Voting when the economy goes bad,everyone is in charge,and no one is to blame: The case of the 2009 German election

The economy was a major issue in Germany’s 2009 election. The global economic crisis did not spare Germany, whose economy is tightly integrated into the global economy. So when the German economy experienced a historical shock, did voters connect their views of the economy with their vote choice? Or did they, as some research has suggested, recognize Germany’s dependence on global markets and cut the government slack, especially when the government consists of the country’s two major parties? Using pre- and post-election panel surveys from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), we investigate the weight that voters gave to the economy, relative to other considerations, when casting their ballot and whether governing parties were disproportionately judged based on the state of the economy.     

Supporting local climate adaptation planning and implementation through local governance and decentralised finance provision

Policies developed at national levels can be unresponsive to local needs. Often they do not provide the rural poor with access to the assets and services they need to allow them to innovate and adapt to the ways that increased climate variability and change exacerbate challenges to basic securities – food, water, energy, and well-being. In development deficit circumstances, common pool resources are important for climate adaptation purposes. In order for climate adaptation actions to deliver resilience, local perspectives and knowledge need to be recognised and given due priority in formal planning systems. Basing formal adaptive development planning on local strategies can support and strengthen measures that people have been tested and know to work. Local climate adaptation through collective action can address current increases in climate variability, future incremental changes, and the need to transform existing systems to deal with qualitative shifts in climate. These types of adaptation can work in cumulative ways. The results of local adaptation collective action that have benefits of low rivalry between users while being highly inclusive can be considered “local public goods”. Evidence is beginning to emerge that when local governance systems facilitate high levels of participation in planning collective action for climate adaptation, and direct access to resources for implementing local plans, “local public goods” can be created and common pool resources better managed.     

The British Mandate and the crisis of Palestinian landlessness, 1929–1936

This article examines landlessness among Palestinians as a facet of colonial policy in Mandate Palestine before the 1936 revolt. The growth of what was sometimes called a ‘landless class’ came into official view after the violence of 1929. Subsequent investigations indicated that landlessness was a significant problem and that it threatened to destabilize the Mandate. The effort to ameliorate the crisis of landlessness, however, clashed with the dominant colonial conception of settler developmentalism, the notion that Jews, not Arabs, were the agents of modern economic development in Palestine. The first part of this examination revisits the contest over the 1930 White Paper, focusing on its relationship to the advent of mass landlessness. The rapid defeat of the new policy via the MacDonald letter left the landlessness problem to fester while simultaneously obscuring it. As the situation in the Arab countryside continued to deteriorate, the onset of the fifth aliya temporarily reinforced erroneous assumptions about the potential to rectify the problem through the yishuv's development. By the time mass landlessness was ‘rediscovered’ and new land controls designed to protect Arab smallholders were on their way to promulgation in 1935–1936, the Palestinian countryside was just months away from determined revolt.     

Driving Legislators' Policy Preferences: Constituent Commutes and Gas Taxes

Understanding differential policy costs across constituencies, and how they link to legislators' policy preferences, can facilitate policy changes that solve pressing problems. We examine the role of policy costs on constituents by studying legislator support for taxing gasoline. Analysis of survey responses from US state legislators, as well as of their voting records, shows that legislators whose constituents would be most affected by an increased gas tax—those whose constituents have longer commutes—are more likely to oppose higher gas taxes. Separately estimating the impact of time spent driving to work versus using public transit shows that the effect of commute times comes from those who have long drives, not from those who ride public transit, highlighting how the policy costs to constituents is a major driver in legislators' considerations. We finish the article by discussing the implications of our findings for combating climate change and for understanding policy feedbacks.     

Varying the intensity of competition in a multiple prize rent seeking experiment

We experimentally test a rent seeking model under five levels of competition. At one extreme, a subject’s probability of winning a prize is equal to her share of the total expenditures. At lower levels of competition, a subject’s probability of winning is affected more by her own expenditures than by the expenditures of others. Predicted expenditure levels are positively associated with higher levels of competition. Consistent with previous rent seeking experiments, we find that subjects spend significantly more than the Nash equilibrium prediction at all levels of competition. However, expenditure patterns generally follow the Nash prediction; expenditures decrease as the level of competition decreases. Our experimental design also includes a lottery choice experiment to control for subjects’ risk preference. We find that subjects who are more risk averse spend significantly less in the contest and this effect is particularly strong for female subjects.     

Increasing Turnout: A Compelling Case?

Recently several thinkers have endorsed compulsion or other measures to increase turnout and revitalise democracy. This article argues that such measures are misguided, because lower turnout (even if unequal across social groups) is not necessarily undemocratic – indeed, it may serve democratic values by, for example, making it more likely that decisions really are made by the relevant constituency, with those most affected getting more say. Encouraging others to vote, or even to turn out, runs the risk of distorting electoral outcomes. If there is no clear democratic case for compulsion, then we should not risk even small limits on individual liberty.     

The Privatisation of Prisoner Transfer Services in Western Australia. What Can we Learn from the Ward Case?

In 2008, Aboriginal elder Mr Ward died of heat stroke while being transported in the back of a prison van operated by private security company GSL (now G4S). This article will address the role accountability mechanisms can play in improving correctional and custodial services and whether existing oversight frameworks can provide a proper supervision and quality control of private security operators. It will focus on the key reports issued by Western Australia's Inspector of Custodial Services, the independent office to oversee the prisoner transfer system. Another central source of information will be an examination of the report and recommendations handed down by the Western Australian Coroner Alastair Hope in June 2009. The Hope Report details the numerous failings of the system which led to the Ward tragedy. Both GSL and the Western Australian state government had breached a duty of care to Mr Ward. Further, it remains highly problematical having a range of oversight bodies if elected government is able to simply ignore the subsequent advice. Parliament must therefore remain a central part of the system of political accountability.     

Tacticians,Stewards, and Professionals: The Politics of Publishing Select Committee Legal Advice

At Westminster, there are increasing pressures on select committees to publish in‐house legal advice. We suggest that examining the process of deciding to publish provides useful insights into the provision, reception, and use of legal advice, and the dynamics of select committees generally. We argue that the autonomy of select committees to decide what use they make of evidence and advice they receive is, in practice, constrained by the intra‐institutional dynamics and practices of select committees. Committee actors – parliamentarians, clerks, and parliamentary lawyers – each have overlapping, sometimes competing, roles. Most of the time, these roles and the responsibilities they encompass coincide, but the prospect of publication reveals clear tensions between the different actors. This is the politics of publication: the tactical approach of politicians is in tension with the stewardship of clerks and the professional norms of parliamentary lawyers. We suggest this tension will only increase in the near future.