Europe’s response to China’s rise: competing strategic visions

Asia Europe Journal - How should Europe respond to China’s growing economic and military capabilities, and to the more assertive foreign policy behavior it has generated? Should it seek to...     

Capabilities and aspirations: South Korea’s rise as a middle power

In November 2010, the G20 Summit was held in Seoul. The G20 has increasingly replaced the G8 as being the premier forum for international economic cooperation, but in November 2010, it was the first time that a summit was held in country that was not a G8 member. It was by the Korean government seen as evidence of the country finally having achieved the goal of becoming an advanced nation playing, while still constrained by the division of the peninsula, a global role in line with its economic standing. The article argues that this has been a constant theme in Korea’s foreign policy since it was originally formulated in 1994 as part of the country’s globalization policy. This addition of an intentional dimension, to the objective capabilities created during the previous decades, has increasingly resulted in the type of behavior associated with middle power status.     

China’s rise: what about a transatlantic dialog?

Asia Europe Journal - This essay examines and evaluates China’s global rise and the state of the transatlantic discussions about this issue. Since 2010, the rise of China has been accompanied...     

Ideas matter: China’s peaceful rise

Illuminating on the power transition theory, realists are more than convinced of potential structural conflicts in both economic and security realms due to China’s rise. They see China as a dormant source of challenges to American preeminence, economic policies of the west as evident in the recent negotiation discourses (e.g., G-20 and G-8 meetings), the “western” norms of diplomacy (e.g., Washington consensus) in developing countries including in Africa, and security concerns of its neighboring states. However, China will be able to avoid this claimed inevitability by abiding to peaceful ideas deeply embedded in “New Security Concept,” “peaceful rise theory,” “peaceful development” and a “harmonious world” doctrine. This paper argues that China will be able to rise peacefully because of the efficacy of practicing liberalism and constructivism at large in its diplomacy. China is increasingly and genuinely embracing shared norms and institutions, gradually gravitating East Asian regional order to its favor in the form of power constellation.     

China’s anti-terror strategy and China’s role in global anti-terror cooperation

Anti-terrorism has become an important part of Chinas domestic and diplomatic agenda. This has its historical roots and theoretical basis. Chinas anti-terrorism campaign started even before 9/11, but it was only after 9/11 that China participates fully in the international anti-terror cooperation and becomes a significant player in the efforts. This paper attempts to make an analysis from the Chinese perspective.     

Environmental issues as a ‘strategic’ key in EU–China relations

EU–China relations face some troubled areas, notably their differing views on human rights and a widening trade imbalance in China’s favour, compounded by the still weak foreign policy coherence on the part of the EU. This raises problems for the EU–China strategic partnership announced in 2003. This paper argues that, in contrast to such problematic political-trade areas, there is some substantive convergence over environmental and energy issues. Convergence is evoked in the EU–China Partnership on Climate Change announced in 2005, and manifested in various cooperative programmes currently operating. In a practical sense, environmental issues are not only important in themselves but are ones where easier confidence and pragmatic cooperation can be more readily established between the EU and China. However, questions of appropriate environmental technology, the commercial/altruistic basis for technology transfer and outcomes of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference in December 2009 remain as issues to settle between them.     

China’s direct investment in the European Union: a new regulatory challenge?

While China is fast becoming an important outward direct investor, its companies are showing an increasing interest to locate in Europe and the European Union (EU). It has been suggested that this can partly be explained by the more lenient attitude of the European countries compared to the US, where some acquisitions were abandoned when they ran into political opposition based on security concerns. Yet, also in Europe, the media follow rather closely each new Chinese entry, and certain politicians have started to criticise the take-over of technology-oriented companies, especially by Chinese state-owned firms. Against the background of a very open foreign direct investment (FDI) policy as measured by OECD FDI Restrictiveness Index for the EU and the individual countries, an overview is given of the pre- and post-establishment obstacles to direct foreign investment. Also, the EU policy measures that directly or indirectly deal with incoming direct investment are discussed. Within the context of the EU competition policy and the merger regulation, the EU Commission has cleared five cases of take-over by Chinese state-owned enterprises. Although the Lisbon Treaty authorises the EU Commission to take charge of investment policy as part of the EU commercial policy, it will take time to realise this. If the announced negotiations about an investment treaty between China and the EU could work out the necessary balance, it would be an important step in achieving more reciprocity between their respective investment regimes.     

Turning pressure into opportunity: CAI and the future of China’s structural reform

Many pundits and media believe that China under Mr. Xi Jinping is politically and economically illiberal with concentration of political power to Xi himself and the expansion of state capitalism. This article believes that China is still in transition and the Daobi (倒逼) mechanism, namely, a planned strategy of introducing foreign competition and international rules to advance domestic reform, takes effect. The EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) is a milestone that could possibly contribute to structural economic and even political changes in China. This article centres on the Daobi mechanism and explains how the synergies among CAI, domestic socioeconomic changes and Chinese leaders’ self-consciousness may set the agenda of China’s domestic reform.

