Crisis Accountability: Ministerial Resignations in Sweden

Accountability processes after crisis events sometimes entail harsh criticism from public and political players alike, forcing cabinet ministers to be on top of the political game and sometimes even resign. However, harsh accountability processes are just as likely to leave ministers undamaged. This article combines two existing theories that propose different factors to account for variation in outcomes: ministerial resignations as a consequence of cabinet formation and individual positions; or resignations as a result of blame management strategies involving individual actors within the cabinet and beyond. Ten crisis episodes in Sweden are analysed and compared. The findings suggest that individual political power bases and experience matter to how well blame management strategies can be employed, while the composition of the government gives structural constraints. The dynamic interplay and framing battle between incumbent decision makers, and external arenas and the skill with which individual ministers engage and frame responsibility, play a key role in determining their post‐crisis careers.     

Caught in the Act: The Smoking Gun View of Ministerial Responsibility

While any discussion of ministerial responsibility must in part focus on ministerial resignations, finding out when ministers resign is only the tip of the iceberg. A full assessment of ministerial responsibility would look at the relations between ministers and their senior bureaucrats, as discussed in Bill Blick’s article. It would look at the impact of managerialism on ministerial accountability, especially in the light of privatisation and contracting out. It would assess the impact of other mechanisms of accountability, including the senate. The subject of this article must always be put into a broader context. This article concentrates on ministerial resignations drawing on evidence from Britain, Canada, the federal government in Australia and the government of New South Wales. When do ministers resign?     

Public Officials,Government and the Public Trust: Schizophrenia?

In late 1996 the Queensland government introduced new legislation to govern its public sector, the Public Service Act 1996. For a few short weeks the supposedly draconian legislation was front-page news, as the government was forced to defend its changes to standards of accountability in public sector employment. Was the fuss a storm in a teacup? Were the changes really so significant? In this article the impact of the legislation upon the central core of public sector employment, the public trust, is considered, and the legislation's interrelationship with the Queensland public sector ethics regime is analysed. These unhappy people were proposing schemes for persuading monarchs to choose favourites upon the score of their wisdom, capacity and virtue; of teaching ministers to consult the public good; of rewarding merit, great abilities and eminent services; of instructing princes to know their true interest by placing it on the same foundation with that of their people: of choosing for employment persons qualified to exercise them; with many other wild chimeras, that never entered before into the heart of man to conceive, and confirmed in me the old observation, that there is nothing so extravagant and irrational which some philosophers have not maintained for truth (Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels).     

The Public Service: Independence, Responsibility and Responsiveness

In recent years there has been controversy surrounding the issues of the independence, responsibility and responsiveness of our public services. Critics come from two opposing directions: (i) there have been charges of politicisation of the public service, with the implication that it has lost its independence and become dominated by the government; (ii) Pusey (1991) has accused 'economic rationalists' in the public service of pursuing their own neo-classical agenda and dominating government policy. Both criticisms reveal a misunderstanding of the respective roles and responsibilities of ministers and public servants and the proper relations between them. In our system of democratic government, it is the prerogative of ministers to decide and the role of departments to propose and advise and then implement the decisions of ministers. This contribution begins by considering the respective responsibilities of ministers and officials, before canvassing the charges of politicisation and what should be expected from public servants in contributing to policy development. Finally there is consideration of the ethical values of public servants and what responsibility they might have for the 'public interest'.     

Survival of the Ministers: On Ministerial Durability in Postwar Norway

The field of ministerial durability, showing why some ministers are dismissed and others not, has increased in size over the last decade. Specifically, linking ministerial performance through resignation calls with durability has been applied to both majoritarian and semi‐presidential systems, whereas this link is less explored in consensual electoral systems. Thus, this study explores the relationship between ministerial performance and durability in postwar Norway, drawing on the principal‐agent theory for parliamentary democracies and the accountability link between party leaders and ministers. The main finding is that there are many similarities to other studies’ ministerial durability and performance. By measuring performance in resignation calls coming through the media, it is found that ministerial durability is decreased when performance is low: the more resignation calls a minister gets, the more likely the minister is to be removed by the party leader. Consequently, it is argued that ministers generally are held accountable by their party leaders whenever they are perceived to perform badly. Even though it is argued in the article that studies on ministerial durability and performance would benefit from alternative performance measures, the analysis shows that resignation calls give a good indication of how party leaders hold ministers accountable.     

