The Logic of Public Fear in Terrorism and Counter-terrorism

This paper attempts to do two things: to provide a summary overview of the ways in which the academic literature has tended to characterize the role of fear and psychological violence in the process of political terrorism and to advocate for counter-terrorism policies that recognize the importance of fear in this process and attempt to reduce this psychological response or, at least, to not exacerbate it. In completing these two tasks, I initially review the literature for discussions of the role of fear in both common definitions and theories of the use of terrorist violence. I then briefly draw upon the empirical findings of public opinion surveys and polls in the UK and US between 2001 and 2010 to illustrate this fear in practice. Finally, the paper concludes with the suggestion that both theories and real world observations point toward the idea that the most efficient form of counter-terrorism policy is one that mitigates levels of public fear.     

The Bermuda Islands blow ‘sweet & sour’ on employers’ liability for Internet libel

The Bermudian Supreme Court (at first instance) recently ruled in Bermuda Restaurants Limited (t/a “Chopsticks”) v. Jonathan Daspin and ConvergEx Global Markets Ltd. (Civil Jurisdiction 2008: No. 134 (to be reported)) on the issue of whether an employer (here, a company) should be held liable for an allegedly libellous email publication by its employee, the managing director. The Judge was asked by the employer company to determine two issues of law which exposed the company and which centred on its vicarious liability for its employee's actions, including whether the use of the company's email system, during working hours, made it complicit in the publication. The Court held, applying principles of English and Canadian law, that the company was not vicariously liable and by extension that it was not the email's publisher.     

Beyond opportunism: Intermediary loyalty in regulation and governance

Regulators and other governors rely on intermediaries to set and implement policies and to regulate targets. Existing literatures focus heavily on intermediaries of a single type – Opportunists, motivated solely by self-interest. But intermediaries can also be motivated by different types of loyalty: to leaders (Vassals), to policies (Zealots), or to institutions (Mandarins). While all three types of loyalists are resistant to the traditional problems of opportunism (slacking and capture), each brings pathologies of its own. We explain the behavioral logic of each type of loyalty and analyze the risks and rewards of different intermediary loyalties – both for governors and for the public interest. We illustrate our claims with examples drawn from many different realms of regulation and governance.     

Scripted Messengers: How Party Discipline and Branding Turn Election Candidates and Legislators into Brand Ambassadors

Political parties with strict party discipline are well-placed to demand that their election candidates and legislators promote the party brand. The franchise-franchisee relationship causes representatives to relinquish individual expression in exchange for centralized party messaging. This article looks at how a strategic desire for party unity combines with internal brand management to turn lower-ranking politicians in a parliamentary system into party brand ambassadors. Our Canadian case study draws on in-depth interviews with party leaders, Members of Parliament, political staff, candidates for office and prospective candidates. The implications for representative democracy in a Westminster system are considered, including the representational constraints for racial and sexual minorities.