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Research has indicated that school factors such as communal school organization and student bonding are predictive of school disorder, with greater communal organization and greater student bonding leading to less delinquency and victimization. Data from a nationally representative sample of 254 public, nonalternative, secondary schools were used to examine structural equation models representing hypothesized relationships among communal school organization, student bonding, and school disorder. The hypothesis that communally organized schools would have less disorder held true for teacher victimization and student delinquency, but not for student victimization. In addition, the hypothesis that the relationship between communal school organization and school disorder would be mediated by student bonding was supported for student delinquency, but not for teacher victimization. 相似文献
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MATTHEW WATSON 《The Political quarterly》2005,76(4):516-528
Boardroom trouble at Deutsche Börse, the company that operates Germany's main stock market, has recently provoked an important debate about competing capitalist models. Werner Seifert, Deutsche Börse's ousted Chief Executive, was eager to portray himself as the innocent victim of aggressive Anglo-American investors who had bought into his company but failed to understand its traditional operating ethos. In this, he was ably supported by key figures within the ruling Social Democratic Party, who, in order to shore up the party's core support, had increasingly come to blame overseas hedge funds for the development of German corporate governance models which prioritised profits over jobs. I review the SPD's structural reading of the Deutsche Börse affair, whilst comparing it to an alternative interest-based reading. The latter allows me to focus more closely on the issue which, more than any other, led to Seifert's downfall: his refusal to bow to the expressed interests of his own shareholders by pressing ahead, against their wishes, with a hostile bid for the London Stock Exchange. Seifert's eventual removal foreclosed the possibility of an integrated London-Frankfurt stock market and, somewhat ironically given the SPD's response to the affair, as a consequence it also prevented the entry of London's highly capitalised institutional investors into the German market for corporate control. The actions of Deutsche Börse's overseas shareholders might still be seen as evidence of a predatory Anglo-American capitalism. However, their successful removal of Werner Seifert may well have been responsible for temporarily keeping other financial predators at bay. 相似文献
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Lobbying is central to the democratic process. Yet, only four political systems have lobbying regulations: the United States, Canada, Germany and the EU (most particularly, the European Parliament). Despite the many works offering individual country analysis of lobbying legislation, a twofold void exists in the literature. Firstly, no study has offered a comparative analysis classifying the laws in these four political systems, which would improve understanding of the different regulatory environments. Secondly, few studies have analysed the views of key agents—politicians, lobbyists and regulators—and how these compare and contrast across regulatory environments.
We firstly utilise an index measuring how strong the regulations are in each of the systems, and develop a classification scheme for the different 'ideal' types of regulatory environment. Secondly, we measure the opinions of political actors, interest groups and regulators in all four systems (through questionnaires and elite interviews) and see what correlations, if any, exist between the different ideal types of system and their opinions. The conclusion highlights our findings, and the lessons that can be used by policy-makers in systems without lobbying legislation. 相似文献
We firstly utilise an index measuring how strong the regulations are in each of the systems, and develop a classification scheme for the different 'ideal' types of regulatory environment. Secondly, we measure the opinions of political actors, interest groups and regulators in all four systems (through questionnaires and elite interviews) and see what correlations, if any, exist between the different ideal types of system and their opinions. The conclusion highlights our findings, and the lessons that can be used by policy-makers in systems without lobbying legislation. 相似文献
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