LET THE MANAGERS GOVERN: MINISTER-BUREAUCRAT RELATIONSHIPS IN NEW SOUTH WALES

Abstract: This article considers the relationships between ministers and chief executives in the New South Wales Liberal-National government. It looks at how ministers have set about taking charge of the public service against the background of the new political and economic realities confronting the state government. Senior ministers have consciously sought to limit their dependence on public servants and they have used a range of strategies to do so. They have remoulded the public service in a new "managerialised" form. Policy-making has been further internalised into ministerial offices and party circles and away from departments. The role of cabinet has been strengthened to impose a new corporate purpose as a counterbalance to traditional departmental interests. New incentive systems, based on contract employment and performance agreements, have been introduced to focus public service loyalties on the goals of the government. Advocates of managerialism, usually career public servants, have been appointed to key positions. Ministerial advisers have been used as countervailing sources of advice and as extensions of ministerial authority. Many ministers themselves have assumed an involved style of ministerial management of departments.     

Reforming the Conventions Regarding Parliamentary Scrutiny of Ministerial Actions

Parliamentary scrutiny of government ministers is limited by the convention that one house of parliament cannot compel a member of the other house to appear before it. This convention limits the Senate's capacity to examine ministers who are members of the House of Representatives. It has its origins in UK parliamentary practice, and is given alleged legal force in Australia by virtue of section 49 of Australia's constitution. That section effectively says that Australia's current parliamentary powers, privileges and immunities are those of the UK House of Commons in 1901.
However analysis of UK practice prior to the twentieth century reveals a surprising picture. Far from protecting members of one house from the other house's inquiries, it would seem that invitations issued by one chamber to a member of the other were never refused, an element of 'custom and practice' now conveniently overlooked. Furthermore, the purpose of the powers had nothing to do with protecting ministers. On the contrary, their origins He in a desire to ensure the strength of parliamentary accountability. If modern Australian practice is to be true to historical House of Commons practice, consideration should be given to ensuring that each chamber does have guaranteed access to ministers of the other house.     

Better the Devil: A Response to Gus O'Donnell's ‘Better Government’

Gus O'Donnell's vision of ‘better government’ is presented as a critique of party politics, most specifically the short‐termism, selfishness and incompetence of elected politicians. There are few people better placed than O'Donnell to form such judgements. However, O'Donnell goes much further, by calling into question the legitimacy of the democratic system which gives rise to party politics. His article outlines several mechanisms by which the exercise of power by elected ministers could be constrained by a managerialist accountability framework, without addressing the question of who determines the appropriate framework for ministerial performance. The House of Commons is condemned as ‘too politicised’. O'Donnell also offers substantial praise for apparently ‘depoliticised’ policy‐making processes, overlooking the inherently political constitution of such processes. In doing so, O'Donnell claims to be challenging party politics on behalf of voters/taxpayers, but instead seeks to dismantle any possibility of the public expressing a collective will via the ballot box that might challenge the immutability of the market economy.     

The Bureaucrat Who Fell Under a Bus: Ministerial Responsibility, Executive Agencies and The Derek Lewis Affair in Britain

Various concerns have been raised about the practicability of Next Steps and the adequacy of accountability mechanisms in Britain, particularly after the dismissal of Derek Lewis as chief executive of the Prison Service. This article critically reviews these concerns. It argues that the agency model is viable notwithstanding doubts about the practicability of the policy–operations distinction; that Next Steps is not the cause of defective accountability or the scapegoating of bureaucrats by ministers; and that a commonly proposed solution—making agency heads accountable to parliamentary select committees—has fundamental drawbacks of its own. The "conventional wisdom" that Next Steps cannot work ignores important evidence and badly needs reassessment.     

