Is Terrorism a Crime or an Aggravating Factor in Sentencing?

Common law systems, in criminal cases, distinguish between theguilt/innocence proceedings and the sentencing stage. This isnot the case in civil law systems where criminal trial consistsof a single phase, combining the inquiry into guilt with sentencing.Under common law practice many facts relevant for sentencingare considered irrelevant at the stage of finding guilt forthe commission of the crime. Aggravating elements, therefore,address a fundamental distinction of substantive criminal lawbetween guilt and dangerousness: guilt is a determination ofresponsibility for a prior wrongdoing; dangerousness is a speculativefuture determination. The intensification of terrorist activityin the past few years has made terrorism one of today's mostpressing problems. But is terrorism a crime or an aggravatingfactor in sentencing? In this article, the author challengesconventional wisdom regarding the meaning of ‘terroristcrimes’, by providing a conceptual understanding of ‘terrorism’,as well as articulating a theory of guilt. Terrorists seldomexpress ‘guilt’. The word ‘terrorism’describes, instead, an overriding motivation, a way of acting,rather than the objective circumstances of acting. Terrorismis nothing but common crimes although committed with an overridingmotivation of imposing extreme fear on the nation as such. Theauthor presents the conceptual grounds of the phenomenon ofterrorism as it has evolved through history, before enquiringinto the meaning of ‘terrorist crimes’: the overridingmotivation associated with the concept of terrorism constitutesthe degree of cognate dangerousness of terrorist crimes.     

Sentencing: Must justice be even-handed?

The question considered is whether a convicted criminal has been treated unjustly if the only reason he receives a much heavier sentence than another criminal convicted of the same crime is that he came before a different judge. The answer offered is that such a criminal would not be treated unjustly. The principle of equality in punishment, properly understood, does not forbid even such gross disparities in sentence (though it also does not require them). The paper discusses the 1978 Model Sentencing and Corrections Act in detail and has important consequences for the current movement to reform punishment to assure just deserts.Work on this paper was supported in part by a Summer Research Grant from Illinois State University, 1981.     

Why is it a Crime to be Poor?

This article considers the historical development of certain aspects of poor relief in England and Wales and their connection with the treatment of vagrants. It will argue that it is the historical link between early statutes controlling both the movement of labourers and the destitute in the fourteenth century and the later parochial responsibility for the relief of poverty which led both to the inclusion of vagrancy provisions within the 1601 Poor Relief Act, and the continuing quasi-legal connection between vagrancy provisions and the relief of poverty. A nexus of punishment was created within the operation of the poor law by the two-fold role of justices of the peace; these officials not only adjudicated the settlement laws, but were also responsible for the legal control of vagrancy. The article will argue that this contributed to the harshness of the 1834 poor law reforms, and continues with contemporary approaches to the relief of poverty via Social Security legislation which prioritises the control of claimant fraud above the rights of the individual to relief from want. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

How Large Should the Strike Zone Be in “Three Strikes and You're Out” Sentencing Laws?

So-called three strikes and you're out sentencing laws for criminal offenders have proliferated in the United States. The laws vary considerably in their definitions of what constitutes a strike. This paper adapts the classic Poisson process model of criminal offending to investigate how varying sentence lengths and definitions of what constitutes a strike affect the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of these sentencing laws. In particular, it asks whether, by using different definitions for the first, second, and third strikes or different sentence lengths, one can make the resulting incarceration more efficient in the sense of incapacitating more crimes per cell-year served.     

Should gains from criminal knowledge be forfeited?

Crime, Law and Social Change - Nobody should profit from crime; this fundamental moral principle is uncontroversial. At the level of public declaration, few people are likely to disagree with this...     

Why Should Justice Be Seen to Be Done?

A well-known maxim instructs that justice should be seen to be done. When “seen” is understood in the sense of “observed”, the maxim is easily defended: open court proceedings protect against arbitrary and partial decisions. However, when “seen” is understood in the sense of “seem,” the maxim is more puzzling, since it is not obvious why courts should concern themselves with people's perceptions that justice has been done. This article addresses this issue, with a particular focus on the social and other benefits that result when judges observe procedures that are widely regarded as fair, especially in criminal trials. The article draws on empirical studies in social psychology that show that when legal authorities treat people in ways that accord with “lay” procedural expectations, they are more likely to view the authorities as legitimate, to cooperate with them, and to obey the law out of an internalized sense of obligation. The article explores the moral significance of these empirical findings, arguing that it would be superficial to see them as a recipe for social stability. The deeper truth conveyed by the empirical research is that relating to people in ways that are widely perceived to be fair is a way for authorities to engage people's moral sentiments and to enliven their virtuous capacity to put aside considerations of self-interest so as to do what is right. This dynamic provides a sound moral foundation for courts to concern themselves with perceptions of justice.     

