Recovery of Spray Paint Traces from Clothing by Beating

Manual recovery of spray paints from textiles using a microscope, the routine method in many laboratories, is often laborious. Beating the clothing with a plastic rod, the routine method used for recovery of glass traces within the authors’ laboratory, is proposed as an alternative. The efficiency of the method was evaluated by spray tests with fluorescent paint. In these tests, paint particles in the acquired debris samples, as well as those remaining on the textiles, were investigated. The results show that beating is an efficient way to recover and concentrate paint particles. A good efficiency for jeans fabric and rough knitwear is reported. The results appeared to be less satisfactory for smooth woven fabric. Application of the method in casework was effective for graffiti paints as well as for flaked car paint.     

Ink Dating Using Thermal Desorption and Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry: Comparison of Results Obtained in Two Laboratories

An ink dating method based on solvent analysis was recently developed using thermal desorption followed by gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) and is currently implemented in several forensic laboratories. The main aims of this work were to implement this method in a new laboratory to evaluate whether results were comparable at three levels: (i) validation criteria, (ii) aging curves, and (iii) results interpretation. While the results were indeed comparable in terms of validation, the method proved to be very sensitive to maintenances. Moreover, the aging curves were influenced by ink composition, as well as storage conditions (particularly when the samples were not stored in “normal” room conditions). Finally, as current interpretation models showed limitations, an alternative model based on slope calculation was proposed. However, in the future, a probabilistic approach may represent a better solution to deal with ink sample inhomogeneity.     

Explaining Reforms of Parliamentary Minority Rights: A Theoretical Framework with Case Study Application

How can we explain institutional reforms that redistribute institutional power between the parliamentary majority and minority? This paper proposes an informal theoretical model to explain such reforms in European parliaments based on congressional literature and inductive explanations from case studies. The article argues that political parties as the relevant actors pursue institutional reforms based on their substantive goals, their current and expected future government status, transaction and audience costs of reforms, second-order institutions that regulate the relative influence of actors in changing parliamentary rules, and the institutional status quo. Hypotheses derived from this model are tested with a qualitative case study of all standing order reforms in the Austrian parliament from 1945 to 2014. The empirical analysis finds support for various hypotheses and their underlying causal mechanisms. As Austria constitutes a least-likely case, the evidence provides strong support for the theoretical model.     

The distribution of individual cabinet positions in coalition governments: A sequential approach

Multiparty government in parliamentary democracies entails bargaining over the payoffs of government participation, in particular the allocation of cabinet positions. While most of the literature deals with the numerical distribution of cabinet seats among government parties, this article explores the distribution of individual portfolios. It argues that coalition negotiations are sequential choice processes that begin with the allocation of those portfolios most important to the bargaining parties. This induces conditionality in the bargaining process as choices of individual cabinet positions are not independent of each other. Linking this sequential logic with party preferences for individual cabinet positions, the authors of the article study the allocation of individual portfolios for 146 coalition governments in Western and Central Eastern Europe. The results suggest that a sequential logic in the bargaining process results in better predictions than assuming mutual independence in the distribution of individual portfolios.