From Rebels to Rulers: The Challenges of Transition for Non-state Armed Groups in Mindanao and Myanmar

This article presents a critical comparison of the ongoing peace processes in the southern Philippines and Myanmar (Burma). It does so by examining two key armed groups: the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) on Mindanao, and the Karen National Union (KNU) in Myanmar. We identify common elements that help to explain the relative – albeit incomplete – success of these two groups in navigating their respective peace processes. The MILF and KNU are ethnonationalist armed groups struggling for self-determination against states that are experienced by ethnic minority communities as culturally alien, and economically and politically dominant. Both conflict actors are characterized by complex combinations of “greed” and “grievance” factors but nevertheless enjoy significant (albeit contested) political legitimacy among the communities they seek to represent. We explore the complex relationships between armed ethnic groups, conflict-affected communities, and civil society actors. We argue that engagement with civil society is a key element of success in the Mindanao peace process, which could be replicated in Myanmar. We examine the roles and changing nature of the state in the Philippines and Myanmar, and contrast the degrees of international involvement, as key variables in these peace processes. We observe that negotiations of comprehensive peace settlements are threatened by “the tyranny of elections” in Myanmar (2015) and the Philippines (2016), and observe the importance of including national parliaments in peace processes in a timely manner. The peace process between Manila and the MILF represents a rare example of a Muslim minority pursuing its political objectives through structured dialogue. The article focuses on the challenges faced by armed groups moving from insurgency to reinvent themselves as credible political actors and governance authorities. Our analysis draws on peace-building literature, specifically the phenomenon of “rebel governance.”     

Unity and Disunity in the FMLN

Problems of unity can affect an armed opposition group at many stages of its existence—during the war, in peace negotiations, and in its transition to political party. This article assesses how internal divisions affected the performance of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador. It finds that while the FMLN suffered significant internal divisions in the early years of the war, it remained remarkably unified from 1983 on. Significant divisions began to appear during the later war years but were not exacerbated until after the war's conclusion, when repeated fracturing occurred. The FMLN began to present itself as a programmatically coherent party only in 2005, and this ideological homogeneity allowed it to establish a series of partnerships with moderate, non‐revolutionary sectors of Salvadoran society and to achieve victory in the 2009 presidential elections.     

Beyond Fateh Corruption and Mass Discontent: Hamas,the Palestinian Left and the 2006 Legislative Elections

The unanticipated victory of Hamas in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections was a defining moment in the study of Islamist politics; the results were a startling surprise to all parties, not least Hamas. Much of the literature that assesses the electoral success of Islamists focuses on the distinct characteristics of Islamist groups, paying less attention to the complex interplay of factors that may account for their success. Examining Hamas's performance in the 2006 legislative elections, this article endeavours to: (1) challenge pervasive analysis which asserts the distinctiveness of Islamist political organisations; (2) situate the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections within a broader discussion of opposition politics in the Arab world; and (3) highlight the significance of long-term organisational trajectories and election campaign strategies in accounting for Islamist electoral performance. Findings in this article have important implications for how we understand Islamist and leftist opposition politics in light of the Arab Spring.     

Not to the highest bidder: the failure of incumbency in the Zambian 2011 elections

Incumbent political parties in emerging democracies tend to use clientelism and state resources to mobilise electoral support. In most cases, they go on to win these electoral contests. However, this paper uses the Zambian example to demonstrate that mere incumbency may not always win elections. Despite the advantages of incumbency, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) lost the 2011 elections to the opposition Patriotic Front (PF). To explain this, the paper argues that the qualities of an incumbent political party matter. For the MMD, the paper identifies three major contextual variables which undermined incumbency: first, the internal long-term but sustained centrifugal conditions which systematically eroded the party’s strength. Second, the public perception of the MMD as a decaying and recalcitrant party which increasingly detached itself from the electorate. Third, the presence of a surging populist, grassroots-based opposition political party.     

A Rising Tide for Jean–Marie,Jörg, & Pauline? Xenophobic Populism in Comparative Perspective

Many analysts attributed right–wing victories in Italy, Portugal, Scandinavia, Holland, and in the 2002 French presidential elections, to a rising wave of xenophobic populism voicing opposition to elitism, migrants, crime, and corruption. Drawing upon increasing political mistrust and volatility, and upon discontent with moderate, left–centre governments, this populist wave looked to be tidal. The generic causes of xenophobic populism are widespread and, although complex, understandable. They now extend beyond a simple response to socioeconomic hardship, mass unemployment or uncontrolled migration. In countries like France, Austria and Australia, which have overcome most major economic and security problems, other cultural and political factors have fostered resentment. The National Front, the Freedom Party and, in Australia, perhaps even Pauline Hanson's One Nation, have assembled a durable, organised, hard core of supporters. Even without their charismatic leaders, these parties may well survive, build on their relative success, and implant themselves as a fairly permanent nuisance in the political arena.     

