A Tarasoff for Europe? A European Human Rights perspective on the duty to protect

It has long been recognised by British courts that a psychiatrist can be permitted to depart from his/her duty of confidentiality, in order to issue a warning where a patient is deemed to present a real and serious threat to other parties. Until recently, however, it seemed that s/he would not be bound to give such a warning, or to take other steps to protect third parties. The approach adopted throughout much of the USA, and famously expounded in the Tarasoff judgment, appeared to have no relevance to British law. This article considers the possibility that the European Court of Human Rights' ruling in Osman v UK may be set to bring about a radical change in this respect, introducing something akin to the Tarasoff approach into the UK, and indeed throughout Europe. As well as the possible legal basis for such a duty, and the circumstances in which it would arise, it will consider how a psychiatrist might reconcile any such duty with other, more established, legal and ethical duties.     

An Improved Protection for the (Mentally Ill) Trans Parent: A Queer Reading of AP,Garçon and Nicot v France

The European Court of Human Rights has been deciding cases concerning LGBT rights since the early 1980s. Its case law on trans rights has changed drastically over time, imposing upon the states of the Council of Europe certain minimum standards regarding the legal recognition of gender identity. In its recent judgment of April 2017 the Court laid down a new rule to be adopted by domestic legislation; namely, that the legal recognition of gender transition cannot be made conditional upon pursuing medical or surgical procedures which have (or are likely to have) sterilising effects. This article analyses the judgment from a critical perspective grounded in queer theory, noting both the positive and the negative elements of the Court's decision.     

All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's 'Banana Decision'

The Federal Constitutional Court's banana decision of 7 June 2000 continues the complex theme of national fundamental‐rights control over Community law. Whereas in the ‘Solange II’ decision (BVerfGE 73, 339) the Federal Constitutional Court had lowered its standard of review to the general guarantee of the constitutionally mandatorily required minimum, the Maastricht judgment (BVerfGE 89, 155) had raised doubts as to the continued validity of this case law. In the banana decision, which was based on the submission of the EC banana market regulation by the Frankfurt‐am‐Main administrative court for constitutional review, the Federal Constitutional Court has now confirmed the ‘Solange II’decision and restrictively specified the admissibility conditions for constitutional review of Community law as follows. Constitutional complaints and judicial applications for review of European legislation alleging fundamental‐rights infringements are inadmissible unless they show that the development of European law including Court of Justice case law has since the ‘Solange II’ decision generally fallen below the mandatorily required fundamental‐rights standard of the Basic Law in a given field. This would require a comprehensive comparison of European and national fundamental‐rights protection. This paper criticises this formula as being logically problematic and scarcely compatible with the Basic Law. Starting from the position that national constitutional courts active even in European matters should be among the essential vertical ‘checks and balances’ in the European multi‐level system, a practical alternative to the Federal Constitutional Court's retreat is developed. This involves at the first stage a submission by the Federal Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice, something that in the banana case might have taken up questions on the method of fundamental‐rights review and the internal Community effect of WTO dispute settlement decisions. Should national constitutional identity not be upheld even by this, then at a second stage, as ultima ratio taking recourse to general international law, the call is made for the decision of constitutional conflicts by an independent mediating body.     

Facial recognition technology,democracy and human rights

On 4 July 2023, the Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered the first judgment on the compatibility of facial recognition technology with human rights in Glukhin v. Russia. The case concerned the use of facial recognition technology (FRT) against Mr Glukhin following his solo demonstration in the Moscow underground. The Court unanimously found a violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private life) and Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Regarding FRT, the Court concluded that the use of highly intrusive technology is incompatible with the ideals and values of a democratic society governed by the rule of law. This case note analyses the judgment and shows its relevance in the current regulatory debate on Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems in Europe. Notwithstanding the importance of this decision, we argue that the Court has left crucial questions unanswered.     

