A Smaller Military To Fight the War on Terror

The defense budget can be reduced and the U.S. military downsized because (1) the nation-state threat environment is markedly different than it was during the Cold War, and (2) a large military is not necessary to combat the terrorist threat. In fact, the Islamist terrorist threat is relatively undeterred by the U.S. military presence abroad, and U.S. forces abroad, particularly those deployed in Muslim countries, may do more to exacerbate than to diminish the threat. The arduous task of dismantling and degrading the terrorist network will largely be the task of unprecedented international intelligence and law enforcement cooperation, not the application of large-scale military force. To the extent the military is involved in the war on terror, it will be special forces in discrete operations against specific targets rather than large-scale military operations.     

Fighting for survival: responding to state capacity and terror group end

ABSTRACT

The well-established argument in the literature suggests that the higher state capacity is associatedwith the lower chance of experiencing civil conflict or higherchance of defeating the violent non-state groups. However, theliterature does not sufficiently address how these groups respondto increasing state capacity, and how their responses to that shapethe dynamic of political violence. I investigate the impact of statecapacity on terrorist group termination by exploring the waysterrorist groups respond to increasing state capacity. I argue thatincreasing state capacity might lead to a set of responses fromthe terror group in a way that it might induce the group to producemore terrorist violence to show that the group can still persist. Itmay also encourage the group to provide positive and negativeincentives to its constituents in order to rehabilitate its physicalcapacity to operate, and to prevent a shift of popular support a wayfrom the group towards to the government. Thus, such responsesof the group will decrease the likelihood of its terror campaign. Ialso expect that these arguments are especially relevant for ethnicor religious terror groups. The results of the empirical analysessupport these theoretical expectations.     

Sino-U.S. Confrontation over Chávez Regime Imminent?

The controversial Chávez government has complicated Sino- U.S. relations. However, China's presence in Venezuela does not pose a threat to U.S. national security,and, in the near future, confrontation between China and the United States over Venezuela is unlikely.     

试述中拉关系中的美国因素(2001～2010年)

中国和拉丁美洲关系源远流长,进入21世纪,中拉关系的快速发展备受瞩目。在越来越密切的中拉关系中,有许多重要的影响因素不容忽视,尤其是美国因素。新世纪中拉关系的迅速升温牵动着美国的神经,本文通过回顾并分析中拉关系、美拉关系10年来的发展历程,总结美国因素在中拉关系中的影响力,从而尝试找出更好地处理中、美、拉三者互动关系的方法。     

Sam Fisher and the “war on terror”: an analysis of Splinter Cell in a post-9/11 context

This article examines the values and attitudes present within the 2002 video game Tom Clancy’s Splinter Cell, and the methods employed to convey them. It compares the game’s message with the rhetoric contained in the Bush administration’s post-9/11 “war on terror” narrative. A qualitative content analysis of a Splinter Cell “game movie” and gameplay sessions is undertaken to examine the messages communicated through elements of simulation and representation. This article finds that Splinter Cell and the “war on terror” narrative express similar perspectives of terrorism and counterterrorism. First, both exaggerate the physical and normative threat of terrorism, and portray it as overwhelmingly powerful. Second, both sources justify violent counterterrorism action through claims of necessity, urgency and self-defence. Third, violence is consistently portrayed as effective for achieving the desired objective. Finally, violence and military action are represented as simple solutions that ultimately lead to victory over terrorism. The parallels between the messages within Splinter Cell and the “war on terror” rhetoric indicate that the game was shaped by the post-9/11 culture in which it was developed. More significantly, however, Splinter Cell perpetuates and legitimises the “war on terror” narrative by conveying its message through an immersive interactive environment.     

Perception and Politics in Intelligence Assessment: U.S. Estimates of the Soviet and "Rogue-State" Nuclear Threats

United States estimates of Soviet nuclear goals and capabilities and the current "rogue-state" nuclear threat reflected prevailing beliefs about threat within the U.S. government and the relative influence of agencies charged with threat assessment. This article establishes that the patterns in formal Soviet threat assessment: (i) did not reflect a uniform response to "external threat," (ii) were inevitably tied to underlying assumptions about adversary intent, and (iii) were susceptible then to perceptual, organizational, and/or political influences within government. Thus, threat assessments reflected the optimism and pessimism—and political interests and ideologies—of those who participated in the estimating process. The article concludes by examining these lessons in light of the experiences and challenges of assessing threat from small states harboring nuclear ambitions.     

Analogies to Terror: The Construction of Social Problems in Israel During the Intifada Al Aqsa

Studies of the construction of social problems suggest that claims makers only relate to the issue that they are trying to place on the national agenda. However, an analysis of the Israeli public discourse about a number of social problems during the Intifada Al Aqsa indicates that this is not the case. The external threat served as an inferential structure for understanding and explaining the country's internal ones. Because of the centrality of the Intifada in the public imagination, claimants made a wide variety of analogies to the problem of Palestinian terror. All four areas of the discourse—about the severity of the problems, their causes, the rationales given for taking preventive and/or ameliorative action, and the solutions offered—were replete with references and analogies to the uprising. Clearly, the claimants believed that this was a particularly effective way of competing in the social problems marketplace, but the analogies may, in fact, have reinforced the existing hierarchy of priorities rather than lead to a significant shift in the public agenda.     