Opposition politics in Malawi: hopeful signs amid the warnings

Across Africa, governments are either peacefully and legitimately ousted, or forced to share power, through the ballot box. In Malawi, the emergence of many political parties since the advent of a multiparty dispensation in 1993 signalled the flourishing of pluralism and opposition politics. However, in the May 2009 elections, the Malawi Congress Party and the United Democratic Front, which constituted the opposition, were largely rejected by the electorate in favour of President Bingu Mutharika's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), credited for his sound economic policies emulated internationally. The reduced presence in parliament of parties outside of the Democratic Progressive Party coalition is troubling. This development has stimulated debate on the opposition's role and ability to defend democratic governance, and the challenges facing it. On the other hand, the DPP's landslide victory has to some degree demonstrated that it is possible to ‘de-regionalise’ and ‘de-ethinicise’ the configuration and alignment of political interests and forces, confirming for other African countries that the analysis of African politics need not be oversimplified into ethnic and cultural terms as is often the case. This paper contends that democratic governance is promoted by a credible opposition that effectively acts as an alternative government. Therefore, there is need for addressing the major factors that militate against its operations to enable it play its rightful role in Malawi's emerging democracy.     

Political opposition and the challenges of a dominant party system: The democratic alliance in South Africa

The African National Congress enjoys a position of leviathan-like dominance in South Africa. In official opposition stands the Democratic Alliance whose support has risen considerably since South Africa's first democratic elections in 1994. The white electorate strongly favours the party over its main rival, the Freedom Front Plus. The coloured community in the Western Cape has also given the Democratic Alliance its support. Although the party has done well in attracting the support of ethnic minority groups it has not been so successful among the African electorate. In accounting for the success of the Democratic Alliance this article considers three themes: firstly, the reasons why white voters, especially Afrikaners, shifted their support to the party; secondly, the brand of South African patriotism now used by the party to promote the primacy of a non-racial South African identity; and finally, the party's understanding of political opposition and the obstacles that exist to it making further electoral progress.     

Opposition Coordination in Singapore’s 2015 General Elections

Abstract

Recent political science scholarship suggests that when opposition political parties are able to coalesce into a united coalition against an authoritarian regime, they will perform better in authoritarian elections, and can more credibly bargain with the regime for liberalising reforms. Yet, most of this literature pays little attention to the variety of ways in which opposition parties cooperate with each other. Drawing on the literature on the bargaining model of war, the author sketches out a theoretical framework to explain how opposition parties coordinate to develop non-competition agreements. Such agreements entail opposition parties bargaining over which political party should contest or withdraw in which constituencies to ensure straight fights against the dominant authoritarian incumbent in each electoral district. The author then applies this framework to explain opposition coordination in Singapore’s 2015 general elections, focusing on the conflict between the Workers’ Party and the National Solidarity Party.     

The weaknesses of Vietnamization

Abstract

Much stress has been put on the fact that the United States has been able to increase Saigon’s various armed forces to over 5 million men, armed with the most modern and destructive weapons. From such statistics, most Vietnam-watchers assume that the United States and the Thieu regime have been able to “extend” their control into the country-side simply through the sheer numbers of their forces and that the National Liberation Front’s “base” has naturally contracted as a result.     

Failure of security co‐operation in SADC: The suspension of the organ for politics,defence and security

Political opposition parties are considered crucial to the nurturing, enhancing and consolidating of democracy in every political system. Indeed, their existence is proof of political tolerance, competitive party elections, the provision of choices to the voting public and the possibility of alternation in power. However, the political opposition on the African continent is generally weak, and particularly so in Botswana, resulting in the predominance of the ruling party in political affairs. This article analyses the weaknesses of Botswana's opposition parties by tracing their historical evolution, characteristics, electoral base, and performance against the background of the political and electoral system in Botswana and the strength of the ruling party itself. It concludes that future prospects for the opposition to make greater inroads into the Botswana Democratic Party's support are small because of the fragmented nature of the opposition itself and the relative satisfaction of citizens with the current government's performance.     