Between Procedural Impermeability and Constitutional Openness: The Italian Constitutional Court and Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice

On 15 April 2008, the Italian Constitutional Court (ICC) raised for the first time a preliminary question to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This decision (see judgment No 102/2008 and order No 103/2008) represented a turning point in the ICC's case‐law, and calls for a careful assessment of the motives backing such revirement as well as of the legal reasoning that the Italian judges used to wrap it up without repudiating their previous case‐law. In addition to this preliminary analysis, the aim of this essay is to explore two themes: i) the developments of the ICC's case‐law as regards the role of Community Law and the ECJ, and ii) the appraisal of the interplay between the ICC and the ECJ in the light of the notion of ‘interpretive competition’.     

Closing the Floodgates on Privacy Class Actions: Lloyd v Google LLC

In Lloyd v Google LLC [2021] UKSC 50, the Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeal's decision, which had allowed a claim under the Data Protection Act 1998 to proceed as a representative action under CPR 19.6. This is significant because the Court of Appeal's decision arguably paved the way for further data protection/privacy claims to be brought as opt-out ‘class actions’ using this procedure. This case note summarises the Supreme Court decision and assesses its implications for both the procedural law of collective redress and the substantive law of privacy in England. It argues that the Supreme Court's reasoning in relation to both of these areas is sound as a matter of precedent and statutory construction. As a matter of public policy, the decision is likely to re-enliven debate about the availability of collective redress in English law and whether the existing collective proceedings regime should be broadened.     

Adoption,Homosexuality and the European Convention on Human Rights: Gas and Dubois v France

On 15 March 2012 the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) issued its first judgment addressing the differential treatment of same‐sex and opposite‐sex couples in respect of the adoption of a child. 1 The Court held that excluding same‐sex couples in civil partnerships, who have no legal right to marry, from adoption provisions available to married opposite‐sex couples does not violate rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention). I argue that the Court's reasoning in Gas and Dubois v France is unpersuasive and unsustainable in light of its wider case law.     

Taking Language Seriously: An Analysis of Linguistic Reasoning and Its Implications in EU Law

This article discusses legal reasoning at the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The following questions are addressed. First, the authors look at the way linguistic arguments are used in ECJ case‐law. Second, they consider whether the requirements of legal certainty, and more specifically that of predictability, may be fulfilled by reference to linguistic arguments in a multilingual legal system. The theoretical starting‐point is that of open‐endedness of language: no means exists to definitely pin down the meaning of words. Defining the meaning of words in a legal context is necessarily a matter of choice involving evaluative considerations. Consequently, when the ECJ uses linguistic arguments to justify a decision, it is an active agent choosing the meaning of words in a specific case. Essentially, the authors argue that legal reasoning based on linguistic arguments is particularly problematic from the viewpoint of legal certainty and predictability. In this respect, the key importance of systemic and teleological argumentation is emphasised in assuring convincing, acceptable and transparent legal reasoning especially in the context of multilingual EU law.     

The European Court of Justice and the Rhetoric of Affirmative Action

The recent Marschall decision by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to uphold a principle giving precedence to women for promotions in the workplace seems promising for the future of affirmative action. At first glance, this decision seems to indicate that the ECJ has taken a different path, moving away from its earlier Kalanke decision which had jeopardised further development of affirmative action in the European Union. On a closer examination, both Kalanke’s sweeping ban of preferential treatment based on gender and Marschall’s new interpretation appear as discursive replies to the same dilemma: should the Court deny the normative objective of equality contained in EC law to generate meaning, thus turning equality into a mere formal principle and rendering judicial review trivial? Or should it embrace a substantive reading of the fundamental principle of equality between men and women, thus substituting the Court judgment for that of the legislature, and subverting the limits of the ECJ’s powers? The aim of this article is to analyse the ECJ’s rhetorical response to the complexities contained in affirmative action judicial review.     

N v UK: No Duty to Rescue the Nearby Needy?

