RELIGIOSITY,PEER ASSOCIATIONS,AND ADOLESCENT MARIJUANA USE: A PANEL STUDY OF UNDERLYING CAUSAL STRUCTURES*

This paper examines the relationship between the religious factor and adolescent marijuana use. Using panel data from a sample of 264 high school youth, several three-wave, four-variable models derived from social learning theory and social control theory are estimated. Each model specifies causal links between measures of religious attitude and predispositions (religious commitment and an act-specific religious belief), involvement with marijuana-using friends, and self-reported marijuana use. The results provide evidence that the impact of religion is indirect through its influence on the variable Peer Associations. The findings also show the emergence of a direct effect of the act-specific belief on behavior over time. This effect is interpreted to be more a function of within-group attitude-behavior similarity due to social selection than to socialization to peer group standards. These findings extend rather than refute previous research which fails to control for the effects of peer influences.     

CONSENSUS IN CRIME SERIOUSNESS: EMPIRICAL REALITY OR METHODOLOGICAL ARTIFACT?*

Miethe (1982) has recently argued that the consistent findings of wide-spread consensus in the rankings of the seriousness of crimes may be more a rejection of the methodological approaches used by past researchers than of actual public sentiments. Building on Miethe's insights, this paper examines the extent to which the nature of the techniques employed to analyze data influences seriousness evaluations. The results indicate that consensus is affected by such factors as the rating task given to the subjects, how consensus is measured, and the type of offense under investigation. In turn these methodological considerations caution against using existing research as the bask either for the verification of consensus theories of justice or for the formulation of sanctioning policy.     

Partisan dealignment and committee power in five Westminster parliaments

What explains the power of parliamentary committees? A large literature on the United States Congress sees strong legislative committees as a consequence of legislators’ incentives to cultivate a personal vote. These incentives are typically understood to be determined by formal electoral rules. How legislatures are elected thus shapes how they are organised. This article argues that explanations of legislative organisation should also consider a non-institutional source of personal vote-seeking incentives: voters’ partisanship. Where partisan dealignment is more extensive, legislators have stronger incentives to develop a personal vote. Where committee systems are more powerful, legislators have better opportunities to do so. Partisan dealignment should thus lead to stronger committee systems. This argument is supported by analysis of original data on the postwar evolution of committee systems in five ‘Westminster’ parliaments. Partisan dealignment is associated with larger committee systems, and with larger expansions of committee systems.     

Redistributing Campaign Funds by U.S. House Members: The Spiraling Costs of the Permanent Campaign

In this article, we document and analyze the increase in the redistribution of campaign funds by U.S. House members during the 1990 through 2000 election cycles. By examining the contribution activity of members' leadership PACs and principal campaign committees, we show that House incumbents substantially increased their contributions to other House candidates and to the congressional campaign committees. The amount of money a member redistributes is a function of that member's institutional position: the greater the position's level of responsibility to the party caucus, the more campaign money the member redistributes, particularly as competition for majority control increases. Also, a member's capacity to raise surplus campaign funds, his or her support for the party's policy positions, and the level of competition for partisan control of the institution all affect the amount the member redistributes.     

Budget Deficits in the States: Massachusetts

Massachusetts entered the current recession carrying a structural deficit counterbalanced by a healthy, $2.1 billion stabilization fund, equal to 10 percent of total tax revenue. Like most states, Massachusetts only dimly realized the depth of the current recession in October 2008 when revenue collections began to slip and welfare caseloads began to increase. By May of 2009, a total FY2009 budget gap of $4 billion had been identified, the combined effect of plummeting revenues and increased costs for welfare and medical assistance. The Commonwealth closed the FY2009 budget gap through a combination of budget cuts, stabilization fund transfers, and federal stimulus funds. The Commonwealth faced an even larger $4.8 billion budget gap in FY2010. With the stabilization fund severely depleted, the FY2010 budget gap was closed primarily by budget cuts, federal stimulus money, and a sales and use tax increase. Because of the Commonwealth's reliance on one-time money to close current budget gaps, a significant budget gap of at least $2.8 billion for FY2011 was identified soon after passage of the budget. In this paper we discuss the political and historic context in which the budget gaps occurred, outline the causes of the budget gaps, and evaluate the strategies employed to close them.     

Towards an International Antitrust Authority? Key Factors in the Internationalization of Competition Policy

Negotiated access to markets through the internationalization of business framework rules is of increasing importance. The article examines the political-economic factors that are contributing to, but also setting limits on, the greater internationalization of one such aspect of policy—competition policy. It analyzes whether internationalizing forces are likely to transform existing international arrangements in competition policy matters from those of a loose regime to that of a fully fledged international institutional system. The latter could be represented by recent proposals for an International Antitrust Authority. The four factors examined are: conflicting ideas about competition policy; the exercise of political power by nation states and business; the roles and stances of international agencies; and democratic concerns about the accountability, representativeness, and transparency of competition policy institutions.
The analysis concludes that future forms of institution-building at the international level of competition policy are important. This is so because, if lejt totally as a set of international regimes, competition policy may be arranged to an excessive degree in the interests of business power or in the interests of one or more dominant countries.