The politics of family planning in the Maghrib

This article uses a comparative case study approach to relate policy outcomes in terms of family planning to the patterns of political forces observed in the 3 Maghrib states of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. It is suggested that official support for a strong family planning program may be linked to recognition of the problem of low labor absorption and to concrete steps taken to counter the problem. The article discusses different vantage points for approaching the political context of family planning and distinguishes between the use of family planning as an instrument of social policy and as an instrument of economic policy. Ideological reasons for opposition to or support of family planning are then outlined. The colonial experience of the 3 states is differentiated and a chronological account of their family planning programs is provided. The political systems and leadership of the 3 countries are separately discussed in greater detail, after which the influence of elite groups on family planning programs and activities in each country is assessed. Developments in the 3 countries since 1978 are then sketched. The author concludes that the relative importance of policies toward employment and women's status in connection with support for family planning has probably varied over time, with economics playing a greater role in the 1970s. The activities of non-regime political actors were found to be very significant in formulation of population policies in Algeria and Morocco but less so in Tunisia.     

Cost Benefit Study of the New Covent Garden Market

The Hon. Editor has received the following letter commenting on Professor Kirk's and Mr. Sloyan's article on the New Covent Garden Market (Vol. 56 Spring 1978). The author is lecturer in applied economics in the Department of Social and Economic Research, University of Glasgow. Mr. Heald's letter is followed by a reply by Professor Kirk on behalf of Mr. Sloyan and himself.     

Social welfare functions when preferences are convex,strictly monotonic,and continuous

The paper shows that if the class of admissible preference orderings is restricted in a manner appropriate for economic and political models, then Arrow's impossibility theorem for social welfare functions continues to be valid. Specifically if the space of alternatives is R ₊ ⁿ , n ≥ 3, where each dimension represents a different public good and if each person's preferences are restricted to be convex, continuous, and strictly monotonic, then no social welfare function exists that satisfies unanimity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and nondictatorship.