How can PhD research contribute to the global health research agenda?

We suggest that PhD and post-doctoral researchers are a strong, untapped resource with the potential to make a real contribution to global health research (GHR). However, we raise some ethical, institutional, and funding issues that either discourage new researchers from entering the field or diminish their capacity to contribute. We offer a number of recommendations to Canadian academic and non-academic institutions and funders, aiming to generate discussion among them about how to overcome these constraints. We need changes in the way graduate research is organised and funded, to create opportunities to work collaboratively within established low- and middle-income countries (LMIC)/Canadian research partnerships. We urge changes in the way that institutions fund, recognise, value, and support GHR, so that established researchers are encouraged to develop long-term LMIC relationships and mentor new Canadian/LMIC researchers. We ask funders to reconsider additional GHR activities for support, including strategic training initiatives and dissemination of research results. We also encourage the development of alternative institutions that can provide training and mentoring opportunities. GHR faces many challenges. If we address those that reduce our potential to contribute, we can become real partners in GHR, working towards equitable global health and solutions to priority health issues.     

Cognitive psychologists as expert witnesses

The first part of this paper defines a central problem for professional ethics: whether agents in professional roles are to act on their own moral perceptions or rather defer to those with special authority to make decisions within particular institutional settings. Specifically, should the psychologist decide for himself whether and how to testify as an expert witness, or should he allow the judge and lawyer to settle these questions for him? I argue that he must decide for himself and attempt to control the nature of his testimony. Given this preliminary conclusion, the second part of the paper argues on direct moral grounds first for a general presumption in favor of psychologists' testimony on the accuracy of eyewitnesses. Such testimony fits the legal criterion of reasonable doubt, if the psychologists' information is more accurate than that of the average juror and lawyer. Second, it is argued that the expert witness must resist intense adversarial pressures and present his testimony as impartially and objectively as possible.