Power Dynamics in an Experimental Game

We introduce a new experimental method for studying power. Drawing from multiple theoretical perspectives, we conceptualize power as relational and structural, as well as comprised of different forms through which basic human needs can be met. Thus, the method we introduce examines how, when faced with a particular need, people use multiple forms of power concurrently and within a “field of influence,” namely, the other players in a game. This enabled us to examine how one form of power is transformed into another and how power is transferred from one player to another through interaction, as well as to measure power as behavior, as the exercise of choice, as potential, and as outcomes. Two experiments using egalitarian start conditions and a survivable ecology demonstrated that participants used power to gain more power, creating inequality. Being the target of force made some players unable to “survive” in the local ecology. Theoretical and methodological issues in the study of power are discussed and the application of our game method to the study of power in other fields is considered.     

Christian Nationalism and Political Violence: Victimhood,Racial Identity,Conspiracy, and Support for the Capitol Attacks

Political Behavior - What explains popular support for political violence in the contemporary United States, particularly the anti-institutional mob that attacked the U.S. Capitol in January 2021?...     

An Intertribal Business Court

Few Indian reservations have any semblance of a private sector. Consequently, poverty and unemployment are major problems in much of Indian country. While there are many reasons why private enterprise is scarce in Indian country, one of the foremost reasons is businesses do not trust tribal courts. Businesses' distrust of tribal courts is not unique as outsiders often fear bias in foreign tribunals. Similarly, businesses are often concerned about a court's capacity to adjudicate complex disputes. Federal diversity jurisdiction was developed to allay fear of bias, and many states have developed business courts to address questions about court capacity. Tribes can overcome these issues by creating an intertribal business court (IBC). Tribes will be free to sculpt the IBC as they see fit. However, the IBC's intertribal nature will help reduce fears of bias, and an IBC's focus on business disputes will answer doubts about court capacity. An IBC will also make tribal law more accessible, further increasing confidence in this new tribunal. As businesses gain greater confidence in tribal legal institutions through the IBC, they will be more likely to operate in Indian country. Accordingly, the IBC could help to transform tribal economies.     

Are non‐government policy actors being heard? Assessing New Public Governance in three Canadian provinces

This article is based on select results taken from a survey of NGO and provincial government policy workers. The purpose is to provide an empirically based assessment of how government and non‐government policy workers engage with one another in the policy process. The data suggest that policy co‐construction and co‐production are a significant feature of the process but there is some need for nuance. The data presented here indicate that the extent of policy engagement may not be as broadly inclusive as the proponents of New Governance suggest.     

Puppet Dictator in the Banana Republic? Re-examining Honduran–American Relations in the Era of Tiburcio Carías Andino, 1933–1938

Most scholarship depicts the Honduran president, Tiburcio Carías Andino, as little more than an obedient puppet of the United States and the United Fruit Company, the classic client dictator running the archetypal “banana republic.” Using both Honduran and American sources, this article challenges the validity of Carías’ supposedly unquestioned compliance with American demands, arguing that Carías was an independent actor capable of using, manipulating, and defying the United States in pursuit of his own disparate goals.     

Revolutionary challenges to the anarchical society of states

David Armstrong, Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993), ix + 328 pp. Index. £37.50.     

Why Are There So Many Lawyers in Congress?

Scholars have long sought to explain the overrepresentation of lawyers in Congress. This article draws on a wealth of data to explore the causes and consequences of this representational imbalance. While lawyers enter politics at higher rates, self-selection at best provides a partial explanation. Conditional on running, lawyers win at twice the rate of candidates from other backgrounds. Contrary to prevailing theories in the literature, voters do not reward candidates with backgrounds in law. Rather, lawyers win because of a sizable competitive advantage in early fundraising, owing in large part to their professional networks. This study has important implications for who runs for office, who wins, and the demographic composition of Congress. It also identifies an underexplored mechanism by which the US system of campaign finance sustains deep representational imbalances.