Crime prevention through environmental design: financial hardship, the dynamics of power, and the prospects of governance

Borrowing from Foucault (Governmentality. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, & P. Miller (Eds.), Governmentality: The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality (pp. 87–104). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) and Foucault and Gordon (Power-knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972–1977. Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1980) and the work of governmentality scholars in general, this paper examines Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) as a strategic form of governance. Using qualitative data gathered from semi-structured interviews with CPTED practitioners and supporters, I argue that the putative availability of expendable capital mediates, although does not necessarily negate, a practitioner’s ability to secure the conduct of conduct through the sharing of CPTED expertise. The importance of shifting power dynamics are examined before evaluating the data vis-à-vis contemporary scholarship in the areas of governmentality and crime and criminal justice research.     

THE SUCCESS of the 1993 BUDGET RECONCILIATION BILL at REDUCING the FEDERAL BUDGET DEFICIT

This article discusses the process by which President Clinton achieved a budgetdeficit reduction package in Congress and the implications of this process. It concludes that future administrations will have more flexibility in debating whether the federal government should increase its scope or reduce taxes.     

The National Schoolmarm: No Child Left Behind and the New Educational Federalism

The 2002 No Child Left Behind (NCLB) law dramatically reshapedthe federal role in K-12 education in the United States. Theimplementation of NCLB has been difficult and contentious, butmuch of the journalistic and scholarly coverage has underestimatedthe source, strength, and stability of the political coalitionthat originally pushed for passage of the law and appears likelyto sustain federal activism in education for the long term.For much of American history, the principle of federalism exerteda powerful restraining influence on the size and character ofthe federal role in education—but that time appears tohave passed. Regardless of whether NCLB ultimately improvesschools or student achievement, the law has created a new educationalfederalism in the United States.     

Traditions of governance: interpreting the changing role of the public sector

The role of the state is changing under the impact of, for example, globalization. The changes have been variously understood as the new public management (NPM), the hollowing–out of the state and the new governance. This special issue of Public Administration explores the changing role of the state in advanced industrial democracies. It focuses on the puzzle of why states respond differently to common trends.
This introductory article has three aims. First, we provide a brief review of the existing literature on public sector reform to show that our approach is distinctive. We argue that the existing literature does not explore the ways in which governmental traditions shape reform. Second, we outline an interpretive approach to the analysis of public sector reform built on the notions of beliefs, traditions, dilemmas and narratives. We provide brief illustrations of these ideas drawn from the individual country articles. Finally, we outline the ground covered by all the chapters but we do not summarize and compare their experiences of reform. That task is reserved for the concluding article.     

Le contrôle politique des organismes autonomes à fonctions régulatrices et quasi-judiciaires

Sommaire. Le contrǒle politique des organismes autonomes à functions régulatrices et quasi-judiciaires est celui qu'exercent le Parlement et le gouvernement sur l'opportunité des mesures qu'adoptent ces organismes et qui doivent ětre appréciées en regard de l'intérět général. L'octroi d'un large pouvoir discrétionnaire en matière d'élaboration et d'application de la politique suivant un processus qualifié par notre droit de quasi-judiciaire soulève des difficultés considerables qui nous obligent à revoir les principes měmes qui régissent les rapports entre ces « tribunaux administratifs » et l'autorité politique parlementaire et gouvernementale. Les techniques de contrǒle utilisées dans la législation relative aux grandes régies fédérales notamment, la cct , le crtc , l’one , sou-lèvent également des difficultés. Ainsi, lorsqu'existe un droit d'appel au gouverneur en conseil ou au ministre, on s'interroge sur la portée de ces recours par rapport aux recours à la Cour fédérale prévus par la Loi sur la Cour fédéraLe ou d'autres lois particulières. De měme lorsque la législation prévoit des moyens de contrǒle à priori, tel le pouvoir d'émettre des directives, on se demande quelles sont les sanctions possibles dans le cas où le tribunal refuse ou néglige d'y donner suite. Ces problèmes sont au coeur des recherches en cours sur certains aspects du développement des principaux tribunaux administratifs ou organismes autonomes à functions régulatrices et quasi-judiciaires. Abstract. Political control of autonomous regulatory and quasi-judicial bodies is the control exercised by Parliament and the government over the actions of these bodies to assess their opportunity in regard to the general interest. The granting of wide discretionary power in the elaboration and application of policies following a procedure qualified in law as quasi-judicial raises considerable difficulties with respect to the very principles which determine the relations between these administrative tribunals and parliamentary and governmental political authority. With respect to the control techniques employed in the legislation relating especially to the major federal commissions such as the ctc , the crtc and the neb , these difficulties are particularly evident. On the one hand, when a right of appeal to the Governor-in-Council or the Minister exists, what is the extent of these remedies in relation to the recourse to the Federal Court granted by the Federal Court Act or other special statutes? When legislation provides for a priori controls such as the power to issue directives, what are the possible sanctions in the event that the tribunal refuses or neglects to follow them? These problems are at the very heart of present research on certain aspects of the development of the major administrative tribunals and autonomous bodies exercising regulatory and quasi-judicial functions.