What's an Elite to Do? The Threat of Populism from Left,Right and Centre

Anthony Painter's report for Policy Network correctly describes populism as a ‘democratic argument’ which sets up a morally pure ‘people’ against vilified ‘elites’, in binary opposition. This is an argument which is increasingly prominent in political discourse, whether the elites in question are political, financial or technocratic. Painter focuses on the now‐familiar ‘radical right‐wing’ version of populism, as reflected across Europe in the rise of parties such as the UKIP. He omits discussion of other types of populism (of the left and centre), which perhaps represent the future for populist politics.     

Politics by Other Means in South Africa Today

Rick Abel's classic Politics by Other Means (1995) used South Africa to argue for law's ‘potential nobility’, but it did so avoiding a heroic mode characteristic of much anti-apartheid writing. Abel showed how law could, with strenuous exertion, be turned into a defensive shield for the oppressed. As a sword, however, it was ‘two-edged’. It allowed the powerful to frustrate or overturn hard-won symbolic victories. Recently, the heroic mode has returned to South Africa. The Constitutional Court, in particular, is lauded for having combated ‘state capture’ under deposed President Jacob Zuma. A closer examination of this period, however, does much to vindicate Abel's earlier scepticism about law's offensive value. The spectacular deployment of law to fight politicians’ crimes has exposed the judiciary to unexpected political threats. Meanwhile, civil society's efforts to entrust judges with administrative duties shirked by the government has inevitably entailed the sacrifice of some rule of law values.     

Government Redistribution in the Shadow of Legislative Elections: A Study of the Illinois Member Initiative Grants Program

We study an Illinois state government program called “member initiative spending” and examine the extent to which three competing theories can explain the program's allocations among Illinois's 118 House districts. We show that member initiative monies distributed before the 2000 general election were disproportionately allocated to districts that were politically competitive, represented by legislative leaders, or represented by moderate legislators. Our analysis supports theories that claim budgetary decisions made by elected officials are tactical, and it shows that the Illinois decision makers who allocated member initiative funds sought to distribute them in a way that would be most beneficial in the sense of vote buying.     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: INTERESTS, IDEOLOGY, VOTERS, AND THE UK REGULATION OF RAILWAYS ACT 1844

Government regulation of the railways in the United Kingdom dates back to the 1840s. Between 1840 and 1844 three regulatory Acts were passed, and a system of government inspection set up which has remained substantially unaltered to the present day. The principal Act, that of 1844, contained controversial powers of rate-capping, state purchase of railways, and detailed price and quantity regulation. It is still frequently held that the Victorian era marked the triumph of laissez-faire and that W. E. Gladstone, the promoter of the 1844 Act, was one of its leading spokesmen. The article therefore explores why regulation occurred at all and why it took the forms it did. Gladstone's actions are evaluated in relation to the standard hypotheses about the origins of regulation. Hypotheses on the motives of MPS voting for and against regulation are tested using the Aydelotte dataset which contains very full personal and ideological data on the Mps of the Parliament of 1841–7.     

RIVAL EXPLANATIONS OF PUBLIC OWNERSHIP, ITS FAILURE AND PRIVATIZATION

This article contrasts three types of explanation of three events – the initial nationalization of many British industries, mainly in the 1940s, the failure of most nationalized industries to be economically successful by the 1970s and the privatization of most of them in the 1980s and 1990s. Its first section summarizes briefly an ordinary historical account of each event as developed elsewhere at greater length (in Foster 1992). The second section considers Chicagoan and Virginian explanations of the same events; and whether they are consistent with the other historical explanations. It concludes that Chicagoan theories do not explain any of these episodes plausibly, except possible rail nationalization, but in that case it worked in any sense only over an implausibly long period. Virginian type explanations have greater power in explaining both nationalization and its so-called'failure'thereafter. It is more difficult to explain privatization satisfactorily in Virginian terms.