1945. Citing an “agreement” of which the American convoy commander had never heard, the Russians would allow only one-half of his troops to proceed. The agreement did exist, however, and the episode must be seen against the backdrop of Soviet suspicions regarding Western willingness to withdraw from the Soviet occupation zone. United States President Harry S. Truman did overrule British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill's calls to link withdrawal to concessions from the Soviets, but he waited two months before doing so. Prior accounts have ignored the delay's effects on Soviet perceptions. The article argues that American actions had the unintended consequence of reinforcing Soviet Chairman Joseph V. Stalin's belief in Western bad faith.     

Spiritualism and modernism in the work of Kawabata Yasunari

Abstract

Kawabata Yasunari held a deep interest in the study of spiritualism from his very youth. He demonstrates his knowledge of the field in his writing in a variety of ways, particularly in the short stories he published during the prewar period. Thus far, scholarship has considered Kawabata's relationship with spiritualism primarily in terms of his biography: there has yet to be a satisfactorily rigorous study taking into account historical context and his use of spiritualism as novelistic technique. This article analyzes Kawabata and spiritualism with respect to modernism by looking at the short stories ‘The Full White Moon’, ‘Requiem’, and ‘Lyric Poem’. This analysis will also help illuminate the diversity of Kawabata's approaches to modernism.     

Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz and the rebirth of the ottoman empire

For more than three decades Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz played a crucial role in the development of military relations between the German and Ottoman Empires. He trained and advised the Ottoman army, and commanded Ottoman troops in the First World War. He was a firm believer in the possibility of the Ottoman Empire's political and military revival, this belief reflecting his own conservative, militarist ideology. From 1898 onwards he was also a firm advocate of a German‐Ottoman alliance in a future war against Britain, arguing that Ottoman expeditionary forces sent against Egypt and India could deal mortal blows to Britain's world power.     

Fifteen minutes of glory: A Burkean analysis of press coverage of Oliver north's testimony

Public esteem for Lt. Col. Oliver North prior to his testimony before the Iran‐contra Committee was low. As he testified, his popularity and support soared, and then tailed off after he left the witness stand. This analysis suggests that these dramatic shifts in audience response to the drama of Oliver North are attributable to the evocation of different audience values before, during, and after his testimony by press coverage of his story which placed differential emphasis on the elements of Kenneth Burke's dramatistical pentad. The differential impacts of print and electronic media to these audience effects are assessed through content analysis. Implications for political processes in general in our media society are discussed.     

Sources of Fujimori's Popularity: Neo-liberal Reform or Ending Terrorism

Much has been discussed regarding the support for Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori during the implementation of his 'fujishock' program. In the voting behavior literature, the role of Fujimori's success in ending the terrorism is mentioned, but is a mere footnote to the story. However, we present historical analysis, public opinion data and economic statistics to argue that had he not controlled terrorism, Fujimori would not have been able to implement his stabilization programs and maintain popular support. We first show that the problem of terrorism was paramount and Fujimori's success in ending it was greatly rewarded in terms of personal support. Second, we show that the subsequent gains in the economic situation can be traced to improvements in security, because the political and social risks inherent in terrorism significantly curtail domestic and foreign investment.