Prosecutorial regulation in the Global South: Environmental civil litigation by prosecutors in China compared to Brazil

Brazil's successful prosecutorial civil action against polluters could be a regulatory example for the Global South. This paper analyses whether such regulation could also develop without the major political, institutional, and legal reforms that spurred it in Brazil. To do so, it analyzes China, where similar reforms have so far not occurred, but where prosecutors have recently started to initiate civil litigation against polluters. It finds that prosecutorial civil litigation in China has only a limited regulatory effect or potential. Prosecutors in China are influenced by conflicting incentive structures that reward one‐off lower level test cases with an innovation bonus, while structurally stimulating a focus on general crime fighting. Ironically, as a result of such incentives, the recent legal reform, toward providing standing for prosecutors in public interest litigation, will, in contrast to Brazil, decrease rather than increase the regulatory effect of these cases. These findings have implications for understanding how the interaction between regulatory independence, legal reform, and regime type shapes possibilities for regulatory innovation in the Global South.     

The Dark Sides of Artificial Intelligence: An Integrated AI Governance Framework for Public Administration

ABSTRACT

As government and public administration lag behind the rapid development of AI in their efforts to provide adequate governance, they need respective concepts to keep pace with this dynamic progress. The literature provides few answers to the question of how government and public administration should respond to the great challenges associated with AI and use regulation to prevent harm. This study analyzes AI challenges and former AI regulation approaches. Based on this analysis and regulation theory, an integrated AI governance framework is developed that compiles key aspects of AI governance and provides a guide for the regulatory process of AI and its application. The article concludes with theoretical implications and recommendations for public officers.     

Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960–1999

This article examines contrasting claims made by scholars of oil and politics that oil wealth either tends (1) to undermine regime durability or (2) to enhance it. Using cross-sectional time-series data from 107 developing states between 1960 and 1999, I test the effects of oil wealth on regime failure, political protests, and civil war. I find that oil wealth is robustly associated with increased regime durability, even when controlling for repression, and with lower likelihoods of civil war and antistate protest. I also find that neither the boom nor bust periods exerted any significant effect on regime durability in the states most dependent on exports, even while those states saw more protests during the bust. In short, oil wealth has generally increased the durability of regimes, and repression does not account for this effect. Future research focused on the origins of robust coalitions in oil-rich states is most likely to provide fruitful explanations to this puzzle .     

The Crime of Self‐Solicitation

I hold that we could justifiably criminalize some threats, on account of the fact that issuing them renders one more likely to commit a crime. But I also point out that if we criminalize some threat‐issuing, we will de facto criminalize some warning‐issuing, which is unjust. So we ought not to criminalize any threat‐issuing. Instead, we should criminalize (roughly) rendering oneself more likely to commit a crime. This would allow us to punish all the threat‐issuers we should want to punish. It would also force us to punish some warning‐issuers, but we would not be punishing them for their warning‐issuing.     

Contextual Compliance: Situational and Subjective Cost‐Benefit Decisions about Pesticides by Chinese Farmers

This article analyzes how cost‐benefit calculation influences compliance with pesticide regulation by Chinese farmers. Building on a study including 150 farmers and experts, it studies how operational costs and benefits and deterrence affect compliance. Moreover, it studies what variation in cost‐benefit perceptions there are with different types of rules, farms, and villages. It finds that, in this context, cost‐benefit calculation matters for compliance; with operational costs and benefits being more clearly related to compliant behavior than deterrence. It highlights that perceptions about costs and benefits are situational and vary along the type of legal rule and the type of regulated actor. It also shows that such perceptions are individually subjective, as even with similar rules and similar types of actors, perceptions vary. The paper concludes by stating expectations on how the situational and subjective nature of cost‐benefit calculation can inform regulators seeking to enhance compliance.