“No Remorse,No Repent”: Linking Lack of Remorse to Criminal Offending in a Sample of Serious Adolescent Offenders

Linking emotions to offender decision-making has only recently become of theoretical interest to criminologists, but empirical work in this area has not kept pace nor has such research examined the role of emotions to offending in offender-based samples. Recently, Warr outlined regret as one such emotion that may be useful in thinking about offending. Specifically, he argued that regret may be related to discontinuity in offending, or conversely that a lack of remorse may be related to continuity in offending. This paper uses data from a sample of serious adolescent offenders followed for seven years to investigate this hypothesis. Results provide support for Warr’s hypothesis that remorse-resistant adolescents incur a higher number of re-arrests, while remorse-prone adolescents incur fewer re-arrests, even after controlling for other relevant risk factors.     

Questioning Blackmun's Thesis: Does Uniformity in Sentencing Entail Unfairness?

It is commonly believed among criminal justice scholars that sentencing guidelines increase uniformity in sentencing at the cost of fairness. They reason that guideline systems rarely take all relevant case characteristics into consideration, and as a result, impose sentences in particular cases that are biased relative to the ideal or best sentence. This bias effect is one of the primary theoretical and practical challenges faced by courts and sentencing commissions in the last 30 years, and provides one of the strongest arguments against mandatory sentencing guidelines. This article identifies a second effect of guidelines on fairness, which has not been sufficiently acknowledged by the scholarly literature: the variance effect increases the fairness of sentences directly by increasing uniformity. This article uses statistical simulation to examine the relationship between the variance effect and the bias effect. The results provide substantial evidence that the variance effect is comparatively large, and that it may often outweigh the negative effects of bias. Under these conditions, sentencing guidelines will both increase uniformity and increase fairness.     

Should competition policy in banking be amended during crises? Lessons from the EU

This article investigates the nexus of competition and stability in European banking. It analyzes the European legal framework for competition policy in banking and several cases that pertain to anti-cartel policy, merger policy, and state-aid control. It discusses whether and how competition policy should be amended in order to preserve the stability of the banking system during crises. The article argues for increased cooperation between prudential regulators and competition authorities, as well as an enhanced framework for bank regulation, supervision, and resolution that could mitigate the need to change competition policy in crisis times.     

Court Sentencing Patterns for Environmental Crimes: Is There a “Green” Gap in Punishment?

Objectives

This study examines sentencing patterns for environmental crimes and tests the assumption that “green” offenders receive more lenient treatment from criminal courts than non-environmental offenders.

Methods

We present two sets of analyses. First, we present an empirical portrait of environmental felony offenses convicted in a single state (Florida) over a fifteen-year period and the resulting criminal sanctions. Second, we use a precision matching analysis to assess whether environmental offenders receive more lenient treatment when compared to non-environmental offenders with the same characteristics and offense severity scores.

Results

Findings indicate that an overall small percentage of felony convictions in state courts stem from environmental crimes. We also find that punishments for environmental crimes are more lenient than sanctions assigned to comparable non-environmental offenses when the environmental crime is ecological, but that punishments are sometimes harsher when the environmental crime involves animals.

Conclusions

The findings provide general support for the argument that courts and other formal institutions of social control treat environmental crimes more leniently than non-environmental crimes. This paper also raises important questions about citizen and state actors’ perceptions of crimes against the environment and, more generally, about the ways in which theories of court sentencing behaviors apply to environmental crime sanctioning decisions.

     

Who Should Serve in Nonstaff Departments?

The nonstaff departments of executive committees in our republic have a history that is not very long but quite complex. It began with a "fast take-off," when executive committees of district and city Soviets virtually competed about how to set up more such departments, although their purpose and purview were often given little thought. This take-off was sometimes followed by disillusionment, and this too involved going to extremes. Sometimes the very right of volunteer components of the administrative machinery to exist was virtually denied. But life puts everything in its place. The departments that were really needed took root and became firmly established. And those that had been established just to make a record ceased to exist, as was to be expected.     

Subjective Proximity to Crime or Social Representations? Explaining Sentencing Attitudes in Switzerland

Lay sentencing attitudes are considered in the light of two theoretical perspectives. The first perspective views sentencing attitudes as parts of broader sets of social representations anchored in one’s position in the social structure. The second perspective explains sentencing attitudes by their subjective experiences of crime. This paper tests both theories by performing a series of multiple regressions on two dimensions of sentencing: punishment goals and severity of punishment. Empirical data comes from a quantitative survey conducted in Switzerland. Findings reveal that indicators of subjective proximity to crime largely account for sentencing attitudes. Nevertheless, social representations of crime measured by causes of crime also have a significant impact on sentencing attitudes. Implications of these findings for sentencing in Western democracies are discussed.     

Why negotiate a legally binding mercury convention?

The purpose of this paper is to explain how and why consensus was reached on a legally binding approach given the opposition of powerful actors. Why did the United States and key emerging economies change their positions? We apply tools from the regime formation literature—classical perspectives on power, interests and knowledge—and the use of different leadership tools to shed light on the issue. Knowledge-based intellectual leadership was exercised by the UNEP Secretariat, providing new information on the seriousness and scope of the problem. Power-based leadership through unilateral action was provided by the United States. When the United States changed position after change in domestic leadership, political costs increased for other opponents. Finally, interest-based instrumental leadership was provided by many proponents, with UNEP and among others the EU in the lead. Still, conflicts remain on control measures and the form of financial mechanism.