This article discusses the deportation of a seriously ill foreign national to her country of origin, where she would face a high risk of extreme deterioration of her health due to the inadequate medical treatment. It criticises the reasoning of the judgment N v UK of the European Court of Human Rights, and explores the circumstances under which removal of a severely ill non-national constitutes a breach of the prohibition against inhuman and degrading treatment under the European Convention on Human Rights.     

Sickness Absence and the Court of Justice: Examining the Role of Fundamental Rights in EU Employment Law

Being absent from work due to sickness is a critical issue for individuals and their employers, but it has traditionally fallen outside the scope of EU employment legislation. This article argues that this is changing; it examines case‐law under the Working Time and Employment Equality Directives. The article considers the justifications that the Court of Justice has advanced to explain this expansion in EU employment law. It finds that the Court has, at times, invoked fundamental social rights as a basis for interpreting employment legislation in a manner favourable to workers. Yet the way in which the Court deploys rights‐based reasoning can be difficult to anticipate, not least the countervailing weight attached to the interests of employers. The case studies indicate that fundamental rights discourse offers a possible foundation for more extensive readings of employment legislation, but it is not a simple ‘trump card’ for advocates of stronger worker protection.     

Lord Cooke of Thorndon (1926–2006): 51 Years in the Law

This article provides an in‐depth analysis of the landmark ‘cash for query’ judgment of the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court of India. The scope of parliamentary privileges in India, as well as in England and America, is examined, particularly with respect to the jurisdiction of the courts. The present position in the law of parliamentary privileges in India was laid down in the case of Raja Ram Pal v The Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, &; Ors. The Supreme Court of India has extensively dwelled on the matter and has delivered a judgment, which is by far the most comprehensive decision in this field of law. The author notes in the analysis that the difference between the English and Indian constitutional systems is of crucial significance. The conflicts between the judiciary and parliament in England arose because of the sovereignty of parliament, and the judiciary had to fight for every inch of its jurisdiction in England. The judiciary had to contend with Parliament not only as a legislative body, but also by virtue of being the ‘High Court of Parliament’, as a superior court. Because of these reasons, the case law from British constitutional history does not have strict applicability in India. The decision of the Supreme Court of India in Raja Ram Pal v The Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, &; Ors, is a clear expression of a very basic feature of the Indian constitutional mechanism: where the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and all governmental organs, which owe their origin to the Constitution and derive their powers from its provisions, must function within its framework.     

Human Rights Watch v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Victim Status,Extraterritoriality and the Search for Principled Reasoning

In Human Rights Watch v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal found that the relevant standard of ‘victim status’ that applies in secret surveillance cases consists in a potential risk of being subjected to surveillance and that the European Convention on Human Rights does not apply to the surveillance of individuals who reside outside of the UK. This note argues that the Tribunal's finding regarding the victim status of the applicants was sound but that the underlying reasoning was not. It concludes that the Tribunal's finding on extraterritoriality is unsatisfactory and that its engagement with the European Court of Human Rights case law on the matter lacked depth. Finally, the note considers the defects of the Human Rights Watch case, and the case law on extraterritoriality more generally, against the backdrop of the place of principled reasoning in human rights adjudication.     

A New Chapter in the Normalisation of Closed Material Procedures

This note provides an analysis of the Supreme Court decision in Haralambous, which authorised the use of closed material procedures (CMPs) in proceedings surrounding search and seizure warrants issued under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). After presenting the facts of the case and the reasoning of the Court, the note examines the decision as an instance of CMP normalisation consistent with the model of normalisation argued for by Eva Nanopoulos in a previous MLR article. The notes goes on to make the case that Haralambous may be distinguished from previous instances of CMP normalisation on account of the Supreme Court's more open acceptance of CMPs in the decision, which signals a new chapter in CMP normalisation in the UK.     

Attribution in Company Law

In Bilta (UK) Ltd (in liquidation) v Nazir (No 2), the Court of Appeal held that the ex turpi causa defence was inapplicable by refusing to attribute the fraud of the directors and the sole shareholder to the company in connection with the company's claim against them and third party co‐conspirators. It is significant that the court has not only clarified the law in relation to attribution, but it did so by rejecting the majority's reasoning and endorsing the dissenting judgment in the House of Lords decision in Stone & Rolls (in liquidation) v Moore Stephens (a firm). This article evaluates the decision in Bilta by critically examining the fundamental principles and policies that apply to the three distinct circumstances under which corporate attribution should or should not take place.     