Is Consensual Politicizing Being Punished in Switzerland?

Over the last decade, Switzerland has been characterized by both a radicalization of its political system and the relative success of the SP and SVP parties, which tend to adopt a strategy of permanent campaigning. Because of this, it is often argued that politicians are held accountable for their behaviour and that their electoral successes depend on their voting behaviour in parliament. We thus explore whether the voting behaviour of representatives, or citizens' evaluations of parties' ideological positions had an impact on their electoral success in the 1995, 1999, and 2003 national elections. More precisely, we assess how far the proximity and directional models explain the electoral success of incumbents and parties using roll call data for the National Council as well as the Selects surveys at the individual level. The results at both levels suggest that voters' choice is largely consistent with what is predicted by the spatial models of electoral behaviour. Swiss voters form their party preference on both proximity and direction, which supports a mixed model of electoral behaviour.     

Manifestos and elections in Ghana's Fourth Republic

Debate continues over the factors that influence electoral outcomes or voter behaviour and alignment in elections all over the world. Several factors have been noted, including the manifestos of political parties. In spite of the potential influence of the party manifesto, several comparative and empirical studies on elections in Ghana have paid little or no attention to manifestos in determining the electoral outcomes of political parties in the Fourth Republic.This paper makes a contribution to the debate by examining how manifestos have influenced the electoral chances of the two main political parties which have been in and out of government in Ghana since the inception of the Fourth Republic, namely, the National Democratic Congress and the New Patriotic Party. Analysis covers the five elections held in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008. Specifically, it discusses not only the ability of the manifestos to shape policy debate but also to some extent, influence electoral outcomes. The paper concludes with some lessons learned.     

EXILE POLITICS AND RESISTANCE TO DICTATORSHIP: THE UGANDAN ANTI-AMIN ORGANIZATIONS IN ZAMBIA, 1972-79

The contemporary debate on democracy and change in Africa appearsto have largely concentrated on the current and future roleof the political parties and the relative merits and demeritsof multi-partly politics vis-a-vis single party rule duringthe 1980s and 1990s. In the case of Uganda, not enough attentionhas been paid to the historical background to the present. Inparticular, a major lacuna has been the role played by organizationsoutside the country for most of the 1970s in the struggle toremove the Idi Amin regime (1971–79) from power. Thispaper seeks to make a contribution towards filling this gapand thus add to our knowledge of the post colonial history ofUganda. It considers critically the part played by such organizationsin the anti-Amin resistance movement which culminated in theformation of the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) inMarch 1979 and the establishment of the first post Amin governmentin Uganda a month later. While recognizing the proliferationof similar exile bodies elsewhere, this paper concentrates onZambia-based groups, the Uganda Liberation Group (Z) and theUganda National Movement.     

Hidden in plain sight: political opposition and hegemonic authoritarianism in Azerbaijan

This paper examines the consolidation and maintenance of hegemonic authoritarianism in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Hegemonic regimes are characterized by their nearly total lack of political competition. Despite the presence of opposition parties and regular elections, the incumbent in these cases is reelected with 70% or more of the vote. What does it take to sustain overwhelming margins of victory in regular elections in the face of institutionalized opposition? Previous studies have suggested that either violent repression or institutionalized co-optation of opposition groups is central to securing long-term hegemonic regime stability. These mechanisms explain how rulers forestall potential opposition. Upon coming to power in 1993, however, Heydar Aliyev – like many post-Soviet leaders – inherited a genuine, existing opposition in the Popular Front movement. I suggest that in the presence of an intractable opposition, Azerbaijan's rulers have taken a different approach with regard to regime maintenance. Drawing on over 50 original interviews conducted during 6 months of field research, I identify the mechanisms by which the government has “hidden the opposition in plain sight” by making it effectively difficult for existing opposition groups to function as credible political parties. Since the mid-1990s, the Aliyev regime has used informal measures to prevent these groups from aggregating and articulating the diverse interests present in society from visibly competing in elections and from serving effectively in government to craft and implement policy. These practices have rendered the opposition technically legal, but completely ineffective. Besides weakening the opposition, these measures produce a series of mutually reinforcing effects – including noncompetitive elections by default and a politically disengaged society – that sustain long-term regime stability. The paper concludes by examining this argument in comparative perspective. Hegemonic regimes have proliferated in the post-Soviet region, and I suggest that this strategy is an important factor in sustaining many of these regimes.     

