From Heroes to Whingers: Changing Attitudes to British Migrants, 1947 to 1977

Shifts in attitudes towards British migrants from the late 1940s to the late 1970s chart the development of a non-British Australia. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, British migrants were accorded a special prestige based on a belief that Australia and Britain had fought to defend shared imperial British values. Although British migrants protested at hostel conditions, public sympathy remained on the side of the migrants. The rise of the Whingeing Pom stereotype around 1960 reflects the declining weight of British wartime experience and a strengthening of the idea of an independent non-British Australia. The 1970s saw the ending of British preference, and the debate surrounding British activism in Australian trades unions raised the question of whether British migrants were now merely an ethnic group within a multicultural Australia.     

Reading Downs: New Labour and An Economic Theory of Democracy

In Downs' median voter theorem parties can only increase their vote by changing their policies and moving towards the electoral centre ground. This theorem has been used to sustain a particular and, I will argue, one-sided interpretation of New Labour's actions and political trajectory. There is more to An Economic Theory of Democracy than the median voter theorem. Downs argues that voters and parties operate in conditions of uncertainty and that this gives parties the opportunity to persuade voters to revise their beliefs. Parties can win elections not only by changing their policies but by changing voters' minds. Downs' arguments about persuasion can be used to generate an alternative and very different interpretation of New Labour.     

The use and non-use of policy appraisal tools in public policy making: an analysis of three European countries and the European Union

The increasing complexity of policy problems, coupled with the political desire to base new policies on the foundation of firm evidence, has accelerated the development of policy assessment tools. These range from complex computer models and cost benefit analysis through simple checklists and decision trees. In the last decade, many governments have established formal policy assessment systems to harness these tools in order to facilitate more evidence-based policy making. These tools are potentially widely available, but to what extent are they used by policy makers and what becomes of the evidence that they generate? This paper addresses these questions by studying the empirical patterns of tool use across 37 cases in three European countries and the European Commission. It uses a simple classification of tools into advanced, formal and simple types. It finds that even when tools are embedded in policy assessment systems, their use is differentiated and on the whole very limited, in particular when it comes to more advanced tools. It then explores these patterns from contrasting theoretical perspectives to shed light on why, when and how different policy assessment tools are used in the policy process.     

Bringing home the bacon: an empirical analysis of the extent and effects of pork-barreling in Australian politics

Which electorates receive targeted funding, and does targeted funding swing votes? To answer these questions, I analyze four discretionary programs funded by the Australian federal government during the 2001–2004 election cycle. Controlling for relevant demographic characteristics of the electorate, those electorates held by the governing coalition received a larger share of discretionary funding, and a larger number of program grants. Among government seats, funding does not appear to have been directed towards those that were more marginal. More discretionary funding—particularly on road-building—was associated with a larger swing towards the government in the 2004 election.     

Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1820–1992

Policymakers often trumpet the potential for third parties to stop the killing associated with civil wars, yet third parties as strategic actors also have incentives to encourage longer civil wars. We argue that in order to assess the influence of third parties on civil war duration, it is necessary to consider the interdependent nature of third party interventions as they are distributed across the set of civil war combatants. We also argue that it is important to consider the geopolitical context in which civil wars occur, rather than focusing solely on characteristics internal to these conflicts. To test our hypotheses about the impact of third parties and geopolitical factors on civil war duration, we rely on event history analysis and a sample of 152 civil wars for the period 1820–1992. We find empirical support for the idea that extremely long civil wars correspond to the equitable distribution of third party interventions—stalemates prolong wars. The analysis also indicates that separatist civil wars and ongoing civil wars in states proximate to the civil war state result in civil wars of longer duration. Finally, we find that when third parties raise the stakes of the conflict by engaging in the use of militarized force against the civil war state, the duration of these conflicts is reduced. In general, our analysis underscores the importance of modeling the interdependent and dynamic aspects of third party intervention as well as the world politics of civil wars when forecasting their duration and formulating policy.     

'The disenchantment conference': Frustration and humour at the world disarmament conference, 1932

A parody of the work of the Air Commission of the World Disarmament Conference of 1932-34 reveals the cynicism and boredom, as well as the personality, of the officials in the British delegation. In doing so, it demonstrates something of the futility of trying resolve the question of disarmament when bureaucrats and military experts are given free reign.