The political strategy of external aid

When creating a process of international aid, the definition of a political strategy is critically important. In theory, a government able to deliver services and goods to its population and to guarantee participation in decision-making might not need the presence of international aid. International aid should bridge an existing gap between a government and its own population by adopting a relevant political strategy. This viewpoint proposes a reference framework for international cooperation actors to define their basic political strategy and provides a comprehensive framework for situating different political strategies into a wider approach.     

Victims of Terrorism and Political Violence: Identity,Needs, and Service Delivery in Northern Ireland and Great Britain

Terrorism and political violence exist fundamentally as communicative acts; inherently the acts themselves serve to inspire anxiety and fear. As the recipients of such a communicative act, victims of terrorism and political violence serve as the vehicle for the dissemination of these communications to both the intended and broader audiences. Their victimising experience is thus a complex interplay between a profound personal trauma and the political/communicative dimension of the attack. Given this complexity, this article addresses how victims’ needs are understood by victims of terrorism and political violence in both Northern Ireland (NI) and Great Britain (GB). Through engagement with practitioners, victims, survivors, and community activists, this article conceptualises the existing perceptions amongst these different groups regarding needs, the delivery of services to victims in NI and GB, and examines the origins of the different approaches. Results demonstrate that victims’ needs are highly context-dependent at a public level, but relate heavily to the experiences of other victims of terrorism and political violence at a private level.     

Welfare,Inequality and Financial Effects of a Multi-Pillar Pension Reform: The Case of Peru

This paper studies the potential effects of a multi-pillar pension system on pension inequality, actuarial liability and welfare in Peru, by means of simulations of future distributions of pensions with social security administrative records. The results show that actual pension inequality and actuarial liability can be substantially reduced with welfare preserving policies. The simulations illustrate that when welfare is considered, it is important to define the implied value judgments, which are not universally agreed upon. Therefore, this paper highlights the trade-offs of a pension policy reform and contributes to assess the second generation of pension reforms in Latin America.     

Campaign resources and electoral success: Evidence from the 2002 French parliamentary elections

We examine the factors that improve the candidates’ likelihood of winning an election by drawing on information from campaign resources used by candidates running in the 2002 French parliamentary election. The main effects that we wish to analyze are the candidates’ gender, political affiliation and possible incumbency. We find that the contributions the candidates received and their political affiliations determine their acceding to the second round of the elections. But surprisingly once they make it to the second round, the contributions cease to be relevant; only the candidates’ gender, incumbency and the actual spending rather than the contribution levels matter.     

Understanding the development of fundamentalism

We use economic theory to examine the intensity of fundamentalist sects in which leaders work to enhance their followers’ observance level. We model three stylized situations under which fundamentalist groups function, examining the intensity of observance in each. We find that, under reasonable conditions, rivalry among fundamentalists makes them more extreme.     

Family contexts of pubertal timing

This study examined the influence of pubertal timing upon family interactions in normal and psychiatric adolescent samples. An important feature of our approach is its emphasis upon micro-analysis of family behaviors (individual speeches) and family processes (theoretically specified speech pairings). Rather than assume that global family patterns (e.g., power) shift in response to pubertal changes, we follow how types of speeches and speech sequences are associated with different pubertal timing. Using the previously constructed family coding system, the Constrainig and Enabling Coding System, we found that on-time adolescents and their parents differed from both off-time groups (early or late). These results are discussed in terms of current implications and suggestions for future research.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the SRCD Study Group on Timing of Maturation, October, 1983, at the Education Testing Service, Princeton, NJ. This research was supported by NICHD Grant 1 R01 HD18684-01, and an NIMH Research Scientist Award (Dr. Hauser).Received his Ph.D. from Harvard University. Research interest is adolescent development within the family and impact of chronic illness on adolescent development and family interaction.Received her B.A. from Wellesley College. Research interests are in humor and attractiveness.Received his M.A. from Boston University. Research interests are in methodology and statistics.Received Ed.D. from Harvard University. Research interests are in adolescent development within the family, and family coping with stress.Received M.D. from University of Chicago. Research interests are in psychosocial aspects of diabetes.Received Ed.D. from Harvard University. Research interests are in developmental psychopathology, and moral and ego development.Received Ph.D. from Ohio State University. Research interests are in assessment of ego development and family systems.Received Ph.D. from University of Miami. Research interests are in family studies and adolescent development.     

Lobbying and compromise

The compromise enhancing effect of lobbying on public policy has been established in two typical settings. In the first, lobbies are assumed to act as “principals” and the setters of the policy (the candidates in a Downsian electoral competition or the elected policy maker in a citizen-candidate model of electoral competition) are conceived as “agents”. In the second setting, the proposed policies are solely determined by the lobbies who are assumed to take the dual role of “principals” in one stage of the public-policy game and ‘agents’ in its second stage. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that in the latter setting, the compromising effect of lobbying need not exist. Our reduced-form, two-stage public-policy contest, where two interest groups compete on the approval or rejection of the policy set by a politician, is sufficient to show that the proposed and possibly implemented policy can be more extreme and less efficient than the preferred policies of the interest groups. In such situations then more than the calf (interest groups) wish to suck the cow (politician) desires to suckle thereby threatening the public well being more than the lobbying interest groups. The main result specifies the conditions that give rise to such a situation under both the perfectly and imperfectly discriminating contests.