The Limits of Theoretical Integration

The integration of theoretical knowledge is often seen as the ultimate goal of research activity in the social sciences. In this article I explore limits in the form and degree to which our knowledge can be integrated, as well as limits in the worth and desirability of some kinds of integration. Most of the analysis depends on drawing two kinds of distinctions in theoretical activity—between theoretical and metatheoretical work and among different types of integration in each kind of work. Using primarily examples from theory and research on justice issues, I articulate three different ways in which work at the theoretical level can be integrated. Each type represents a distinct kind of knowledge development, requires different criteria of evaluation, and involves a varying degree of difficulty to achieve. Nevertheless, each of these types of integration is well worth pursuing. Justice research shows evidence of work involving all three types. Using a somewhat broader range of examples, I also distinguish three different ways in which metatheoretical work might be integrated. Again, each type is quite distinct and should be evaluated in different ways. However, each of these types is significantly more difficult to achieve than any of the types of theoretical integration. Moreover, I suggest that the last metatheoretical type—involving the integration of entire strategies, perspectives or schools of thought—is probably not even a desirable goal. As a consequence of these analyses, I recommend (1) that social scientists in general (and justice researchers in particular) focus most of our attention on one or another of the types of theoretical integration, and (2) that we articulate clearly which type of integration we are pursuing and evaluate our success at the effort using only the appropriate criteria. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Social Justice Conference in Bremen, Germany, 10–12 March 2005.

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Low Power,First Offers,and Reservation Prices: Weak Negotiators are Self-anchored by Their Own Alternatives

Although most scholars recommend making the first offer in negotiations, recent research and practitioners' experience have uncovered a second-mover advantage in certain situations. In the current article, we explore this first- versus second-mover dynamic by investigating the circumstances under which negotiators would make less favorable first offers than they would receive were they to move second, focusing on the effects of negotiation power in the form of alternatives. Additionally, we examine the effects of low power on reservation prices and whether these effects could be mitigated using an anchor-debiasing technique. In Study 1, we manipulated negotiators' power in the form of the best alternative to the negotiated agreement and examined its effect on first offers and reservation prices. Our results showed that low-power negotiators would receive more favorable first offers than they would have made themselves when facing either low- or medium-power counterparts. Also, our results suggest that low-power negotiators had less favorable reservation prices than their medium- and high- power counterparts. In Study 2, we investigated whether this effect would persist in the face of anchor-debiasing techniques. Our results showed that while anchor-debiasing techniques did improve their first offers, low-power negotiators would still benefit from making the counteroffer rather than moving first. Our findings uncover the disadvantageous effects of low power on first-offer magnitude while offering practical advice to negotiators.