Explaining economic growth in the Soviet Union, 1950–86

Production function estimates are provided for Soviet industrial production and gross national product for the period 1950–86. A variety of alternative specifications is tested, including Cobb-Douglas, constant elasticity of substitution and variable elasticity of substitution production functions, and an error correction mechanism is used to investigate the long-run properties of the estimated equation. The structural stability of the estimates is also examined. Constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production functions suggest that the rate of total factor productivity growth in the Soviet economy has declined steadily over time, becoming negative sometime in the period between 1970 and 1980. However the extensive statistical tests can doubt on the validity of any production function estimated on Soviet data.     

Bolt from the Blue or Avoidable Failure? Revisiting September 11 and the Origins of Strategic Surprise

Drawing on the strategic surprise, warning-response, and foreign policy literature, this article argues that the September 11 terror attacks should be regarded as a strategic surprise and examines a number of key factors that contributed to vulnerability and inhibited vigilance. Three broad explanatory "cuts" derived from the literature—psychological, bureau-organizational, and agenda-political—are deployed to sift through the rapidly expanding empirical record in an effort to shed light on the processes and contextual factors that left the United States vulnerable to the attacks. The article aims to improve our understanding of generic processes and practices that enhance or detract from vulnerability and vigilance.