A Dawn of Two-Party System in Japanese Politics?: The Emergence of the Democratic Party of Japan

The long rule of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has finally ended, and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has captured government. This article is to examine why and how that has ended and what are the major factors which have contributed to the change of government. The inability of Japanese opposition parties to capture government has been discussed for a long time. The first part of this article is to examine the strength and weakness of major structural explanations which have been discussed in existing literature. Then, the article proposes a process-level analysis which takes a synergistic effect among institution, strategy and chance seriously. The second part of the article is a short history of the emergence of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) as a ruling party. The history will start with a formation of a small political party in September 1996,and describe how a new single-member electoral system shaped the incentives of political actors, how they worked out political strategy under the new system, and how chance affect the success or failure of political strategy.     

Laissez-faire versus Strict Control of Political Finance: Hegemonic Parties and Developmental States in Malaysia and Singapore

ABSTRACT

This article compares the financing of political parties and candidates in two Southeast Asian countries. In Malaysia, some political finance regulations exist only on paper, and political financing is for the most part not restrained at all. In contrast, the financing of candidates and parties has always been tightly circumscribed in Singapore. These different strategies, “laissez-faire” versus “strict control,” are the consequence of various factors. In Malaysia, the New Economic Policy has effected a close, often economically unproductive linkage between the state, the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition, and business. The rise of businesspeople has resulted in the commercialization of competition within (the United Malays National Organisation. Additionally, increasing competition between the ruling coalition and the opposition has resulted in growing expenditures for electioneering in the form of advertisements and electoral patronage. The laissez-faire style of regulation has been compounded by the difficult-to-control practices in East Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak), where vote buying, electoral patronage based on the largesse of oligarchs, and obvious nonobservance of the rules have been typical. In contrast to Malaysia as a whole, the costs for parties and candidates are still relatively low in Singapore. As a cadre party, the PAP (People's Action Party) is relatively autonomous from private business interests, and intraparty competition is not commercialized; the developmentalist state is highly productive, and the ties between the state, the PAP, and business are not characterized by cronyism. Moreover, electioneering is not very commercialized because the opposition is still relatively weak.     

The evolution of the New Patriotic Party in Ghana

This paper examines the emergence and development of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) government in the context of a broader examination of the roles of political parties within the Ghanaian political landscape. After describing the political architecture as well as some significant constitutional issues of Ghana's democracy and the roles played by other societal stakeholders, the paper examines the rationale for the formation of the NPP, its manifesto, structure, constituency, power brokers. It then analyses various aspects of the implementation (or not) of the NPP's political and economic objectives since it came to power in 2000 with a message of ‘positive change’. The electoral politics of the campaigns against its major opposition, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), and issues of regionalism, ethnicity and other factors are considered in detail. The paper concludes with some lessons learned and generic recommendations for emerging African political parties in relatively young democracies.     

Electoral Competition and the New Party System in Mexico

Mexico's former opposition parties had specific social bases that would not, on their own, have catapulted either opposition party into power. In the 1990s, specific regional bases of support developed for the parties, reflecting their efforts to develop their organizations more locally. Nationally, this led to the emergence of two parallel two-party systems, PAN-PRI competition in the north and center-west and PRD-PRI competition in the south. In parallel, a proregime-antiregime cleavage came to dominate the Mexican party system, which, combined with local-level opposition efforts to oust the PRI, created new incentives for the opposition parties to abandon past emphases on ideological differences and to act like catch-all parties instead. The regime cleavage fostered the dealignment of the Mexican electorate, a process that promoted the development of catch-all parties. Movement within the parties to behave like catch-all parties has not come without internal tensions, but electoral dynamics prove powerful inducements to catch-all behavior.     

Electoral Cycles, Party Organization and Mobilization in Canada

Canadian political parties oscillate between periods of inter-election quiescence and electoral year mobilization. In this paper we measure, across a series of elections, organizational activity in inter-election periods as parties develop strategic positions and seek to reshape their bases, and then their subsequent mobilization strategies and successes. Our research strategy employs ecological models rooted in electoral district level data including party resources and activity (from annual financial accounts), census data describing the electoral districts, as well as conventional aggregate electoral data. Our initial models utilise evidence from Ontario, Canada's largest province, and cover several electoral cycles that witnessed a string of governmental turnovers. This analysis provides a more nuanced model of party systems than those based on simple election results. Even in a period of remarkable electoral flux, party activity and success appear to be deeply rooted in the diverse constituency social and political contexts of the system.