Countering Aggressive Rising Powers: A Clash of Strategic Cultures

The United States has to contend with rising powers ranging from the prc, which is already an economic and political great power and potentially a military threat, to Al Qaeda and the network of Islamist terror organizations, whose means to power remain limited but whose will to power and aggression are great. In the middle are states that already or may soon possess nuclear weapons. Each of these powers has its own “strategic culture” that affects its decision-making, and attention needs to be paid to how the strategic habits of today's rising and aggressive powers might intersect with U.S. strategy.     

巴基斯坦新阶段反恐斗争：成效、不足与前景

2008年以来,巴基斯坦的反恐斗争进入了新阶段。这是塔利班持续挑战巴基斯坦政府权威、巴基斯坦调整反恐政策和美国推出阿巴战略共同作用的产物。巴基斯坦新阶段反恐斗争取得了一定的成效,但仍存在着一些不足。巴基斯坦反恐斗争的前景取决于美国在阿富汗的下一步行动、巴军能否保障FATA重建顺利进行、巴政府能否争取到FATA居民的支持对抗塔利班等诸多因素。     

Negotiating U.S. policy to counter terrorism

Conclusion Terrorists have been active throughout history. Their threat, just like the threat of national warfare, ebbs and flows with events and personalities. To counter this threat, U.S. policy should be mature, honest, flexible, farsighted, publicly known, and consistent with our highest values. At this time, the Bush Administration has a good opportunity to reassess U.S. policy and develop a balanced response to the threat of terrorism.Effective counter-terrorism policy can only evolve from an effective process for evaluating and developing that policy. And the key to successful process is sound negotiation theory. This focus on process, bringing with it a broad view of the problem and a preference for joint activity, creates a workable approach to dealing with the serious threat of terrorism in our world. John S. Murray is President and Executive Director of the Conflict Clinic, Inc., a private not-for-profit organization affiliated with the Center for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030. Mr. Murray's sister is Jean Sutherland, whose husband Tom was kidnapped in Beirut by Islamic Jihad on June 9, 1985.     

Business as Usual

In the years since 9/11, there is no doubt that the emphasis of U.S. global strategy has been on counter-terrorism and the war in Iraq. During this period of time, the U.S. investment in strategic, political and military resources in the Middle East, Iraq, and the war on terror, which are the top priorities on the list of Bush＇s foreign policy, has been far greater than in any other fields. However, there are some in the U.S. who believe that China＇s rise has been much ignored by the U.S., due to the global war on terror （GWOT）, and that America should, in fact, be focusing more on China, not the Middle East. However, as we see it, China has by no means been ignored by the U.S., neither has China＇s rise been the result of U.S. ignorance.     

Before the Bombs There Were the Mobs: American Experiences with Terror 1

Terrorist studies rarely discuss activities before the invention of dynamite, which made modern terror possible. One important, interesting, and forgotten form is the mob terror campaign. Two significant successful American examples are examined and compared, “The Sons of Liberty” which ignited the American Revolution, and the Ku Klux Klan, which “won the peace” the South wanted after it lost the Civil War. The study concludes by briefly comparing modern with mob terror.     

美国绿色经济理念下的贸易摩擦隐患及中国对策

巨额外债已经成为威胁美国经济发展的重大隐患,美国希望通过倡导绿色经济为其国内经济寻找新的增长点,同时争取在全球气候变化、节能减排等议题中占据主动。该倡议暗含着强烈的战略性贸易保护动机,可能会影响未来中国制造业的国际竞争力,成为中美贸易摩擦的新隐患。为此,我们应该及早应对,从舆论引导、理论研究、政策设计和战略人才储备方面做好充分准备,以便在将来的中美贸易战略布局与战术对决中掌握主动、占据先机。     

The EU's approach post-September 11: global terrorism as a multidimensional law enforcement challenge

In response to the threat of terrorism following 9/11, the European Union has opted for a clear cross-border law enforcement approach that is quite distinct from the putative ‘war on terror’. This choice has been determined by factors of history, divergent threat perceptions, relative value orientations and restricted competences. And yet, far from limiting itself to a traditional ‘internal’ law enforcement focus, the EU has developed an extensive multidimensional approach that combines legislative and operational, repressive and preventive, internal and external, as well as institutional, measures. But weaknesses persist: the preference given by member states to instruments of cooperation and coordination, rather than integration, as well as the poor implementation of many agreed-upon measures, negatively weigh against the effectiveness of the EU's multidimensional law enforcement approach. Legitimacy deficits also exist owing to limited parliamentary and judicial control. These deficits will need to be addressed to reinforce the credibility of the EU's approach as a viable ‘European’ alternative to the US ‘war on terror’.     

