保释制度价值论纲

保释制度既具自身的内在价值,又兼实现诉讼经济、遏止超期羁押等方面的外在价值,但在具体实施过程中也存在一定价值冲突.目前而言,保释可分为“权利保释”与“裁量保释”两种模式.为实现保释制度适用价值的最大化,我国在引入该项制度时,应借鉴各国的已有成果及实践经验,并结合本国的司法实际进行理性选择.     

The impact of governance on education inequality: Evidence from Bangladesh

Bangladesh has made remarkable progress in increasing education access in the last 20 years. However, substantial inequalities in educational attainment remain even though equity in education is a central government objective. The article argues that weaknesses in education sector governance are crucial to understanding these persistent inequalities. At the level of the budget, anti‐poor biases in allocation decisions are shown to be the result of the budget's role in political management and the lack of effective accountability mechanisms. The spearhead of government attempts to address education inequality at the primary level has been the conditional cash transfer programme for poor children. The article shows that the programme has failed to target the poor and suggests that this has been due to the weaknesses and contradictions in the governance of the programme. Strengthening the links between policy and implementation through improvements in the governance of the sector are crucial if inequality is to be addressed and national education goals achieved. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

毛泽东政治动员思想论析

中国共产党在同各种错误倾向的斗争和深刻总结历史经验的过程中,逐步形成和发展了毛泽东思想。毛泽东思想作为规范性政治动员手段在中国政治动员中的运用,譬如农村包围城市、群众路线等等思想已经被革命实践证明了是正确的。本文即是从政治动员的角度,侧重挖掘和研究毛泽东思想中关于群众的政治动员、武装的政治动员和斗争的政治动员三种政治动员思想。     

毛泽东早期的爱国主义研究

毛泽东早期的爱国主义思想萌芽于个人精神价值观 ,包括忧国之心、报国之志、救国之路、建国之图和世界主义环环相扣的五部分 ,基于其上的爱国主义具有向社会主义转变的必然性     

Understanding “corruption” in regulatory agencies: The case of food inspection in Saudi Arabia

Corruption is a relatively neglected topic in studies of regulatory agencies. The label is applied to a wide range of deviations from behavioral standards ultimately derived from Weber's account of the ideals of Prussian bureaucracy. This paper draws on a study of the work of Saudi Food Inspectors to argue that it is unhelpful to reduce a complex phenomenon to simple allegations of malpractice that can be managed by disciplinary sanctions. Our data show that irregular behavior by street‐level agents may be deeply embedded in the expectations that members of a society have of one another. It is less a matter of personal gain than of maintaining one's recognition as a fellow citizen. Such behavior is not easily changed through sanctions directed at individual inspectors. Our study does not exclude the possibility that irregular behavior can be motivated by personal gain, and properly managed by criminal or similar penalties. However, it does propose that research should be more sensitive to the contexts within which irregular behavior occurs rather than treating “corruption” as a uniform and homogenous phenomenon.