Developments in Danish Parliamentary Democracy: Accountability, Parties and External Constraints

Danish parliamentary developments since the Second World War include the consolidation of minority rule, a reduction in the power of established political parties, and more external constraints on parliamentary actors. They also involve a number of more specific changes to the various steps of delegation and accountability. The evidence tends to support the thesis of a paradox in the development of parliamentary democracy. On the one hand, changes in the constitutional chain of delegation and accountability have, on the whole, favoured the principals (voters, parliament, ministers) compared with their agents (parliament, ministers, civil servants). On the other hand, the established parties have declined somewhat and there are more external constraints than there used to be. This implies that the power of democratic principals has increased within narrower limits of action. In such a situation, the principals can be said to 'decide more about less' because of the stronger national and (not least) international constraints. However, the emergence of a partially new system of governance cannot unequivocally be called better or worse than the traditional Danish system of democratic governance.     

Accountability in the Privatized State

As well as better efficiency and improved services, privatization has also often promised improved accountability. But how does the empirical evidence on this look and what are the lessons here? This article looks at the notion of accountability and the degree to which privatizing public sector activities might improve or worsen such mechanisms. It then looks specifically at the different systems of accountability existing following three privatization activities in Victoria and compares these against that existing previously under public operation. The sale of electricity sector enterprises, the operation of urban rail service franchises, and the implementation of a public–private partnership project to supply transport infrastructure are adopted as case studies. For each case study, accountability systems are articulated and the operation of these systems is discussed. Overall, the article analyses the effectiveness of accountability systems now operating in the privatized state from the perspective of stakeholders. Importantly, the degree to which trade‐offs may have been made under new accountability arrangements is also discussed. Finally, the article draws together some general lessons on accountability for future privatization activities and proposes a conceptual model for a pyramid of accountability.     

Enhancing Public Accountability for Developing Countries: Major Constraints and Strategies

Many Asian countries are attempting to promote public accountability as a part of public-sector reform, but their situation remains unsatisfactory compared to advanced countries. Except for a few, many Asian developing countries are still struggling with political and socioeconomic weaknesses. Indeed, the nature of public sector reform in many Asian developing countries differs substantially from that of advanced countries. Furthermore, the concept of accountability is not interpreted equally throughout the world. Accordingly, the purpose of this article is to review the major constraints to enhancing public accountability in Asian developing countries and to discuss major strategies to promote such accountability from the perspective of developing countries. This article first reviews the concept of accountability and its development, followed by discussion of constraints in enhancing public accountability and public sector reform, key measures to enhance public accountability, and implications and conclusions.     

Where Have All the Ministers Gone?

The relationship between ministers and public servants has been a longstanding topic among students of Australian public administration. Recent debate has centred on issues of supposed politicisation and excessive responsiveness in the Australian Public Service (APS), caused, in part, by the weakened tenure of department heads (secretaries). The recent Moran report has little to say on this relationship. It endorses changes to the appointment processes for secretaries which are presumably designed to strengthen secretaries’ independence from their political masters. It adopts a view of citizen‐centred service and strategic leadership that appears to marginalise ministers. Its approach to public sector leadership is taken from international management theory that works well in a business context and in the United States (US) government system. It is less well‐suited to Westminster‐style systems.     

How Well Does Accrual Accounting Fit the Public Sector?

In this 'controversy' we challenge the unqualified application of full accrual accounting within the Australian public sector. In particular, attention is directed to the recognition and valuation for financial reporting purposes of public sector resources that are of a non-financial nature, such as library and museum collections. Our main contention is that attempting to recognise such resources at monetary values within the financial reports of public sector organisations is a contrived, imprecise and inappropriate practice that threatens to occlude rather than enable the accountability of public sector institutions and their managers. Building from this accountability theme, we present perspectives on promoting accountability for the technical accounting practices which have been imposed within the public sector.     