     

China as a ‘net donor’: tracking dollars and sense

The article examines China's emergence over the past decade as a net donor, and the implications of this status in global development. The analysis begins by outlining China's rise as a net donor, drawing comparisons in two-way aid flows with the other rising states, specifically Brazil, South Africa and India, and then turns to the implications of China's rise as an aid sender. The central argument is that conceptualizing China's rise as a ‘net donor’ is crucial for understanding the hybrid position that China has come to occupy in the global aid system, and the consequences of this positioning. Although China has achieved remarkable success with its own development, rather than join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) regime of traditional donors, the Chinese Communist Party and government leadership has chosen instead to continue to self-identify with the countries of the South, and to construct ties of South–South cooperation outside of DAC arrangements. The Chinese leadership is trying to stake out an unprecedented position in the global aid system, traversing the North–South divide, despite the fact that China has already joined the ranks of world economic powers.     

Evolution,retreat or rejection: Brazil’s,India’s and China’s normative stances on R2P

This paper outlines the development and evolution of the normative positions of China, Brazil and India on issues surrounding the responsibility to protect (R2P) by charting their engagement in the ‘institutionalized conversation’ within the United Nations. In doing so, it seeks to dispel characterizations of these states as having adopted individual or common positions that either wholly reject or accept R2P. The nuances of the adaption and adoption of their postures need to be appreciated. Indeed, of the three component ‘pillars’ of R2P, they find themselves in general accord regarding Pillar One (state responsibility) and Pillar Two (prevention and assistance). It is on Pillar Three (reaction and response) that they diverge from each other and find themselves most at variance with ‘Western’ agendas of intervention and regime change. This divergence is most sharply drawn at present, in light of the Libyan and ongoing Syrian experiences.     

The breakdown of the EU’s strategic partnership with Russia: from strategic patience towards a strategic failure

This article investigates the evolution of the European Union (EU)–Russia relationship to understand whether Russia’s violations of Ukraine’s territorial integrity in 2014 destroyed the EU–Russia strategic partnership. It uncovers fundamental differences in three key sectors—security, trade and energy—and regarding the broader design of their contractual relationship. Despite the appearance to the contrary, their relationship was never a well-functioning ‘partnership of choice’. Structural asymmetries contradictory approaches to and fundamentally different understandings of the role and utility of their relationship affected the EU–Russia relationship from the very beginning. The widening gaps were not addressed nor were the differences of the two actors acknowledged, let alone overcome. The confrontation over Ukraine was therefore not the cause but rather a symptom of deeply rooted problems. The blame for talking past each other and engaging in a marriage of convenience, rather than a real partnership, falls on both the EU and the Russian leadership.     

India’s public opinion and foreign policy: a view from New Delhi

ABSTRACT

Incoherent, or even nonexistent, is the common criticism leveled at India’s public opinion. Given this criticism, scholars of Indian foreign policy often do not consider public attitudes in their research. Contrary to this, I trace the evolution of India’s public opinion and foreign policy connections since the early 1990s to demonstrate that the Indian public has opinions on foreign policy and that those opinions have limited but growing impact on the country’s foreign policy.     

Guest Editor’s Introduction: India’s Economy: Growth,Governance, and Reform

This introduction provides the context for, summarizes, and connects the articles in the special issue.     

Central Asia’s pipeline politics and India’s energy quest

Asia Europe Journal - Although Central Asia emerged out of the ashes of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, yet the ‘Five Stans’ (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan...     

China–Australia strategic partnership in the context of China’s grand peripheral diplomacy

Alongside its rise, China has intensified its relations with countries on its periphery by adopting a “dual-core” strategy in order to create a “Community of Common Destiny”. In this context, China has upgraded its relationship with Australia from “commercial” to “strategic” levels. China’s “dual-core” strategy and the China–Australia strategic partnership reveal not only China’s desire for intensifying its economic interdependence with countries on its periphery, Australia included, but also China’s strategic intention of creating its own sphere of influence in the form of a “Community of Common Destiny”. China wishes to sustain its economic and social progress by restoring the past glory of “Fuqiang” (wealth and power) as it enhances both its “hard” and “soft” power. The intensified economic interdependence may persuade countries on its periphery to avoid being involved in any attempt by China’s competitors to contain its rise.     

The EU–India strategic partnership: neither very strategic,nor much of a partnership

While formally labelled as ‘strategic’, the European Union (EU)–India partnership is more often than not described as ‘lukewarm’ and ‘reluctant’. Thus, by process-tracing the EU–India relationship, this article reveals the significance of 1999 as a crucial point that has urged both Brussels and New Delhi to significantly alter both their outlook on global life and on each other. The bilateral relationship will be shown to be a story of two actors aspiring to global prominence, who—to their mutual frustration—find themselves consigned and constrained to play a leading role only in their respective neighbourhoods. The bilateral relationship seems only to reinforce this marginalization in global affairs, as neither of the strategic partners considers the other significant enough to develop meaningful relations with them.     

Arctic Issues and China’s Stance

The Arctic has abundant resources and important values in scientific research, transportation and military affairs. On Arctic affairs, the Arctic countries are cooperative and competitive to each other while taking acceptable as well as cautious attitudes to non-Arctic countries’ participation. China wishes to strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation on Arctic-related issues with various parties.     

China’s Employment Situation and Policy

Employment constitutes the basis of people’s living and the means to ensure the stability of a country as well. Realizing relatively full employment is the important prerequisite and basic way to improve people's life. Being the most populous country in the world, China has abundant labor resources and faces an arduous and urgent task to tackle the employment problem. Therefore, providing more employment is a major issue directly bearing on people's living that China will have to face for a long time.