Psychological obstacles to administrative responsibility: Lessons of the MOVE disaster

Investigative bodies and other observers have attributed much of the blame for the 1985 MOVE catastrophe in Philadelphia to ineffective management by the city's previously successful mayor, W. Wilson Goode. Goode's behavior toward the disruptive extremist group followed two patterns, both paradoxical: protracted delay followed by excessive haste, and arms-length action that contrasted sharply with his usual hands-on management style. Drawing on the theory of decisionmaking developed by Irving Janis and Leon Mann, this paper suggests that both paradoxes resulted from unresolved decisional conflicts that impeded responsible and rational handling of the problem. The case points to the value of devoting more attention to the psychology of decision-making in educating present and future public managers.     

THE BEHAVIOUR OF LEGISLATORS AND BUREAUCRATS AND POLICING EXPENDITURES: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND SOME EMPIRICAL RESULTS*

Abstract: This paper is concerned with an analysis of legislation, public administration and government expenditure decisions on policing activities. These three dimensions of government can be used as mechanisms of social control. Whether they are or not is an empirical question that has to be determined in each case. It is shown that there are no strict relationships between the three dimensions of government activity: separate decision-making is undertaken for each of the three dimensions. It is indicated that there are eight possible combinations of the three dimensions, assuming that the three dimensions of government activity are bivariate and discrete. The empirical analysis relates to the state of Queensland and it is concluded that Queensland can be described as a case consisting of authoritarian legislation, public administration contrary to the rule of law, and low policing expenditures.     

NGOs and Ethnic Conflict: Lessons from the Work of the Project on Ethnic Relations in the Balkans

This article examines the impact of nongovernmental organization-sponsored contact and communication on fostering peaceful solutions to ethnic conflict via case studies of the activities of the Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) in Romania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Serbia. It explores five operational principles that guide PER activity: creating credible, neutral forums for dialogue; maintaining momentum; working within political realities; encouraging indigenous solutions from within existing processes; and acting with the backing of powerful states. These principles explain PER's success as a "weak mediator" of ethnic conflicts. According to this analysis, PER also exhibits organizational characteristics that contribute to success, including nonpartisanship, area expertise and extensive networks of local contacts, and an ability to secure the trust of local actors.
A significant indicator of the success of PER activities is the establishment by conflicting parties of institutionalized mechanisms for addressing their differences. Contrary to the view that electoral competition contributes to conflict, this study finds that the possibility of achieving an electoral advantage by participating cooperatively in conflict resolution activities creates incentives for local actors to recognize opportunities offered by PER activities and leads local actors to heed PER's advice. Finally, the article offers a cautionary observation. While PER's perceived influence with major international actors may contribute to its local successes, once a state actor with the power to impose a solution has committed itself to ending a conflict, its preferences outweigh any local interests in determining the outcome and renders the efforts of a "weak mediator" such as PER irrelevant.     

Multi-layered justice and security delivery in post-conflict and fragile states

This paper examines the value of an alternative approach to SSR policy, namely a multi-layered one in post-conflict and fragile state environments. It begins by arguing that there is a state-centric bias in current SSR policy and practice. This contradicts development principles of a ‘people-centred, locally owned’ approach in post-conflict and fragile state contexts. The SSR's state-centric approach rests upon two fallacies: that the post-conflict and fragile state is capable of delivering justice and security; and that it is the main actor in security and justice. The paper goes on to present the outline of a multi-layered strategy. This addresses the issue of who is actually providing justice and security in post-conflict and fragile states. The paper continues by describing the accountability mechanisms that could be pursued by SSR programmes in support of this approach. The conclusion is that the advantage of the multi-layered approach is that it is based not on the state's capacity, but on the quality and efficacy of the services received by the end user, regardless of who delivers that service.