关于美国“重返亚太”的几点看法

2011年美国高调“重返亚太”的实质是从过去集中关注全球反恐战争回归到全面经营亚太。其主要特点有：战略重点向亚太地区倾斜,加大对经济手段的倚重,加大军事上进攻色彩,加强对中国的防范。美国高调“重返亚太”具有深刻的背景和出于多重战略考虑,并且迄今已收到一些效果。但也应看到,美国“重返亚太”也存在许多难以克服的阻力和制约因素,这些因素既有亚太地区内和外部的,也有美国国内经济、政治、社会方面的。     

Regime and Power in International Terror Crises: Strong Democracies Fight Back Hard

This study explores regime, power, and violence in international terror crises (ITCs). It examines terror strikes and retaliations against the terror groups and their hosts. The exploration tests two hypotheses: first, democracies, like other states, retaliate, even at the risk of escalation; and second, strong democracies fight back with massive violence as do authoritarian regimes. Historical narratives of ITCs from 1934 to 2006 show that strong democracies were the most common targets of terror. Like authoritarian states, they responded to terror, but were the most violent retaliators, followed by weaker states, democratic or not. So the democratic constraints affect weaker states more than stronger ones. These trends draw attention to the destabilizing nature of international terror and its challenge to the peaceful resolution of international disputes.     

Conjuring up the next attack: the future-orientedness of terror and the counterterrorist imagination

Although terrorism is widely understood to be the politically motivated creation of fear by means of violence in a target group, the nature of that fear is seldom explained or even considered. The present article attempts to close that gap by proposing a definition of terror as the apprehension of (more) violence to come. Because every terrorist act is perceived to be part of a potential series, terror is oriented towards the future and involves the imaginary anticipation of prospective events. On the basis of this definition, I will examine the problematical role of counterterrorist discourse. As the statements of public officials and security experts in the run-up to, and during, the “War on Terror” demonstrate, the peculiar dynamic of terror is, seemingly paradoxically, reinforced by counterterrorist rhetoric. With its insistence on the escalatory nature of terrorist violence and its repeated prediction of even worse attacks, counterterrorism contributes to the evocation of terror in the sense proposed here.     

Trade Structure and the Effectiveness of America's "Aggressively Unilateral" Trade Policy

When does America's "aggressively unilateral" trade policy work best to open overseas markets? This paper revisits the determinants and effectiveness of Section 301 of U.S. trade law and develops a modified two-level game model for understanding the conditions under which domestic interests and institutions support the use of aggressive negotiation tactics. It argues that a system-level variable, the structure of trade, systematically affects threat effectiveness by influencing both the level of unity among domestic interest groups and the degree of divided government in the sender of threats (the United States). America's sanction threats will enjoy more unified domestic support and hence be more credible when the dispute involves a country having a competitive trade relationship with the U.S. (such as Japan, Canada, and the European Union) rather than one having a complementary trade relationship with the U.S. (such as China, India, and Brazil). Statistical tests based on the universe of Section 301 cases concluded between 1975 and 1995 yield evidence in support of this contention.     

Explaining Changes in U.S. Grand Strategy: 9/11, the Rise of Offensive Liberalism,and the War in Iraq

This paper proposes a model for explaining shifts and variations in U.S. grand strategy. The model is based on a distinction between four ideal-type grand strategies or ideational approaches to security according to the objectives and means of security policy: defensive and offensive realism, and defensive and offensive liberalism. While the four approaches are continually present in the U.S. policy community, it is the combination of two systemic conditions—namely the distribution of capabilities and the balance of threat—that selects among the competing approaches and determines which grand strategy is likely to emerge as dominant in a given period. Great power parity is conducive to realist approaches. In contrast, a situation of hegemony encourages the emergence of ideological grand strategies, which focus on ideology promotion, according to the ideology of the hegemon. In the case of a liberal hegemon, such as the United States, liberal approaches are likely to emerge as dominant. In addition, a relative absence of external threat encourages defensive approaches, while a situation of high external threat gives rise to offensive strategies. Thus, various combinations of these systemic factors give rise to the emergence of various grand strategies. This model is tested in two cases of the two most recent shifts in U.S. grand strategy following 1991. In accordance with the expectations of the model, a change in the distribution of capabilities with the end of the Cold War made possible a change from realist to liberal strategies. In the benign environment of the 1990s the dominant strategy was defensive liberalism, while the change in the balance of threat after 9/11 gave rise to the grand strategy of offensive liberalism.     

Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo

This study explains the behavior of democratic states during wars of choice using an integrated decision model. Integrated models are an attractive choice for explaining multifaceted decisions, particularly when simpler, existing theories have an uneven or only partial ability to explain conflict behavior. To illustrate these points, this study assesses the behavior of key NATO members during the 1999 intervention in Kosovo. I compare the behavior of France, Germany, Italy, the U.K., and the U.S. with the expectations of theories of collective action, balance of threat neorealism, public opinion, and government institutional structures. As an alternative, I introduce a simple, integrated, decision-making model that incorporates the core concepts from the other explanations in a staged, conditional manner. The integrated model does a better job of explaining state behavior in Kosovo than do existing theories. The integrated model also is applicable to other conflicts. The results of this study, and the potential of integrated models, have implications for our thinking about foreign policy analysis, for behavior during military interventions and the fight against terrorism, and for future U.S. leadership of alliance and coalition war efforts.