New Directions for a Critical Theory of Work: Reading Honneth Through Deranty

Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition has been criticised for presenting a deficient concept of work and the normative significance of work. In recent years Jean-Philippe Deranty, among others, has suggested that Honneth could overcome this deficiency by reintroducing into his mature theory the critical concept of work that first appeared in his 1977–1985 writings. My paper critically reconstructs and assesses Deranty’s position. I argue that Deranty has understated the extent to which his research direction diverges from Honneth’s. Rather than simply nuancing Honneth’s existing philosophical system, Deranty’s work exposes some of its conceptual limits and points beyond it.     

From Critique to Reconstruction: On Axel Honneth's Theory of Recognition and its Critical Potential

Abstract

This paper aims to analyse Axel Honneth's theory of recognition by focusing on two distinct methodological approaches present in it, namely, critique and reconstruction. The critical moment in Honneth's theory of recognition is articulated around two concepts: world-disclosing critique, which is based on the attempt to suggest new and provocative points of view on social reality through the usage of rhetorical devices; and misrecognition, as the empirical starting-point for the theoretical model. These two notions, which can be traced back to Adorno and the so called "first generation" of the Frankfurt School, are interpreted as the mainlines of the diagnostic moment in Honneth's critical theory, as they provide an effective analytical insight into the reality of social suffering. Furthermore, they represent the basic fundament upon which the second level, reconstruction, is articulated. By bringing to light the core aspects of social interaction, they provide the initial clues for the development of the normative framework of recognition, the formal idea of a "good life". The final part of the paper argues that such an interpretation of Honneth's theory of recognition helps to overcome some of its most problematic aspects and thus to deepen its critical potential.     

Why Subjectivity Matters: Critical Theory and the Philosophy of the Subject

Abstract

In this paper it is argued that Habermas' critique of German Idealism is misguided and that his rejection of the philosophy of the subject is unjustified. Critical Theory needs to recognise the importance of subjectivity for all social philosophy if its theoretical aims are to be achieved. In order to demonstrate the relevance of subjectivity to Critical Theory the essay draws on analytic philosophy of mind and on the work of Manfred Frank and Dieter Henrich.     

Recognition,reification and (dis)respect

Abstract

Axel Honneth Honneth, A. 1982. Moral consciousness and class domination: Some problems in the analysis of hidden morality. Praxis International, 2(1): 12–24.  [Google Scholar] was already recognized as the leading figure in the ‘third generation’ of critical theory, long before he took up, in 1996, Habermas's chair in philosophy at Frankfurt and the directorship of the Institut für Sozialforschung. He has for a long time been reconceptualizing Frankfurt critical theory in terms of an originally Hegelian conception of recognition, and associated notions of respect and disrespect – a model which brings out a concern with human suffering which was a strong feature of the first generation of critical theorists. This volume of translated essays, together with a recent volume in German and his 2005 Tanner Lectures on reification, provides a good opportunity to triangulate Honneth's developing work.     

A Critical Theory of Social Suffering

Abstract

This paper begins by defending the twofold relevance, political and theoretical, of the notion of social suffering. Social suffering is a notion politics cannot do without today, as it seems indispensable to describe all the aspects of contemporary injustice. As such, it has been taken up in a number of significant research programmes in different social sciences (sociology, anthropology, social psychology). The notion however poses significant conceptual problems as it challenges disciplinary boundaries traditionally set up to demarcate individual and social phenomena. I argue that philosophy has a role to play in the attempt to integrate the diverging perspectives stemming from the social sciences. I attempt to show that, as it engages with the social sciences to account for the conceptual and normative issues thrown open by the question of social suffering, philosophy in fact retrieves the very idea of critical theory, as a conjugated critique of social reality and of its knowledge. I conclude by showing how the question of social suffering then becomes a useful criterion to distinguish between the different existing approaches in critical theory.     

Friendship,Recognition and Social Freedom: A Sociological Reconstruction

In Freedom’s Right, Axel Honneth articulates the social freedom of friendship with reference to its institutionalised norms. These action norms, however, are not specific to friendship; they apply to modern intimacy per se. Such non-specificity cannot adequately account for the experience of social freedom in friendship. Addressing this issue, I evaluate friendship as a form of recognition and identify a generative recognition deficit functional to its relational autonomy. Then, taking Honneth’s institutional approach to friendship as a point of departure, I ascertain an institutional deficit that both sustains friendship’s autonomy and constrains the generalisability of its social freedom by way of institutional connectivity to heterosexuality. I suggest that only a differentiating approach to friendship that fathoms its extraordinary position among interpersonal relationships can yield new insights. That done, friendship can in turn provide a prism through which to assess the conceptual approaches deployed in its analysis.     

Between Psychoanalysis and Political Philosophy: Towards a Critical Theory of Political Myth

Abstract

This paper focuses on a specific aspect of political imaginaries: political myth. What are political myths? What role do they play within today's commoditized political imaginaries? What are the conditions for setting up a critique of them? We will address these questions, by putting forward a theory of political myth which situates itself between psycho analysis and political philosophy, in line with the tradition of critical theory that many still associate with the name of the Frankfurt School. We will first discuss the notion of political myth by illustrating the contribution of both disciplines to its understanding and then, through a discussion of the notion of social unconscious, we will apply this analysis to a contemporary example of political myth, that of a clash of civilizations.     

War and Peace in International Relations Theory: A Classroom Simulation

Simulations are increasingly common pedagogical tools in political science and international relations courses. This article develops a classroom simulation that aims to facilitate students’ theoretical understanding of the topic of war and peace in international relations, and accomplishes this by incorporating important theoretical concepts about the causes of war found in international relations theory into the design and implementation of the simulation. In addition to sharing a successful classroom simulation with other international relations instructors, the article makes two important contributions to the pedagogical literature on simulations. First, it shows how simulation design can be usefully based on the theoretical concepts and/or substantive problems that course instructors aim to impart to their students. Second, it demonstrates that it is possible to achieve important learning objectives with low-intensity simulations that do not require a big investment of time, energy, and resources.