Economics behind the law: why number of divorce cases grows when families become wealthier?

In this paper we study the effects of increasing family wealth on the number of divorce cases in a society. We assume that, when one party of a married couple seeks for divorce, the physical family wealth is equally divided between the homemaker and the breadwinner according to the Law. Through some simple mathematical analysis we discover that the number of divorce cases will increase when the amounts of family wealth increase. Our theoretical result is well-justified by the observation from the Chinese society after the Reforms.     

The Economics of Bail Setting and Social Welfare

In most jurisdictions, there is a statutory preference for releasing on bail an accused in custody that has not yet been convicted unless the accused is charged with very serious offence like homicide. Nonetheless, the courts are vested with the powers to decide on the quantum of bail or to even refuse bail outright. To induce the defendant to surrender for trial [Lim, B.-T., & Quah, E. (1998). Economics of bail setting. Bulletin of Economic Research, 257–264] demonstrate that the bail quantum should be based on the expected cost of punishment and the probability of re-arrest if the defendant jumps bail. However, there are costs to society if the defendant absconds, which include, inter alia, the cost of re-arresting the defendant. In this paper, we derive the optimal bail quantum on the assumption that the probability of re-arrest and the penalty for absconding are chosen by the courts whose objective function is to minimize the sum of the expected harm to society and the net costs to law enforcement if the defendant jumps bail. The cost and benefit of being released on bail are examined. A model is proposed which may be useful to the court officials in bail setting as an effective means to secure the defendant's attendance at trial as well as to achieve social equity.