MINISTERIAL STAFF IN AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT

Abstract: This study examines the ministerial staff in Australian commonwealth government to discover what they do and how they assist ministers in achieving political control of departments. The data consist of interviews with ministers, departmental secretaries and ministerial staff. The study finds that ministerial staff offer policy advice in much the same way as found by James Walter in his study almost a decade before this one. But there does appear to be more emphasis on monitoring departmental implementation of policy and brokering positions within government than was the case in the earlier study. The study concludes that the relationship between ministers and their offices and the departmental secretaries is characterised by a conditionally cooperative approach, which is similar to that recommended by several public administration scholars.     

Duty calls but not for all: The policy involvement of cabinet ministers during crisis

During a crisis, the public expects the government to handle the situation. In parliamentary democracies, these expectations are directed to the cabinet and its ministers. Cabinet ministers are expected to be highly involved in policy making under their jurisdiction and in general. During periods of politics as usual, ministers differ in their policy involvement. This paper asks whether that changes during a crisis. Based on an analysis of cabinet ministers in Israel during the first wave of the COVID19 crisis, this paper finds that ministers’ policy involvement during a crisis is relatively low. Most ministers are little involved in issues outside their jurisdiction. Ministers less central to the crisis management are also little involved in issues under their jurisdiction. Ministers central to the crisis management are highly involved in introducing decisions on issues under their jurisdiction, but not necessarily in other aspects of policy making. These findings have implications for issues of accountability and trust.     

THE FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK OF AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC ENTERPRISE

Abstract: This paper is concerned with the complexities of accountability for Australian public enterprise and analyses some of the conceptual issues which need to be addressed in developing a framework for reform. The analysis suggests that the matrix of financial accountability relationships is quite complex in terms of its objectives, its concern for both public interest and commercial viability issues and the number of participants. Furthermore, it operates in an intricate environment of political, administrative and control structures. Although the general financial reporting objectives for public and private enterprises may be similar from a conceptual viewpoint, the assumptions underlying the private sector agency model (a simple one-to-one shareholder-manager relationship based on profit maximisation and individual self-interest) may not allow a realistic or suitable modelling of the intricacies of this process at an operational level at least.
The analysis identifies some of the difficulties encountered when modelling the financial accountability processes for public enterprises. It then suggests a framework which takes into account the multi-layered nature of performance objectives and the unique operational environment of public enterprises. The model encompasses performance responsibilities at both the macro- and micro-economic levels, and operates through a linked chain of participants, each with distinct financial accountability obligations and information needs. It identifies several tiers of participants together with the appropriate accountability responsibilities at each level.     

Public–Private Partnerships and the Public Accountability Question

Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are growing in popularity as a governing model for delivery of public goods and services. PPPs have existed since the Roman Empire, but their expansion into traditional public projects today raises serious questions about public accountability. This article examines public accountability and its application to government and private firms involved in PPPs. An analytical framework is proposed for assessing the extent to which PPPs provide (or will provide) goods and services consistent with public sector goals of effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. Six dimensions—risk, costs and benefits, political and social impacts, expertise, collaboration, and performance measurement—are incorporated into a model that assists public managers in improving partnerships’ public accountability.     

Ministerial Turnover and Why Reshuffles Matter for Parliament

Reshuffles are a relatively common occurrence in British politics. We expect to see them whenever a new Prime Minister enters Downing Street, after elections and following ministerial resignations. Recent research from the Institute for Government warns that the regular churn of ministers has negative consequences for policy making and for parliamentary accountability. This article summarises their latest research and what this tells us about the potential implications of Boris Johnson’s February 2020 reshuffle on government and Parliament.