Identifying Successor Corporations Liable under CERCLA and Pursuing Insurance Coverage for That Liability

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) imposes liability well beyond general corporate successor rules. A company can allocate liability to other Potentially Responsible Parties as more culpable, taking advantage of CERCLA's joint and several liability. Often a source of recovery must be teased from a complex corporate history somehow connected to the site. This article examines the basis for attributing environmental liability to entities within a corporate history, before addressing how even a bankrupt or dissolved target may still have insurance that can be tapped. Similarly, CERCLA's strict liability enables recovery from insurance with some connection to either the target's or the company's corporate history, notwithstanding insurers' non-assignment arguments.     

Daring to Be Heard: Advertorials by Organized Interests on the Op-Ed Page of The New York Times , 1985-1998

Advertorials are a form of outside lobbying that organized interests use to influence policymakers and attentive publics. It is apparent from their popularity that organized interests consider them to be an effective form of political communication. This article analyzes 2,805 organized interest advertorials that appeared on the lower right quadrant of The New York Times op-ed page from 1985 to 1998. Advertorials take two broad forms: (a) image advertorials, which are paid messages by organized interests designed to create a favorable climate of opinion, and (b) advocacy advertorials, which are sponsored messages intended to win support for an interest's viewpoints on controversial issues. Typologies of advertorials (11 categories), organized interests (21 categories), corporate and noncorporate economic interests (29 categories), and policy content (28 categories) are used to document annually and over time who is sponsoring advertorials, what types of advertorials are being used, what interests avail themselves of advertorial campaigns, which issue areas are receiving attention, what images and policy messages are being communicated, which organizations sponsor the most advertorials, and the timing of such political advertising campaigns. We find over time an increasing number of advertorials, an increasing number and diversity of sponsoring interest organizations, an increasing trend toward advocacy advertorials, a continuing but declining sponsorship dominance by corporate interests, a shifting policy issue emphasis that corresponds to events in the political environment, and evidence that organized interests employ a variety of sponsorship strategies.     

Everything Is Relative,Including the “Absoluteness” of the Current,Restrictive Pollution Exclusion

Although insurers like to call the most recent versions of the pollution exclusion “absolute,” insureds should not necessarily agree—just as many courts have not agreed—that the exclusion is “absolute.” Instead, insureds should examine the precise language of the exclusions at issue, which may on their face provide a basis to argue that a potential for coverage exists. Further, whether the release at issue is made up of “pollutants” or constitutes “pollution” can only be judged by the circumstances of each case. Ultimately, an insured stands to gain if it can demonstrate that some aspect of the underlying claim, no matter how small, remains potentially covered under at least one policy. To avoid a duty to defend, an insurer must conclusively establish that all potential for coverage is excluded. Even a sliver of potential coverage is enough to trigger an insured's right to call upon an insurer to defend the entire underlying action, a right that itself could be worth millions of dollars in attorney's fees and investigation costs.     

A longitudinal study of moral and ego development in young adults

The purpose of this study was to investigate the longitudinal changes in moral judgment and ego development in a young adult sample when a concurrent measure of verbal ability was used as a statistical control. Sixty-one late adolescents and young adults, representing three educational groups, were tested in 1977 and 1979 on the Defining Issues Tests, a measure of moral judgment (Rest), the Sentence Completion Test of Ego Development (Loevinger and Wessler) and Terman's Concept Mastery Test, a measure of verbal ability. No group or time differences were found in ego development. A significant increase was found between the 1977 and 1979 moral judgment scores,p<0.05, and between groups at both testing,p<0.001. Sex differences were found,p<0.01, with females scoring higher than males, which were statistically accounted for by verbal ability. These findings suggest that moral development continues into the young adult years and that verbal ability may moderate sex differences in moral judgment.     

