Evaluating collaborative institutions by segregation and homophily in policy networks

Many policy systems are experimenting with collaborative institutions to manage complex policy problems in the face of persistent conflict and scientific uncertainty. Policy networks are central to the theory of why collaborative institutions are effective. While many policy systems naturally become segregated, fragmented, or siloed due to homophily, collaborative institutions are hypothesized to create more integrated systems of organizational collaboration. Collaborative institutions may, therefore, be evaluated by the extent to which they reduce the tendency toward homophily and increase the integration of policy networks. This paper evaluates three collaborative institutions in regional land-use planning and specifies a theory of the program from two prominent frameworks: Institutional Collective Action and the Advocacy Coalition Framework. Results show that three forms of homophily are at work, and that in some cases, collaborative institutions successfully reduce the tendency toward network segregation.     

Winter in Xi’an

正The weather in Xi'an is dominated by mercilessly hot summers and bonechilling winters. Their length makes them seem unending and so overpowering that, sandwiched between these two opposing giants, the other seasons feel inconsequential. This distorted climate cycle leaves me simultaneously eager for change, yet caught unaware when that change finally comes. While I will always prefer the languid heat of     

Riding a Train For 38 Hours

Irecently had some free time in between studying and starting a new job, and decided to go traveling. For some reasons the things I usually found charmingly strange about Beijing had just annoyed me during those last days of the semester,     

Cultivating Clients: Reputation,Responsiveness, and Ethnic Indifference in India's Slums

Studies of clientelism overwhelmingly focus on how brokers target voters with top-down benefits during elections. Yet brokers also receive requests from voters for assistance between elections, initiating the processes through which they cultivate clients. Why are brokers responsive to the requests of some voters and not others? We provide the first study of broker preferences when evaluating client appeals. Theories emphasizing brokers as vote monitors anticipate they will prefer co-partisans and coethnics, whose reciprocity they can best verify. Theories emphasizing brokers as vote mobilizers anticipate they will prefer residents who will maximize their reputations for efficacy. We test these expectations through a conjoint experiment with 629 Indian slum leaders, ethnographic fieldwork, and a survey of 2,199 slum residents. We find evidence of reputational considerations shaping broker responsiveness. We find mixed support for monitoring concerns, highlighted by an absence of the strong ethnic favoritism assumed to dominate distributive politics in many developing countries.