Buy baby: the European Union and regulation of human reproduction

In its decision in ex parte Blood the Court of Appeal relied on European Community (EC) law to hold that the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority had acted unlawfully in taking its decision to prevent Mrs Blood from exporting sperm taken from her dying husband without his written consent. The Blood case raises the issue of the extent to which EC law may affect the regulation of human reproduction in the Member States. Responding to fears that such national regulation might be 'swept away' by the commodifying nature of EC law, this article considers the scope of the potential application of EC law to regulation of human reproduction. The cautious conclusion is that, while there may be some increase in deregulatory pressures, the 'vertical relationship' of supreme EC law to national law may turn out to be less significant than 'horizontal relationships' between policy-makers within and between the EU and its Member States.     

The Strasbourg Court and Indirect Race Discrimination: Going Beyond the Education Domain

Prohibiting indirect discrimination has been hailed as guaranteeing substantive equality by addressing issues of structural discrimination and inequalities in a way that direct discrimination cannot and will not. However, Article 14, the ECHR's non‐discrimination provision, does not distinguish between direct and indirect discrimination. Only in 2007 the European Court of Human Rights explicitly included the notion of indirect (race) discrimination under Article 14 in DH and Others v Czech Republic, its famous judgment on Roma education segregation. Since then it has applied the prohibition of indirect race discrimination in a limited manner to similar education cases. However, in its recent Grand Chamber decision, Biao v Denmark, the Strasbourg Court started clarifying some unsolved issues in the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination in its case law and finally applied the concept to the much broader area of immigration and citizenship.     

Defamation in cyberspace: A Japanese perspective

The aim of this paper is two-fold: first, to introduce how Japanese law and its jurisprudence have dealt with the case of on-line defamation, which is arguably one of the most acute problems in modern society, and second, to critically examine the efficacy of such an approach. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in on-line defamation (as oppose to off-line defamation) will be introduced as an exemplar of the way Japanese law and its jurisprudence have dealt with such an acute problem. A first step will be to provide, by way of background, a brief overview of how defamation in a conventional sense has been treated by the Japanese legal system. The second step will be to outline how the Japanese jurisdiction has dealt with on-line defamation, that is to say, to what extent the Japanese court regulates on-line defamatory comments made by the ordinary people. A third step will be to examine the efficacy of such an approach, and the final step will be to examine whether the UK court can learn a lesson from the Japanese jurisdiction. The author will draw upon Japanese jurisprudence, in order to consider whether a valuable lesson might be offered to the UK jurisdiction.     

Devotion to Legalism: On the Brexit Case

This note examines the UK Supreme Court's judgment in the Brexit case, Miller v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union. The case upheld the decision of the High Court, which rejected the claim that the foreign affairs prerogative provided a legal basis for giving notice to EU institutions of the UK's intention to withdraw from the EU. But the Supreme Court's preferred basis for dismissing that claim rested on the more general proposition that significant constitutional change can only be effected by statute. This position offers the germs of a jurisprudence of constitutional change and was substantiated by means of an analysis of Parliament's dual capacity as legislator and constituent agent. Miller also includes important and potentially innovative dicta on the relationship between international and domestic sources of law.     

Intoxicated Consent in Rape: Bree and Juror Decision-Making

The article examines the recent Court of Appeal judgment in Bree, in which the court considered the guidance that should be given to a jury when the complainant is intoxicated at the time of an alleged rape. As well as analysing the reasoning of the court in Bree, the judgment is placed in context by examining factors, such as social attitudes, that influence juror decision-making in rape cases. It also examines the suggestion made by the court in Bree that further law reform in this area would represent 'patronising interference' in the lives of women.