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We argue that partisan elected judges have an incentive to redistributewealth from out-of-state defendants (nonvoters) to in-stateplaintiffs (voters). We first test the hypothesis by using cross-statedata. We find a significant partisan effect after controllingfor differences in injuries, state incomes, poverty levels,selection effects, and other factors. One difference that appearsdifficult to control for is that each state has its own tortlaw. In cases involving citizens of different states, federaljudges decide disputes by using state law. Using these diversity-of-citizenshipcases, we conclude that differences in awards are caused bydifferences in electoral systems, not by differences in statelaw. 相似文献
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The anti-corruption norm in both scholarship and the policy world has too narrowly focused on the domestic and institutional context of bribe-taking and public corruption. Instead, we argue that corruption in the contemporary global economy requires a multiple set of connected transactions, processes, and relationships that take place within informal transnational networks that blur the line between illegal and legal activities. These networks include multinational companies, elites in host countries, offshore financial vehicles and conduits, middlemen and brokers, and destination financial institutions. We examine how these actors operate in Central Asia, a region that is widely identified as corrupt, yet is rarely understood as embedded in the types of global processes, offshore connections and transnational links specified in our analysis. Examples of offshore centers in tax planning from Central Asia, and partial results from a field experiment based on impersonating high corruption risks from four Central Asian states, provide evidence for how the various actors in transnational financial networks structure their dealings. We then present two brief illustrative cases of how these transnational networks have operated in energy explorations services in Kazakhstan and telecommunications contracts in Uzbekistan. Our findings have theoretical, practical, and normative implications for scholars and practitioners of Central Asian international political economy and other ‘high risk' regions. 相似文献
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