The Reputational Basis of Public Accountability

This article proposes a reputation‐based approach to account for two core puzzles of accountability. The first is the misfit between behavioral predictions of the hegemonic political science framework for talking about accountability, namely, principal–agent, and empirical findings. The second puzzle is the unrivaled popularity of accountability, given evidence that supposedly accountability‐enhancing measures often lead to opposite effects. A “reputation‐informed” theoretical approach to public accountability suggests that accountability is not about reducing informational asymmetries, containing “drift,” or ensuring that agents stay committed to the terms of their mandate. Accountability—in terms of both holding and giving—is about managing and cultivating one's reputation vis‐à‐vis different audiences. It is about being seen as a reputable actor in the eyes of one's audience(s), conveying the impression of competently performing one's (accountability) roles, thereby generating reputational benefits.     

The Constitution and Accountability for Public Functions

In review of judicial interpretation of the United States Constitution set against the current reality of American governance, the authors conclude that traditional separation of powers doctrines hold few constraints for delegation of "public functions" beyond the boundaries of the three branches. As the result of constitutional permissiveness, the legislative and executive departments have increasingly lost out (or abdicated) to private and quasi-governmental institutions to conduct core government functions. Public accountability has been lost in this exchange. At a time of revolutionary change across Eastern Europe and elsewhere, when newly forming governments look to the United States for structural models, they are unlikely to be informed about the functional reality of American governance by either the written constitution or doctrines articulating the constitution.     

公共决策中的责任机制

在我国社会转型过程中,传统政府形态发生了很大变化,正在实现由行政型政府向管理型政府转变;由管制型政府向服务型政府转变;由无限政府向有限政府转变。在此过程中,政府决策的范围和方式也发生了很大的变化。在传统全能政府时期,政府决策涵盖到社会生活、经济生活的各个领域,而在社会转型之后,政府则更加注重对社会公共事务的决策和管理。由此,政府决策的责任机制也发生了根本性转变。目前,我国应加快建立起公共决策的责任机制。     

In Search of Public Accountability: The 'Wenling Model' in China

This article specifically attempts to answer two interrelated research questions: firstly, how do democratic consultation assemblies (DCAs) heighten public accountability in the current institutional setting of China's sub-provincial localities?; and secondly, what can be learned, from the Chinese case, in relation to achieving public accountability elsewhere? To address the first question, this article will explore two particular variations of the DCAs, and will focus on the interplay between the managerial and democratic accountability orientations to address the second question.     

Designing Public Participation Processes

The purpose of this Theory to Practice article is to present a systematic, cross‐disciplinary, and accessible synthesis of relevant research and to offer explicit evidence‐based design guidelines to help practitioners design better participation processes. From the research literature, the authors glean suggestions for iteratively creating, managing, and evaluating public participation activities. The article takes an evidence‐based and design science approach, suggesting that effective public participation processes are grounded in analyzing the context closely, identifying the purposes of the participation effort, and iteratively designing and redesigning the process accordingly.     

Comparing Accountability in the Public and Private Sectors

Analysis of public accountability tends to concentrate on public sector institutions. However, increasing use of the private sector in the provision of public services suggests the need to compare accountability in the two sectors. While private sector (for-profit) companies are more accountable in terms of their 'bottom line', accountability requirements in the public sector are generally more stringent, particularly with regard to process and general policy.     

Accountability and Entrepreneurial Public Management: The Case of the Orange County Investment Fund

This article presents a conceptual framework that illustrates four distinct types of accountability environments facing public managers. The framework is used as a heuristic tool to examine the broad facts and contexts surrounding the bankruptcy of the Orange County, California investment pool. The framework also suggests management philosophies and strategies that are appropriate for each type of accountability environment.     

Strategy and Accountability: Structural Reform Litigation and Public Management

Structural reform litigation involves legal action against public bureaucracies alleging that an official has violated the legal rights of an agency's client. A pattern of rights infringements raises the specter of systemic dysfunction. If the court finds for the plaintiffs, or if the defendant agency agrees to settle, the remedy reconstitutes agency operations. What are the incentives faced by public managers whose agencies are involved in structural reform litigation? How might public managers retain public accountability while strategically using the institutional arrangements present in such cases? This article examines these questions through a spatial bargaining model and discusses its analytical implications in the context of a comprehensive suit against the child welfare agency in Kansas City, Missouri.     

Promoting Public Service Integrity: A Case for Responsible Accountability

We discuss below difference between the concepts of accountability and responsibility, in the context of government administration. We argue that New Zealand's public sector reforms, in particular, have depended on an essentially mechanistic as distinct from an organic interpretation of public organisations. A mechanistic approach focuses disproportionately on notions of organisational accountability at the expense of responsibility, and as a consequence may prove counterproductive over the longer term in maintaining high standards of ethical probity. A concept of responsible accountability needs to be developed further as a means of countering this possibility. We speculate on whether the emphasis on contractualism has enhanced or undermined an integrity-based as opposed to a compliance-based ethics regime, and the possible implications of this for the maintenance of ethical standards.     

Accountability in Accounting? The Politics of Private Rule‐Making in the Public Interest

Over recent decades governments have increasingly delegated domestic and international regulatory functions to private-sector agents. This article examines the reasons for such delegation and how private agents differ from public ones, and then analyzes the politics of regulation post delegation. It argues that the key difference between delegation to a public agent and delegation to a private one is that in the latter case a multiple-principals problem emerges that is qualitatively different from the one usually considered in the literature. An agent's action will be determined by the relative tightness of competing principal–agent relationships. This tightness is a function of the relative importance of each principal for the agent's financial and operational viability as well as its effectiveness in rule making. Further, the article posits that exogenous changes in the macro-political climate can deeply affect the nature of principal–agent relationships. The authors test their hypotheses about the politics of regulation in the postdelegation period through the study of accounting standards setting in the United States, a case of delegation of regulatory authority to a private agent that goes back to the New Deal era and has received renewed public attention in the wake of recent corporate financial scandals.     

Balancing Accountability and Efficiency in a More Competitive Public Sector Environment

Extract from a speech delivered at Government-in-Excellence Summit 2000, 'Reinventing Government — A Manifesto for Achieving Excellence and Managing for Results in the New Millennium', 24–26 May, Singapore, (For the full text see www.anao.gov.au)     

Enhancing Public Accountability for Developing Countries: Major Constraints and Strategies

Many Asian countries are attempting to promote public accountability as a part of public-sector reform, but their situation remains unsatisfactory compared to advanced countries. Except for a few, many Asian developing countries are still struggling with political and socioeconomic weaknesses. Indeed, the nature of public sector reform in many Asian developing countries differs substantially from that of advanced countries. Furthermore, the concept of accountability is not interpreted equally throughout the world. Accordingly, the purpose of this article is to review the major constraints to enhancing public accountability in Asian developing countries and to discuss major strategies to promote such accountability from the perspective of developing countries. This article first reviews the concept of accountability and its development, followed by discussion of constraints in enhancing public accountability and public sector reform, key measures to enhance public accountability, and implications and conclusions.     

Equity and Accountability: The Impact of State Accountability Systems on School Finance

Using an 11‐year panel data set containing information on revenues, expenditures, and demographics for every school district in the United States, we examine the effects of state‐adopted school accountability systems on the adequacy and equity of school resources. We find little relationship between state implementation of accountability systems and changes in school finance equity, though we do find evidence that states in which courts overturned the school finance system during the decade exhibited significant equity improvements. Additionally, while implementation of accountability per se does not appear linked to changes in resource adequacy, states that implemented strong accountability systems did experience improvements.