Depression,Suicidal Ideation,and Substance Use Among Continuation High School Students

This study examines the structural relationships among depression, suicidal ideation, gateway substance use (including cigarettes, alcohol, and marijuana), and hard substance use (including cocaine, stimulants, and inhalants) in a sample of continuation high school students at high risk for drug abuse. When the model was examined separately by ethnic group (Latino and Caucasian) and gender, significant differences among the factor correlations emerged. Compared to Latinos and females, Caucasians and males, respectively, demonstrated a greater number of significant relationships among the factors. For Latinos and females, only the depression and suicidal ideation factors were significantly correlated with each other, as were the gateway and hard substance use factors. For Caucasians and males, four of the six factors were significantly intercorrelated. One implication is that mood enhancement may be a particularly important reason for hard substance use among Caucasian and male adolescents.     

Promise and peril

The size of the federal budget tells only one part of the tale of government's presence in the market economy. The enormous amounts of non-tax dollars government requires to be spent on regulation – estimated at $647 billion per year – powerfully argue for some sort of regulatory scorekeeping. Regulatory costs are equivalent to over one-third of the level of government spending. A regulatory budget can be an effective tool both for spurring reform and monitoring regulatory activity.At bottom, today's rulemaking process is plagued by the fact that agency bureaucrats are not accountable to voters. And Congress – though responsible for the underlying statutes that usually propel those unanswerable agencies – nevertheless can conveniently blame agencies for regulatory excesses. Indeed, Americans live under a regime of Regulation Without Representation.A regulatory budget could promote greater accountability by limiting the regulatory costs agencies could impose on the private sector. Congress could either specify a limit on compliance costs for each newly enacted law or reauthorization of existing law, or Congress could enact a more ambitious full-scale budget paralleling the fiscal budget, a riskier approach. A comprehensive budget would require Congress to divide to a total budget among agencies. Agencies' responsibility would be to rank hazards serially, from most to least severe, and address them within their budget constraint. In either version of a regulatory budget, any agency desiring to exceed its budget would need to seek congressional approval.Regulatory costs imposed on the private sector by federal agencies can never be precisely measured, and a budget cannot achieve absolute precision. Nonetheless, a regulatory budget is a valuable tool. The real innovation of regulatory budgeting is its potential to impose the consequences of regulatory decisionmaking on agencies rather than on the regulated parties alone. Agencies that today rarely admit a rule provides negligible benefit would be forced to compete for the right to regulate. While agencies would be free to regulate as unwisely as they do now, the consequences could be transfer of the squandered budgetary allocation to a rival agency that saves more lives.Budgeting could fundamentally change incentives. Under a budget, adopting a costly, but marginally beneficial, regulation will suddenly be irrational. Congress would weigh an agency's claimed benefits against alternative means of protecting public health and safety, giving agencies incentives to compete and expose one another's bogus benefits. Budgeting could encourage greater recognition of the fact that some risks are far more remote than those we undertake daily. In the long run, a regulatory budget would force agencies to compete with one another on the most important bottom line of all: that their least-effective rules save more lives per dollar spent (or correct some alleged market imperfection better) than those of other agencies.There are clear benefits to regulatory budgeting, but there are also pitfalls. For instance, under a budget, agencies have incentives to underestimate compliance costs while regulated parties have the opposite incentive. Self-correcting techniques that may force opposing cost calculations to converge are only at the thought- experiment stage. However, limitations on the delegation of regulatory power and enhancing congressional accountability can help.Certain principles and antecedents can help ensure that a regulatory budgeting effort succeeds. Explicitly recognizing that an agency's basic impulse is to overstate the benefits of its activities, a budget would relieve agencies of benefit calculation responsibilities altogether. Agencies would concentrate on properly assessing only the costs of their initiatives. Since an agency must try to maximize benefits within its budget constraint or risk losing its budget allocation, it would be rational for agencies to monitor benefits, but Congress need not require it.Other ways to promote the success of a budget are to: establish an incremental rather than total budget; collect and summarize annual report card data on the numbers of regulations in each agency; establish a regulatory cost freeze; implement a Regulatory Reduction Commission; employ separate budgets for economic and environmental/social regulation; and control indirect costs by limiting the regulatory methods that most often generate them.A regulatory budget is not a magic device alone capable of reducing the current $647 billion regulatory burden. Yet a cautious one deserve consideration. Having good information is an aid in grappling with the regulatory state just as compiling the federal fiscal budget is indispensable to any effort to plan and control government spending.